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                  Anyone who has conducted research on perception or cognition in infants has likely 
encountered colleagues, science writers, and others who have expressed disbeliefs at his or 
her findings. Evidence for perceptual and cognitive capacities in infants strains the beliefs of 
many people because it conflicts with prevalent conceptions about infants and intuitions 
about cognitive development. …When data conflict with intuition, however, intuition is rarely 
the best guide for advancing understanding. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
          Developmental researches have demonstrated that during their first year of life infants 
learn many things about the physical world and start organizing the experience they have with 
objects, separating them into classes (Mandler, Bauer & McDonough, 1991; Mandler & 
McDonough, 1993, 1998). This process is what is called category formation in infancy. At the 
same time, they learn words in their language which represent these categorical distinctions. 
Importantly, how advances within the domain of lexical acquisition and category 
development might influence one another has been an important topic of debate recently.   
          Following Gopnick and Meltzoff (1986, 1993, 1998), children seem to be particularly 
motivated to acquire words that are relevant to the cognitive problems they are working on at 
the moment.  The attainment of preverbal concepts is also suggested to motivate infants to 
learn words by paying attention to the labels presented together with given stimuli. At the 
same time, studies conducted by Waxman and Markow (1995) suggest that the use of certain 
words may draw infants' attention to different aspects of a given stimulus, providing the 
opportunity to increase conceptual understanding. For example, given objects unique names 
(basic-level labels) are good ways to draw infants' attention to the dissimilarities that objects 
which belong to the same category may share. Concurrently, the use of common names 
(global-level labels) is suggested to draw infants' attention to the similarities among a 
selection of objects (Waxman, 2003). 
           As can be noted, although some recent researches have addressed this issue, the 
number of studies is so far limited.  In addition, the available data mostly comes from children 
at the one-word stage, lacking data from younger infants.  Therefore, the aim of the 
experiments conducted for this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of how 
language and conceptual development might be related. More specifically, how the 
availability of labels at different levels of abstraction (basic-level label, global-level label) 
may influence 7-and-11-month olds' object categorization.   
           To investigate these issues, initially two sets of experiments were conducted:    
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Experiment 1, tested 7-month-olds' performance in a global-level object examination task, 
contrasting animals and vehicles in three conditions: (1) with basic-level labels, (2) with 
global-level labels, and (3) without verbal input. Experiment 2, tested 11-month-olds' 
performance using the same kind of task and the same conditions.  Due to the fact that the 
impact of object labels on categorization tasks was not clear in Experiment 1 and 2, 
Experiment 3 was conducted.  Finally, Experiment 3 tested 11 month-olds'  performance in a 
basic-level task, contrasting cars and trucks in two conditions: (1 ) without verbal input, and 
(2) with global-level labels (i.e. "car", "truck"). The method of assessment used in these 
studies was the "familiarization-preference-for-novelty paradigm" which has been an 
important method of studying object categorization in early ages (see Chapter 4.6).  
          By comparing infants' performance between conditions within each experiment, it was 
expected to learn more about how the kind of verbal input given may influence infants' 
performance in an object examination task at the particular ages. Whether the level of 
abstraction of the task (global-level task, basic-level task) plays any systematic role, was also 
an issue to be investigated.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Course of Language Acquisition 
       One of the most remarkable achievements in early infancy is the acquisition of language. 
In this chapter, I will describe the components of language which children must master to be 
able to communicate effectively with other members of their culture. In addition, some 
prerequisites assumed to be necessary for language acquisition will be discussed. The major 
goal of this chapter is to give the reader an overview over different aspects related to the 
process of learning language during early childhood. 
 
2.1. The components of language: Sound, Meaning, Order, Use 
       According to the Webster's Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary, language “is the words, 
their pronunciation, and the methods of combining them used and understood by a 
community".     
      This definition identifies four central aspects of language:  
• sounds (phonology),  
• words (semantics),  
• methods of combining words (syntax), and  
• the rules which permit language to be used effectively (pragmatism).  
      Thus, mastering these four aspects of language becomes a prerequisite for effective 
communication. Although each aspect refers to a distinct subsystem of cognitive abilities, 
they are connected to each other forming a larger system – language skills. 
 
Phonology 
      The children’s first contact with language is mostly one-sided. Although they may gurgle 
or coo, most of the initial experience is experience as a listener. Among their first tasks, they 
have to learn to identify the sounds that make up their mother language and how they are 
combined to constitute words. That is, the infant must distinguish specific sounds in the 
stream of spoken language and perceive the speech sounds (phonemes) correctly. This 
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includes ignoring the speech variations which do not provide a difference in meaning (e.g., a 
same word uttered by two different persons), and attending to other sounds variations which 
do mark a difference in meaning (e.g., the word "bada" versus "dada", which differ on the 
initial phoneme). The sound units of a given language and the rules for combining them are 
called phonology.  
        Cole & Cole (2001), suggested that the infants’ control of the sound system of their 
native language does not necessarily occur at any specific time (e.g., some infants can master 
it earlier than others) and it can take several years for the infant to master correctly the 
pronunciation of words of their mother tongue. Some infants will find a particular phoneme 
especially difficult to pronounce, even after he/she understands many words that employ that 
sound.  A particular example of this is offered by the above authors: at the age of two and a 
half years, Alexander could not say /l/ sounds at the beginning of words, making it difficult 
for him to pronounce the name of his friend's dog, “Lucky”. Instead, he consistently 
pronounced the name "Yucky". This error did not concern Alexander at all; he always knew 
what other people were talking about when they referred to Lucky, at the same time that 
Lucky did not seem to notice it. When Alexander called him, he came.  
          Recent research conducted by Hohle and Weissenborn (2003), provided evidence that 
7-months-old German-speaking infants do recognize unstressed closed-class lexical elements 
in continuous speech.  
         The stimuli for this experiment were consisted of four different German closed-class 
elements and four different text passages. The set consisted of two prepositions, bis (up to) 
and von (from), and two determiners, das (the) and sein (his). For each element, a six-
sentence text passage was constructed in which the target word appeared once in each 
sentence. A female native speaker recorded the stimuli. She was instructed to read the 
passages in a lively voice. Afterwards, the target words were recorded in isolation 30 times 
each by the same speaker. These recordings were used later in the testing sessions. 
         During the experiment, the child was seated on the mother's lap in a testing booth. On 
the back wall of the testing booth a green lamp was fixed. On each of the side walls a red 
lamp was fixed at the same height as the green lamp. The loudspeakers were invisible to the 
child. A hidden video-camera recorded the behavior of the child during the experiment. A 
modified version of the head turn preference procedure was used. The procedure was the 
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following: Each experimental session consisted of a familiarization phase, followed by a test 
phase. During the familiarization phase, the isolated words were presented to the child, 
whereas at  test, the text passages were presented. Each trial was started by the experimenter 
causing the green lamp (on the back wall) to flash. When the child fixated on this lamp, the 
experimenter caused the green lamp to be extinguished and one of the red lamps on the side 
wall – on the side from which the next acoustic stimuli would be presented – to begin to flash. 
As soon as the child fixated on the blinking lamp, the acoustic stimulus was started by the 
experimenter (the push also started the computer timer measure the child's head turn 
duration). Each child heard two out of the four closed-class elements during the 
familiarization phase. The familiarization phase stopped automatically when for both 
familiarization items a listening time of at least 30 seconds was reached. During the test 
phase, all children heard the text passage for each of the four words. During the experiment, 
the experimenter observed the child on a video monitor e coded the head turn duration on-
line. Mean listening times for every text passage were calculated for each child. Furthermore, 
the mean listening times for the passages containing the familiarized words and for the text 
passages containing no familiarized word, were calculated for each child and statistically 
compared. Twenty-one of the 28 children participating in this study showed longer listening 
times to the passages which contained the familiar words. As suggested by  these results, the 
ability to detect unstressed closed-class elements in continuous speech starts early in infancy. 
  
Semantics 
        A second basic language skill that infants must master is linking a specific combination 
of sounds (i.e. words) to corresponding objects or events in the world. This is known as 
semantics. In the case of words that refer to objects, they must learn that some words refer 
specifically to one object, and others to an entire class of objects.  For example, cookie is an 
arbitrary string of sounds, which English speakers use to refer to a specific class of objects. 
The task of the child is to attach words to conceptual groupings, learning when it is 
appropriated to use them and when it is not (e.g., cookie does not refer to all goods found in 
the bakery). That is, they must learn that some words refer to basic- level classes (e.g., dogs, 
cats), while others refer to a more general class of objects (e.g., animals).  
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         Recent research has shown that infants ability to link words to corresponding objects in 
the world starts early in development (Friederich & Friederici, 2005).  Friederich and 
Friederici have demonstrated that 14-month-olds show different reactions when looking at 
pictures of known objects presented with basic-level words that were either congruous or 
incongruous to the picture. The current study used a cross-modal event-related (ERP) priming 
paradigma, with coloured pictures and slowly spoken basic-level words. The 
electroencephalograms (EEGs) were continuously recorded for further analysis. The 
procedure was the following: The participants were seated in front of an LCD computer 
screen in a sound insulated experimental room. Concurrently with the presentation of each 
picture, a word or word-like was provided. Words were either the correct names of objects 
pictured or names of other objects, either congruous or incongruous to the picture meaning. 
The incongruous words were not semantically related to the pictured objects (i.e. apple-shoe).  
The data analysis of this experiment revealed  difference between infants'  responses of 
congruous and incongruous words.  It shows that 14-month-olds already create lexical 
expectations from the picture content. Thus, lexical priming is already present at this age. 
         Another way to look at semantic understanding of infants and toddlers is to study 
overextension of early nouns. This is a common phenomenon in the process of early word 
acquisition. By the time of the second year of life, children go through a period where many 
of the first learned nouns are overextended. That is, they apply a label to a broader category 
than the term signifies.  One explanation for this phenomenon is that initially the child must 
deal with a limited vocabulary when trying to communicate (Rescorla, 1980). Another 
explanation is that overextensions occur due to the uncertain assignment of the meaning of the 
word (Mandler, 2004). Mandler suggests that when a child uses the word "dog" to name a 
"cow" it might be that for the child the difference between them is not really clear, but this 
does not necessarily have to do with perceptual confusion.  It might also be that the child 
misuses a word when objects share properties like functions, way of moving, kind of 
interactions, etc.  The author exemplifies this by saying that we call two different looking 
dogs, i.e. Chihuahuas and St. Bernards by the same name ("dog"), so the fact that two things 
are different in appearance is not always sufficient to say how things will be labelled. 
According to Mandler (2004), production data alone is not sufficient to determine whether 
overextension results from uncertainty about the exact intention of the word, or from the 
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inability to retrieve a known word when needed. Hence, more comprehension data are needed 
to explain this kind of error. 
          It is often difficult to identify the first words uttered by a child. Although parents are 
usually so eager to claim their child's ability to speak that they discover "words" in early 
cooing and babbling, genuine words  usually appear late in the first year of life. Studies have 
demonstrated that although vocabulary comprehension can be seen by the age of 8 months, 
production starts sometime later, around the age of 11 months (Fenson et al., 1994).   
         Further studies have shown that although differences can vary widely among infants, on 
average, they have the ability to use approximately 10 words by the age of 13-to-14 months, 
50 words by the time they are 17-to-18 months old, and from 200 to 300 words by the time of 
their second birthday. However, their receptive vocabulary is considerably larger i.e., when 
infants are able to produce 10 words, they demonstrate to understand over 100 words (Fenson 
et al., 1994). 
         Another aspect to be taken into consideration is the level of abstraction of words used by 
young infants, which tend to refer to objects at the basic level (e.g., chair, table).  Words at the 
basic level refer to objects that usually share maximal perceptual similarities or provide the 
same kind of interactions (see Mervis & Rosch, 1981).  For example, a young child usually 
says "car" rather than "vehicle" which has a more general meaning. Although infants tend to 
stick to the basic level in their first words, studies (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998) have 
demonstrated that infants less than one year of age  have knowledge about higher-level 
categories (e.g., vehicles, animals) as well as basic level categories (e.g., dogs, cats).   
        The children’s initial preference for basic-level words can be related to the fact that 
around the age when the first words are produced they also discover that every object has a 
name, by observing how adults label things. According to Gopnik and Meltzoff (1993), the 
production of names is an active form of categorization, not a passive (i.e. recognizer) one.  
By naming objects at the basic level, children produce different responses to different kinds of 
objects. And this process of differentiation is closely related to their ability to categorize 
objects at the basic level. 
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Syntax 
        Mastering the sound system of language and the meaning of words is not all that a child 
must accomplish. In most languages, the linguist must also notice the order in which words 
are arranged and the rules that govern what kind of words can be combined in which way. 
Another aspect to be grasped by the child is the inflection of words which means a change in 
the form of a word, especially its ending, that changes its functions within sentences (e.g., – 
ed, - est, - ing). This group of rules is called the syntax or grammar of a language. 
        As children begin to combine words and to form complete sentences, they increase the 
complexity of words and grammatical forms they use. With syntax, an infinitive array of 
messages can be generated even by using only a small number of words.  Here is a set of 
examples illustrating this: "The horse kicked the boy", "The boy kicked the horse", "Did the 
horse kick the boy?", "The horse didn't kick the boy", "The boy was kicked by the horse", and 
many more. 
        According to Cole and Cole (2001), it is between the ages of two and six years that 
children begin to use a great number of grammatical devices – the "grammatical rules" or 
"syntax" which will be elaborated more and more in language classes through schooling 
programs. A number of these grammatical constructions are followed intuitively by people in 
their daily speech although most of them cannot say why they use them the way that they do. 
        A demonstration of the usual gap between people's ability to use language and their 
ability to understand the principles that underlie daily speech was brought by Cole and Cole 
with the help of the following examples: 
 
         1. John is easy to please. 
         2. John is willing to please.  
 
 
        In this particular case, both sentences seem to follow the same ordering principle. 
Despite their surface similarity, they differ grammatically. However, clarifying the difference 
becomes possible by adding a single word at the end of each sentence while preserving the 
order of elements. As the new sentences show: 
 
        
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                       9 
        3.  John is willing to please Bill. 
        4.  John is easy to please Bill. 
  
        In this case, sentence 3 is just as acceptable in the English language as sentence 1. 
However, although the order in sentence 4 is unchanged, it is not grammatically acceptable 
and cannot be interpreted. 
        Such examples suggest that acquiring the syntax of a language involves the mastery of 
highly abstract rules which even adult speakers of a language could not explain. Yet, such 
rules appear to be commonly grasped by children learning their native language. 
 
Pragmatics 
        Besides the building blocks of phonology, semantics and syntax, a language learner must 
consider the rules of his/her native language which tell him/her how to communicate 
effectively in different contexts. This is called pragmatics. Pragmatics refers to the ways that 
the members of a community achieve their goals by using language. The way someone speaks 
to his/her parents is not the same way he or she interacts with a little child, for example. 
Taken into consideration the level of formality of the speech, the language used in a formal 
conversation may have little resemblance to what would be heard at a dinner with friends. 
Another example is that the conversational style of day-by-day interactions is quite different 
from the language used when reading a storybook to a child. Hence, knowing the difference 
and when to use which style is the essence of pragmatics.  
         Language is said to be effective when speakers and listeners come to share a common 
interpretation of what is being said. However, a major limitation in the language of a small 
child is that in many cases it leaves a lot of interpretative work for the listener, thus making it 
not fully communicative. It is through the child's increasing knowledge of syntax 
(grammatical rules) and semantics (word meaning) that this problem will be diminish with 
time. 
         Therefore, one important skill to be mastered by the child in order to be understood by 
others is to say things in such a way that the meaning will be clear to the listener. Besides, the 
child must also include in the speech all the necessary information to make it possible to the 
listener to understand the message. 
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          Importantly, studies on language acquisition have demonstrated that this skill develops 
over years. Children as young as two and a half years of age have showed  ability of engaging 
other people in communicate interactions and taking the listener into account by adapting 
messages according to the demand of the situation (Wellman & Lempers, 1977). 
         Clearly, learning a language is a multifaceted skill which involves a series of complex 
developments: from understanding and uttering sounds to appreciating the conventional rules 
of social communication. Despite the complexities, most infants manage it easily with the 
intention of communication. 
 
2.2. What is required for language? 
 
        Taking into account that the ability for full-fledged language is an exclusive human 
skill, a question raised by Siegler and colleagues (2003) is: What does it take to be able to 
learn a language in first place? The authors suggest that some prerequisites are necessary to 
develop the language skill: a human brain and a human environment. 
 
A Human Brain  
         Language is a species-specific behaviour. That is, only humans acquire language in the 
course of development in their environment. In addition, it is species-universal, that means, 
all young humans have the ability to learn language.  It takes highly abnormal environment 
conditions or quite severe cognitive impairment to impede children to acquire language in the 
course of development. Therefore, Siegler and colleagues suggest that a probable prerequisite 
for language development is a human brain (Siegler, Deloache & Eisenberg, 2003).  
         In contrast, although animals can communicate with one another (i.e., birds claim 
territorial rights by birdsong) no other species naturally develop anything approaching the 
human language.   
        Some researchers have had some success in training nonhuman primates to use 
communicative systems (Hayes & Hayes, 1951). These authors raised a chimpanzee in their 
home, with their children. The aim of this field study was to see if the chimp would learn to 
speak. However, although the chimp clearly demonstrated a rudimentary understanding of 
some words and phrases, she produced no recognizable words. Hence, the authors concluded 
that nonhuman primates lack the vocal apparatus to produce speech. Later, researchers 
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attempted to teach sign language to nonhuman primates (Patterson & Linden, 1981). As 
result, the animals showed ability to communicate with their trainers and caretakers by using 
signs. However, although one chimpanzee showed ability to name a number of objects, make 
requests (i.e., "more fruit") and comments (i.e., "Washoe sorry"), the general consensus was 
that these skills did not qualify as language skills because there was little evidence of 
syntactic structure in the chimps utterances. 
       Research with nonhuman primates has shown that even the most basic language 
achievements come only after concentrated effort by humans to teach the animals, whereas 
human children master to learn their native language with little explicit teaching. In fact, only 
the human brain seems to acquire a communicative system with the complexity of language 
naturally. 
       Concerning the "brain-language" relations, a vast number of studies have demonstrated 
that the human brain contains several areas associated with the understanding and production 
of language. Advances in the ability to record electrical activity and blood flow in the brain 
have made it possible to access very specific information on the brain's involvement in 
language.  For example, researches developed by Mills and colleagues revealed that before 
children begin to speak, brain wave activity is distributed across many areas of the brain as 
they listen to words they comprehend. As they begin to speak, brain waves become more 
focused in the left hemisphere (Mills, Coffey-Corina & Neville, 1997).  Furthermore, children 
who was detected left hemisphere damage at 16-to-24-months of age, showed delayed 
language acquisition at the age of four years (Chilosi, Cipriane, Bertucceli, 2001). Such 
studies suggest that some language processing is located in the left hemisphere shortly after 
the first birthday.  
          Previous EEG studies have also offered developmental evidence for left hemisphere 
specialization for language (Molfese & Betz, 1988). These studies revealed that for both: 
adults and children, listening to speech is associated with more electrical activity in the left 
hemisphere of the brain than in the right. In addition, the hemispheric specialization for 
language increases with age. 
        
A Human Environment 
         As mentioned earlier, the existence of a human brain is not enough for language to 
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develop. That is, a human environment is crucial for the development of this exclusive human 
skill (Siegler, Deloache & Eisenberg, 2003).  
         It is worth to mention that different theories on language acquisition see the importance 
of a human environment at different levels. For example, for Chomsky (1975), children will 
set the correct grammar forms of their native language into the pre-existing innate constraints 
by hearing to adults speaking. In contrast, for Vygotsky (1986), language acquisition results 
from social interaction from the outset. Nevertheless, they all take the environment as a 
necessary prerequisite for language learning (see Chapter 3 for a discussion on different 
theories of language acquisition). 
        Most of the time children are exposed to different kinds of verbal input. In any culture, 
some speech is specifically directed towards them i.e., when mothers talk to their young 
children. As children grow older, they get increasingly involved in interactive conversations 
with their peers and adults. As a result, their communicative skills also increase. 
        Studies have showed that mothers have a very special way to direct speech to their young 
children (Snow, 1984). This infant-directed speech style, known as motherese or parentese, 
seems to be crucial on the children's early contact with language (a discussion on infant-
directed speech is found in Chapter 3). For example, in one study, both Chinese and American 
children listened longer to a Chinese woman talking to a baby, than to the same woman 
talking to and adult (Werker, Pegg & Mc Leod, 1994).  Therefore, one can conclude that 
infants are particularly attracted by the speech style adopted by parents and caregivers 
communicating with them. 
         Another research has also demonstrated that the more mothers interact and talk to their 
children, the more words children acquire (Olson, Bayles & Bates, 1986). In this particular 
longitudinal study, interrelations between mother-child interaction and children's developing 
speech progress were assessed. Forty mother-child pairs took part in this study.  Assessment 
of interaction was conducted at 6, 13 and 24 months of age. At 6 months, videotaped episodes 
of face-to-face play in the laboratory were also obtained. Mothers assessed their children 
vocabulary competence at the age of 13- and 24 months, and measures of children's cognitive 
and linguistic competence were obtained by using the Bayley Scales of Infant Development 
and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test.  Analyses revealed that children with large and 
more differentiated vocabularies tended to show superior developmental progress compared 
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to their peers. In addition, vocabulary progress was closely linked to frequent, responsive 
mother-child language interaction, even when family social class and maternal education 
served as control variables.  
        Based on the presented evidences, it seems possible to conclude that infants begin life 
equipped with two basic prerequisites for acquiring language: a human brain and a human 
environment.  Thus, as long as they do not suffer brain damage or grow up in conditions of 
extreme social deprivation, they will naturally acquire their mother language.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 Theories on Language Acquisition 
         Given the importance of the development of language in infancy, a number of theories 
have been formulated in order to explain this process. In this chapter I will describe the main 
ideas of four general approaches on language acquisition: (1) the Nativist View, (2) the 
Interactionist Views, (3) the Theory-Theory View and (4) the Connectionist View.  In 
addition, I will present different theoretical attempts to explain how the process of early word 
learning occurs. 
 
3.1.  Nativist View 
        The nativist view of language acquisition has been strongly dominated by the work of 
the American linguist Noam Chomsky (1975, 1999). 
        Chomsky assumes that all human beings are born with a set of rules to combine words, 
which he refers to "Universal Grammar". The universal grammar is claimed to be the basis 
upon which all language skills are building up.  Although different languages appear to be 
extremely diverse at first sight (i.e. they show a different surface structure), it is suggested 
that they share underlying similarities in grammar (i.e. they show a similar deep structure). 
Therefore, sentences might have the same surface structure but different deep structures. 
Zanden (1978) illustrates this point by using the following example: 
 
        "They are eating apples". 
 
1. (They) [(are eating)(apples)]. 
2. (They) [(are)(eating apples)]. 
 
 
          In the first case, the sentence means that people are eating apples. In the second 
illustration, the sentence means that the apples are for eating rather than cooking. The surface 
structure refers to the sound of the word sequence, while the deep structure refers to the 
intention of the sequence (or the thought behind it). For Chomsky, it is through the 
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application of preverbal and intuitive rules, known as transformational grammar, that 
individuals translate deep structure into surface structure, and vice versa.  Such processes are 
assumed to be biologically built in our organism. 
        Therefore, when children begin to listen to adults around them they will automatically 
recognize the language he/she is dealing with, and, as result, will set the correct grammar 
form. This is known as setting the parameters. Children initially absorb a number of 
sentences, but rather than simply reproducing them, they extract rules from them and create 
their own grammar which they apply to create new sentences never heard before. Over the 
years, when language is already mastered to some extent, children still keep on adjusting until 
parameters is matching that of  their culture's adult spoken language.  
         In this context Chomsky (1975) makes two main arguments: 
 
• Young children are mostly not exposed to correct language forms; when people talk 
they often interrupt themselves, change their minds and so on. Yet children manage to 
learn their language anyway.   
 
• Children do not copy the language they hear, but deduce rules from it.  These 
deductions enable them to produce sentences they have never been exposed to before. 
Thus, what they learn is not a repertoire of sentences but rather a grammar which 
enables them to generate a number of new sentences. 
 
          Accordingly, he suggested that children are born with a language-generating 
mechanism which he called language acquisition devices – LADs. And that means that the 
basic structure of the language is biologically channeled. At birth, the child's LADs are 
presumed to be still. As children grow older and interact with their environment, the 
maturation of the LADs enables them to fit more and more complex language structures into 
the preexisting ones.          
         Following the nativist framework, the growth of language begins early in life and is 
strongly influenced by the surrounding environment.  Studies developed by Mehler et al. 
(1986) offer support to this view. Mehler and colleagues have shown that 4-days-old infants 
are already sensitive to particular characteristics of their mother tongue. The authors tested 
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French babies sensitivity to the difference between French and Russian input from the same 
speaker.  In addition, they found that at birth infants fail to react to differences between 
languages. These data provide evidences that the stimuli received during the 9 months in  the 
mother's womb does not provide sufficiently input for the child to show preferential attention 
to his/her native language at birth.  
        Therefore, language acquisition is assumed to be "something" that happens to the child 
placed in a determined environment in the same way that the body develops according to the 
nutritional condition and environmental stimulation.  The difference between a stimulating 
and an impoverished environment may be essential in language acquisition as it is in physical 
growth. Capacities which are part of human development can flourish or be restricted, 
depending on the environmental conditions which are provided.  
        According to Chomsky (1975, 1999), Language Acquisition Devices work like a genetic 
code for the acquisition of language and is programmed to recognize the universal rules that 
underline any particular language which can be heard.  At birth, the LAD is presumed to be 
still. As a child interacts with the surrounding environment, the maturation of the language 
acquisition device enables the child to gain more and more complex language forms into the 
already existing structures of the LAD. Thus, the basic structure of the language is 
biologically established. During the process of language acquisition, children have basically 
to learn the peculiarities of their native language and not the basic structures. Eventually, this 
process results in the adult's ability to use language.        
        In support of Chomsky's theory of "Universal Grammar", Jusczyk et al. (1989) 
demonstrated that the architecture of the human mind is such that it is sensitive at the outset to 
the structure of any language. Jusczyk and colleagues studied infants raised in an English-
speaking environment and found that at the age of 4 months they were sensitive to cues that 
correlate with clause boundaries of both English and Polish input. However, by the age of 6 
months infants had lost the sensitivity to Polish clause boundaries, but continued to 
demonstrate sensitivity to the clause boundaries in their native language (English).  
        Corresponding data suggests that some general features about the structure of the human 
languages are built into the child's system or will be learned very early on the basis of 
linguistic predispositions.  With development, these early sensitivities guide infants to 
progressively select the appropriate structure of their native language and stabilize it. 
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         As noted by Zanden (1978), Chomsky does not claim that a child is genetically endowed 
with a specific language. Rather, children possess an inborn capacity for generating grammar 
rules of a specific language when being exposed to it. 
         In sum, the nativist view assumes and the structures which make language acquisition 
possible operate on different principles, and are much more determined by the evolutionary 
history of the human kind than by the experience of particular children. Experience 
determines which of the many possible languages a child will acquire. For example, children 
who never are exposed to the Chinese language will not grow up speaking Chinese even 
though they are genetically capable to learn that language. However, the experience of being 
exposed to a particular language does not modify the language acquisition device (LAD); it 
just activates the innate mechanisms designed for the purpose of language acquisition. 
 
3.2. Interactionist Views 
        Differently from the nativist theory on language acquisition (Chomsky, 1975, 1999), 
interactionist approaches link language development either to the development of general 
cognitive processes, or to the social organization of the environment.   
        Those who take the first approach tend to have ideas associated with Piaget's 
constructivism, emphasize the way in which cognitive development "prepares the field" for 
developing language (Piaget, 1971, 1986; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Markman & 
Wachtel, 1988; Markman, 1989).  
        Those who take the second approach (cultural-context perspective), emphasize the way 
in which the environment as well as social interactions influence children's developmental 
achievements (Vygotsky, 1986; Snow, 1984; Flom & Pick, 2003).  
 
The Piagetian Infant 
        Born in Switzerland in 1896, Jean Piaget is one of the most influential experimenters and 
theorists in the field of developmental psychology and the study of human intelligence. 
Piaget's theory is based on the idea that the developing child builds cognitive structures by 
understanding and responding to physical experiences. These mental structures gradually 
increase with development. Hence, what in the beginning are only reflexes (e.g., crying, 
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sucking) later evolve into highly complex mental activities such as the ability to think 
symbolically (Piaget, 1971, 1986).       
         Importantly, Piaget's theory suggests that the child progresses through four different 
stages of mental development:  
• sensorimotor (0 – 2 years),  
• preoperational (2 – 6/7 years),  
• concrete operational (6/7 – 11/12 years) ,  
• and formal operational stage (11/12 upwards).  
        The major transitions are reflected in thought, in which early action-based schemes turn 
into symbolic, logical, and finally abstract mental structures. 
        The classical Piagetian interactionist perspective suggests that conceptual development 
precedes linguistic development.  Therefore, language is a verbal reflection of the child's 
conceptual understanding. Children must develop concepts before they are able to develop 
linguistic forms which represent them (Piaget, 1986).      
        As mentioned by Bukatko and Daehler (2001), Piaget's perspective of development 
suggests that throughout the first two years children increasingly use actions as means to 
obtain their goals. In the beginning, infants' first movements are reflexive, not planned. As 
children pass the sensorimotor stage, their actions become increasingly goal directed. In 
addition, children become able to distinguish themselves from the environment and learn 
about object's properties and how they relate to each other. 
         A remarkable feature which emerges at the end the sensorimotor period (and develops 
further during the preoperational period), is the child's ability to use symbols, i.e., an object or 
word to stand for something. Piaget called this emergent ability -   semiotic function.  He 
considered it to be a powerful cognitive ability, because it allows children to think about past 
and future events, and about objects without their presence. Moreover, Piaget asserted that 
language would not be possible without thought. Children must possess the cognitive ability  
to let one thing stand for another before they become able to use words to represent objects, 
events, and so on (Piaget, 1971). Hence, an important achievement of the children's first years 
of life is their ability to think symbolically.    
          In addition, Piaget argues that at the end of the sensorimotor period children have 
developed a basic understanding of themselves as being part of the world, but still have 
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difficulty in understanding other peoples' point of view. Thus, if language is determined by 
thought, the child's early speech is suggested to be egocentric and fails when other people's 
point of view should be taken into account. An example of this is the child's early use of 
"private speech" (speaking aloud to oneself).  This hypothesis was supported by data collected 
from preschool children's conversations (Piaget, 1986). Thereby, Piaget observed that 
although children seemed to be playing and talking to each other, their remarks were focused 
on what was being done by themselves and about their own concerns; apparently children did 
not care whether anyone else was interested or even listening. Hence, no intention to 
communicate could be detected.  He called this the collective monologue and believed it to be 
a mirror of the children's early egocentric thought.  As children mature, their ability to accept 
other people's point of view increases; thus, their linguistic abilities also increase. As a result, 
the early collective monologue gives place to genuine dialogues.    
          According to Piaget's framework, one of the most important statements about cognitive 
development is that it is the result of the active engagement of the child. For   him, active 
learning promotes deeper and continuing understanding. Therefore, language comes to be a 
verbal reflection of the child's conceptual understanding.  
 
 Vygotsky's developmental perspective on language acquisition 
       Taken into consideration the cultural-context perspective of development, the most 
prominent theory of language and thought was developed by Lev Vygotsky  (1986). Born in 
Russia in 1896, Vygotsky studied literature and cultural history at Moscow University.  He 
graduated in 1917, the same year as the October Soviet Revolution.  
       As Vygostky formulated his ideas during the revolutionary period in Russia  (when great 
emphasis was given to the way in which social organizations channel human potential),  it is 
not surprising that he saw culture and social organization as having an important influence on 
the development of children's mind. These ideas can be seen in his theory of zone of proximal 
development or ZPD. Harris and Butterworth (2002) describe Vygotsky’s ZPD as follows: 
 
                  The "zone of proximal development", or ZPD, may be defined as the  difference         
between what a child can achieve unaided in a particular situation – such as completing 
a puzzle or playing with toys – and what can be achieved with the help of adults, older 
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children, or, even, with children of similar age (p. 188). 
 
         As noted, Vygotsky viewed language as a social tool which is derived from the child's 
social exchange.  For him, speech has the pre-eminent role of carrying culture. Language both 
stores and carries the stock of social experience and can be regarded as a "tool of thought".   
        One of the main differences between Piaget and Vygotsky refers to their views on the 
relationship between language and thought. Vygostky put much more emphasis on the 
formative role of culture for development than did Piaget. While Piaget was mostly concerned 
to explain intelligence on the basis of biological roots (developmental stages), Vygostsky was 
concerned to show how culture influences development. Importantly, Vygotsky did not deny 
the influence of biological processes on development, but rather suggested that social and 
cultural factors make important contributions to the development of intelligence.   
         In contrast to the interpretation given by Piaget, Vygotsky  believed that the child's 
initial utterances or "private speech", serve an interpersonal function, signalizing others about 
their affective state. Hence, it does have communicative intentions. In the pre-school years, 
speech seems to serve a different function. By observing infants making use of private speech, 
Vygotsky noticed that they often use this as a mean to plan and guide their own behaviour 
(Vygotsky, 1986). Like adults, children seem to make use of private speech when they are 
engaged in challenging tasks or find them particularly difficult. In his framework, the use of 
private speech which first seems to guide children’s actions later becomes interiorized into a 
form called inner speech. For example, a social rule that is first uttered by the parents, 
becomes later something that the child says aloud in private speech, eventually becoming an 
internalized concept. 
         To test the hypothesis that private speech (or collective monologue) serves no cognitive 
or communicative purposes (as proposed by Piaget), Vygotsky conducted a series of studies 
based on observations. The corresponding studies were described by Wertsch (1985). In one 
of the studies it was demonstrated that private speech fulfils important cognitive functions: 
When children were facing difficulties to solve a given problem, they raised the level of the 
externalised private speech in order to guide their problem solving.  A second study also 
demonstrated that private speech serves communicative functions: In this study, preschoolers 
were placed among deaf-mute children. If private speech had no communicative function, 
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language production should not be affected by the fact that their playmates could not hear 
their utterances. As a result, it was observed that the rate of private speech decreased in the 
presence of no hearing children. 
           As can be noted, the socio-cultural perspective proposed by Vygotsky assumes that 
children's experience with language is social from the outset. And language takes an 
increasingly important role in regulating behaviour as children develop. Like other 
behaviours, it results from social interactions.  
          Importantly, Vygotsky suggested the existence of a close link between language and 
thought. For him, initially language and other complex mental processes are something that 
only adults have access to. Thus, when adults explain something to a child, they give access 
to intellectual processes based on language. By this, social relationship provides the child’s 
initial contact with intellectual processes which are learned by the child. With further 
development these processes will operate as verbal thought.  
         Vygotsky (1981/1988) called the above described pattern of development as "the 
general, genetic law of cultural development". According to this view, intellectual processes 
move from being external – social – to internal. He described this process as follows: 
    
                        All the basic forms of the adult’s verbal social interactions with the child later become 
mental functions… Any function in the child’s cultural development appears twice, or 
on to planes. First it appears on the social plane and then on the psychological plane. 
First it appears between people, as an interpsychological category and then within the 
child, as an intrapsychological category. This is equally true with regard to voluntary 
attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts and the development of volition 
(p. 73).  
 
          Following this line of thought, linguistic patterns used by adults during interaction with 
children might influence semantic and conceptual structure. Evidence supporting this 
assumption has been offered by Mervis (1987). Based on empirical data, Mervis suggests that 
particular features of adult's use of category names might lead infants to develop new types of 
language and categorization. In addition, the author argues that in many situations children 
choose to attend to or emphasize different attributes offered by adults because of their limited 
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experience or lack of knowledge about appropriate functions and correlated attributes of 
objects.  
         Clearly, the socio-cultural perspective interprets children as social beings, shaped by 
their cultural context. In the "zone of proximal development", older and more skilled 
individuals help children to acquire skills like language and values of their culture. Infants 
take particular advantage of interactions with adults in order to develop their linguistic and 
cognitive abilities. 
         In sum, different interactionist perspectives try to explain how the child's linguistic and 
cognitive system are being formed throughout development. Importantly, as discussed by 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1998), most of the researches investigating relations between language 
and thought have inferred the child's cognitive structures from the linguistic behavior.  Very 
few studies have directly investigated the effect of language on nonlinguistic cognitive 
developments or vice-versa.  
 
3.3. A Theory-Theory View 
       As stated by Mattes (2005), "essential to the existence of both social skills and culture 
itself is the ability to communicate with others through a system of shared understanding. 
Clearly, to thrive in such an environment, it is absolutely essential to have a good 
understanding of other people" (p.2). But how do newborns develop their understanding of 
others? Recent studies have shown that children do not fully develop what is commonly 
agreed upon as a theory of mind until they are about 4 years old (Tomasello, 1999). So what 
happens before that milestone and how do infants conceive of other people during that 
development? With the help of her research colleagues, Alison Gopnik has formulated 
specific ideas about this natural tendency to theorize about the world and has called it the 
"theory theory" (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986; Gopnik, 2003). 
        As stated by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1998),  the central idea of theory-theory "is that the 
processes of cognitive development in children are similar to, indeed perhaps even identical 
with, the processes of cognitive development in scientists" (p.3).  The everyday experiences 
are viewed as "evidence", and theories are developed to interpret that evidence. To put it in 
other words, the basic idea is that children develop their knowledge of the world by using 
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similar cognitive devices that adults use in science. Particularly, children develop abstract and 
coherent systems of entities and rules. That is, they develop theories.  
         According to Gopnik (2003), children actively explore the world, testing predictions of 
the theories and gathering relevant evidence. Eventually, however, when the predictions of the 
theory are falsified, the child begins to search for alternative theories. In this case, if the 
alternative theory does a better job of predicting and explaining evidences it replaces the 
existing one. Importantly, this account has been successfully applied to explain children's 
understanding of the world. 
         Studies conducted by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986) suggest a relation between linguistic 
and cognitive development which is different from either one described by the interactionist 
perspectives (Piaget, 1971; Vygotsky, 1986).  
         According to a "Theory-Theory View", semantic and cognitive developments emerge 
simultaneously; neither one precedes the other. Instead, a bidirectional interaction between 
conceptual and semantic development is suggested (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1998). 
        Following the specificity hypothesis (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986), the attainment of 
preverbal object concepts may motivate children to learn words by drawing attention to the 
verbal input which is presented together with a given object. At the same time, the use of 
particular linguistic patterns may direct children's attention to different aspects of a given 
object, hence providing the opportunity to solve cognitive problems and to increase 
conceptual understanding. For example, evidence provided by Waxman and Markow (1995) 
suggests that novel words might promote category formation by drawing infants attention to 
properties that objects labelled similarly may share (for a detailed description of the 
experiment, see chapter 5). 
         In support for the assumption that language shapes conceptual understanding, recent 
work suggests that infants may take particular advantage from the words they hear, 
connecting them to objects or events that they are standing for. For example, a study 
conducted by Baldwin and Markman (1989) showed that 10-to-14-month olds paid more 
attention to given stimuli when adults presented them accompanied by labeling phrases such 
as: "See the robot! It is a robot!", than when the same stimuli were presented without being 
labeled. In a follow-up study, the authors explored the effectiveness of labeling as compared 
to pointing. This study tested 10-to-14-month olds as well as 15-to-17-months old infants. 
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Two tasks were presented in different contexts: Infants saw pairs of unfamiliar toy-objects 
when either the experimenter was pointing to the target alone, or pointing at the target at the 
same time the labeling phrase was used. As a result, infants of both age-groups looked at the 
target object equally long in both conditions. In a subsequent playing phase without any 
verbal input, infants looked longer at the toy-objects that had been labeled. From these 
findings, one could conclude that both pointing as well as labeling increase infants' attention 
to the target objects. However, labeling seems to have particular effects on infants' subsequent 
interest to objects. This provides a good example for the claim that language shapes our 
thinking, even at the very beginning or word learning.  
         The specificity hypothesis would also allow predictions in the other direction in the 
following sense: The acquisition of certain milestones of cognitive development (such as 
symbolic play) or the development of rather specific competences (such as object 
permanence) can provide the ground for word learning in general or for specific linguistic 
concepts: Imagine a 15-months-old infant who knows that objects sometimes are put into 
groups by adults, either linguistically or physically. Such a child may notice that all objects of 
a particular kind are called "bottle" and may use this word to refer to these objects. As he/she 
pays more attention to the object's names, he/she notices that names are not only applied to 
objects like "bottles" but to a variety of objects. When the mother shows a picture book, for 
example, she names the objects exclaiming "horse" or "elephant" every time they come into 
view. Based on these experiences, the child could conclude that every object has a name to be 
discovered (this is considered a central issue of the naming spurt). The infant might also 
realize that all objects belong somehow to a category and that in general are divided into 
kinds. In dealing with objects, the child might demonstrate it by sorting out behaviors and 
placing objects into different locations. By this behavior, the child would parallel how he/she 
and his/her mum linguistically place different objects into categories.  
         Gopnik and Meltzoff (1998) argue that in all these cases it seems that infants take 
particular advantage from the linguistic signs if they see them as relevant to the problems they 
are trying to solve.  For example, infants who can find hidden objects after they have been 
moved from a particular location to another, begin within weeks to use words such as "gone" 
to indicate disappearance (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986).  
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         As reported above, the theory-theory perspective provides a helpful model to understand 
the relation between language and conceptual organization.  Gopnik and Meltzoff (1998) offer 
an interesting example for the proposed model. The example demonstrates that we can think 
about the child's acquisition of early words as being similar to a physics student hearing about 
a new theoretical possibility from a scientific innovator. So it goes:  Consider the acquisition 
of a particular scientific word; in these circumstances, "entropy". According to the authors, 
developing an understanding of such words and the ability to use them appropriately is one 
sign of theory formation. 
         Considering the acquisition of "entropy" helps us to understand the process of theory 
change in young children: We pay attention to words like "entropy" because they are relevant 
to a given scientific problem we try to solve. Learning words is an important part of learning 
the concepts. Moreover, hearing the same word in different contexts may lead us to see 
similarities which we might not have considered in the absence of those contexts. In a 
classroom situation, for example, hearing the professor saying the word "entropy" when 
discussing two different phenomena, may lead us to link them although apparently they do 
not have anything in common. Besides, this linkage might have implications for other aspects 
of our further understanding of physics.   
          By using the above described example, Gopnik and Meltzoff intended to show that 
humans do not simply have an innate repertoire of concepts and are merely waiting to map the 
correct term onto the pre-existing concept. It is also not the case that we simply match our 
linguistic behavior to a pre-existing one and eventually our cognition is shaped accordingly. 
Rather, both types of developments, learning the words and the related concepts, seem to 
emerge simultaneously facilitating one another.    
         Summarizing data reported above, one can conclude that there seems to be a complex 
interplay between linguistic and cognitive developments. And, rather than being the result of 
some general relation between linguistic and cognitive abilities it seems to involve quite 
specific links between conceptual developments and related semantics development. Thus, 
semantic and conceptual understanding emerges simultaneously, influencing and facilitating 
each other, and they are closely linked from the very beginning of language learning.  
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3.4. Connectionist View 
        Another contemporary approach which emphasizes the role of general learning processes 
for language acquisition refers to connectionist models (Elman et al., 1996). The general idea 
is that language acquisition can be explained through associative learning of neurons which 
can be simulated in computer network models. This is true for all mental processes, including 
language learning. By using connectionist models together with genetic algorithms and 
artificial life models, connectionist researchers have studied evolutionary change at the level 
of neural networks, besides maturation and learning in individual networks and the interaction 
between them. 
       
  Connectionism and the functioning of neural networks 
          According to Elman and colleagues (Elman et al., 1996), for most people knowledge 
comes from two different sources: what is given to us by our nature, and what we know as a 
consequence of nurture. But what do nature and nurture mean in this context? Nature is 
mostly understood as what is present in the genotype, and nurture usually means what is 
learned by experience. The difficulty, however, is that when someone looks at the genome, 
he/she does not see arms or legs, or even complex behaviours. But as he/she learns about the 
basic mechanisms of genetics, it becomes possible to understand that the effects of gene 
products are indirect and often depend on interactions not only with other gene product but 
also with external stimulus. 
          Hence, it seems obvious that for connectionists knowledge comes from the interaction 
between nature and nurture, or what has been called "epigenesis". The genetic constraints 
interact with internal and external stimulus, which together give rise to the phenotype. 
         Based on this general insight, some researchers saw the late advances in developmental 
neuroscience and computation as appropriated tools for understanding neural processing 
(Elman et al., 1996). As noted, the inspiration for connectionism has emerged from advances 
in two fields: genetics, embryology, and developmental neuroscience from one side, and 
computation from the other.   
         To conceptualize connectionism or neural network modelling, Garson (2002) described 
it as a framework in cognitive science which hopes to explain human intellectual abilities 
using artificial neural networks based on the architecture of the brain. Because neurons are the 
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basic information processing units of the brain, and every kind of information processed in 
the brain occurs in networks of interconnected neurons, the connectionist models try to 
explain how computation occurs in neural networks. 
         One can imagine the neural networks as a computer network (see Figure 1). Different 
units are connected to one another, because no group of elements qualifies as a network 
without being connected to other members. It is the existence of connections between the 
units within a computer that identifies them as a network. As units in a connectionist model 
are analogous to neurons, the connections are analogous to synapses. In fact, synapses are 
gaps between neurons through which chemical messengers leave one neuron and enter 
another. Consequently, synapses are where information flows from one neuron to another. 
Hence, connections within a neural network are synapses. Synapses in a connectionist model 
are represented with lines. 
 
                                   
                     
                                                Computer Network 
 
 Figure 1: A sample computer network 
 
          Units are to a connectionist model in a computer what neurons are to a biological neural 
network in an organism – the basic information processing structures. The units of a neural 
network are usually divided in three classes: input units, which are the ones that receive the 
information to be processed, output units where the results of the processing are found, and 
the hidden units, which are responsible for conducing information from the input units to the 
output units (see Figure 2). 
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                        Input Units            Hidden Units           Output Units 
           
Figure 2:  A sample neural network 
 
          Based on Garson (2002), the functioning process of the neural networks goes like this: 
Each input unit receives some activation from external sources (e.g., sensory or motor). Then, 
each input unit sends its activation value to the hidden units to which it is connected. Each of 
these hidden units calculates its own activation value depending on the activation values it 
receives from the input units. This signal (or information) is then passed on to output units or 
to another layer of hidden units. Those hidden units compute their activation values in the 
same way, and send them along to their neighbors. Eventually the signal at the input units 
propagates all the way through the net to determine the activation values at all the output 
units. Output units, then, send signals out of the system. To put it in other words, when our 
organism encounters a familiar input, the input units of our system become active and this 
activation spreads out around the net. Eventually, certain units in a response layer are turned 
on associating the received input to the input obtained in previous occasions. This process is 
also known as parallel-distributed processing (PDP). 
         According to Siegle (1998), a connectionist network’s response to a stimulus generally 
involves the activation of a number of units in the network. This pattern of activations can 
represent an association in memory between two stimuli or a reaction to an external stimulus 
based on the network’s architecture and the designer’s conception of the network. Thus the 
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processes operating within connectionist networks can be assumed to correspond to neuronal, 
cognitive, or behavioral events based on the intuitions of the network’s designer.  
 
The child's sensitivity to language: predicting the next sound 
         As already mentioned in Chapter 2, by four days infants have the ability do discriminate 
the prosody of their native language from that of another languages (Mehler et al. 1986). 
Clear predispositions with respect to the discrimination of different speech sounds have also 
been detected early in infancy (Kuhl, 1991). 
        Based on this evidence, Elman and colleagues (1996) discussed a network (Elman, 1990) 
that discovers word boundaries in a continuous stream of phonemes without built-in 
representational constraints. According to the authors, "the linguistic-relevant representations 
simply emerge from the processing of the input" (p.119).         
        Elman's network attempted to simulate the infants' task of identifying words from a 
sequence of input phonemes. The proposed network was fed one phoneme at a time and was 
expected to predict the next phoneme in the sequence.  
        As described by Elman et al. (1996), the input consisted of a string of words made up of 
a sequence of phonemes (see example below): 
 
        Manyyearsagoaboyandagirllivedbytheseatheyplayedhappily. 
                                    
       The phonemes themselves go together to make up English words and the words make up 
sentences. Attempting to predict the next phoneme in the sequence, the network must exploit 
statistics regularities implicit in the phonotactics of the language. It was not given any further 
information about the structure of the language.  
        Results showed that the error tended to be high at the beginning of a word but decreased 
until the word boundary was reached. Before it was exposed to the first phoneme in the word, 
it was not sure of what would come next. However, the input of the two first phonemes was 
usually enough to enable the network to predict with confidence the following phonemes in 
the word.  
        It is important to report that the network made segmentation errors. For example, the 
string of phonemes "aboy" (see above) was treated as a single unit by the network. According 
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to Elman and colleagues the explanation for this error is quit simple: this prediction is a 
consequence of the distributional characteristics of the article "a" and the noun "boy" in the 
English language – they often go together like phonemes in a word do. Interestingly, current 
literature brings evidence that children also make this kind of mistake (Peters, 1983).  An 
illustration of infant's segmentation errors is offered by Elman et al., (1996). Young infants 
often temporarily say: "the nelephant" having missegmented the indefinite article "an" and the 
noun "elephant".  
       Another error produced by Elman's network was an undershooting segmentation error 
based on orthographic missegmentation. For example, in the sequence "they" the network 
recognizes the sequence "the" as legal, and leaves the "y" unattached to any word. The 
previous example "aboy" was also an example of overshooting segmentation error. 
       The network, however, demonstrated the ability to learn to rectify some of these errors. 
On exposure to further training examples, where the article "a" is combined with a range of 
other nouns, it will eventually learn to separate "aboy" into two different words. In contrast, 
the network will continue to have difficulty to work out whether "the" should be continued 
into "they" once the word "the" is a legal unit itself. To solve this problem, the network would 
require further information. 
       By these examples, Elman's work has shown that as with most connectionist networks, a 
long initial period is essential to learning.  The next section shows that it is also true in 
vocabulary learning. 
  
Vocabulary development 
       A particular aspect investigated by developmental researchers is why there is a period of 
slow vocabulary growth, followed by a dramatic change during which there is a considerable 
increase in the number of words the children can produce (Thal, Bates, Goodman & Jahn-
Samilo, 1997). A connectionist simulation of the intra and inter-domain processes involved in 
concept formation and vocabulary growth has suggested that these kinds of phenomena are 
emergent properties of the dynamic learning (see Plunkett et al., 1992).  The networks' task 
used to investigate this issue was to associate images with labels.  
        Elman and colleagues (1996) describe this connectionist simulation as follows: the 
images used for the simulation task were random dot patterns, grouped in categories that have 
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an internal prototype structure. No prototype pattern had more than two dots in common with 
any other prototype. Hence, the network was not able to categorize purely based on perceptual 
similarity. The network must take into account the label assigned to each pattern in order to 
find the correct conceptual classification.  
        Before being presented to the network, the image patterns were pre-processed in a retina 
in order to compress the representation of the pattern on the image plane, forming a 
distributed representation of the random dot patterns with a corresponding retinal 
representation. Each group of images was associated with a discrete label. It consisted of 32 
bit vectors in which only one bit was active for each label. This means that there was no 
internal categorical structure built into the set of labels and there was an arbitrary relationship 
between the labels and its associated group of images. The task of the network then, was to 
reproduce at the output level the appropriated retinal and label representations that were 
presented at the input level. The network was trained in a "three-phase cycle":  
1) a retinal representation was presented at the input units and activity was spread 
through the network to the output units,   
2) the activity on the retinal output units were then compared to the initial retinal 
representation, 
3) finally, image and label were simultaneously presented and error signals were used to 
adjust weights (the strength or weakness of the connections) on both sides of the 
network.  
         These three-phase learning sequence was successively applied to all image-label pairs 
during training (see Plunkett et al., 1992 for more detailed description of the simulations' 
network). 
         The performance of the network in producing output labels and retinal representations 
were evaluated at various points during training in terms of comprehension and production. 
However, the results described here focus basically on the networks' production performance 
and its relation to the phase of vocabulary spurt seen during children's development. Once 
given a retinal image, production was measured in terms of the network outputting the correct 
corresponding language representation, among other evaluations. 
        The results of the network training revealed several features that are characteristic of 
infants' early conceptual and language development.  For example, the network took longer to 
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discover the appropriated clustering when labels were not included as input in the training. It 
suggests that the network also exploited the predictive power of the label in identifying 
category membership, pointing also to a rich inter-domain interaction between label and 
visual representation. 
        The described results resemble a set of findings obtained by using object examination 
tasks, which reveal that the presence of object labels promotes object categorization in 12-to-
13-month-olds (Waxman & Markow, 1995). 
        Another important observation within the network training was that production scores 
remained low in the initial phase of training, but subsequently increased dramatically. Again, 
as stated earlier, the same kind of behavior can be observed in lexical development (Thal et 
al., 1996). 
         Although many connectionist simulations of children language acquisition are not 
necessarily well known outside the connectionist circle, this research has made enormous 
contributions to our understanding of how particular developmental processes occur. 
               
3.5. Lexical development as one important aspect of language acquisition 
         As will be shown in this section, the general theories of language development outlined 
above have implications for lexical development (i.e. word learning).  
 
Word learning as guided by innate constraints 
         As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the nativist view on language development has 
been strongly influenced by the work of the linguist Noam Chomsky (1975, 1999). 
         For nativists like Chomsky, the language children hear and the feedback they get in their 
early attempts to produce words provide insufficient information for them to induce the rules 
of grammar.  The fact that children produce a range of sentences which they have never heard 
before makes it unlikely that language could be acquired through learning mechanisms such 
as conditioning or by imitation as proposed by Bandura (1977). Most importantly, it is 
believed that the capacity for language comprehension as well as language production are 
innate, and that the principles on which language develops are not the same as those 
responsible for other behaviors.         
         According to Markman (1989), when an adult points to an object and labels it, the 
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meaning of this label is quite arbitrary for a young child. It could be that the novel word refers 
to the object category, part of the object, or even to its substance, color, and so on.  One 
solution children would initially find in order to constrain the number of word meanings, is to 
assume that a novel word refers to the whole object and not to its part, substance or color. But 
it is not all. Once assumed that a word refers to the whole object and not only part of it, a 
child must still decide how to extend it to other objects. There are a number of possibilities for 
this: It could be that the novel word refers to some external relation between objects. Spatial 
and causal relations are examples of common relations between two objects that a word could 
in principle label. More generally, objects can be also related through the way they participate 
in specific events or themes (e.g. dogs play with balls; birds build nests). However, the 
existence of a thematic relation between two or more objects does not necessarily make them 
the same kind of thing.  An interesting question here is: how do children work it out? 
         In an attempt to answer this question, Markman and Hutchinson (1984) proposed that 
children constrain the possible meaning of words by ruling out thematic meanings.  Despite of 
considering thematic relations a good way of organizing objects, children do not consider 
these relations when trying to find what a novel label might mean. It is believed that when 
children learn a new word, they transfer their attention from thematic to taxonomic 
organization. Thus, it is assumed that when hearing a novel label, children take into 
consideration the whole-object and the taxonomic assumptions.  It means that, when infants 
hear a new word in connection with some object they might assume that the word refers to the 
whole object and not to its parts or properties. In addition, children may assume that the new 
word can also be extended to classes of similar objects (taxonomic categories) and not to 
objects that are thematically related.  For example, when the word "cup" is used in 
conjunction with the object that holds their milk, the new word is applied to the whole object 
and not just to the handle. Another example is that infants use the word "dog" not only to refer 
to a particular family of dogs, but tend to extend it to other dogs and not to objects which are 
thematically related to dogs (e.g., a ball). 
         To test these predictions, Markman and Hutchinson (1984) conducted a study which 
compared children's performance on organizing objects when they were not given an object 
label versus the presence of a novel label. 
          In one set of experiments, Markman and Hutchinson investigated whether hearing a 
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novel word would cause 2-and-3-years old children to shift attention from thematic to 
categorical relations. Basic-level categories (e.g., dogs, chairs) were used with this age group 
of children.  These set of studies had two conditions: no word, and word condition. In the no 
word condition, in each test trial the experimenter first placed the target picture against a 
frame in front of the child, and said "Look carefully now! See this?" as he/she pointed to the 
picture. Then the experimenter placed the two choice pictures on the table and said to the 
child "find another one that is the same as this", while he/she continued pointing to the target 
picture. One of the choice pictures was a member of the same basic-level category as the 
target. For example: the target might be a dog (e.g., a poodle) and the choice another dog 
(e.g., German shepherd). The other choice picture was thematic related to the target (e.g., dog 
food). In the novel word condition, the material and procedure was the same. The only 
difference was the presence of an unfamiliar name when the target picture was presented. For 
example, the experimenter said "See this? It is a sud!" And then said: "find another sud that is 
the same as this sud". As a result, children in the no word condition tended to chose the 
thematic related object, i.e., dog and dog food.  In the novel word condition, when the target 
picture (e.g., a dog) was given an unfamiliar label, the children were more likely to select 
categorically, it means, to pick another dog.  
         In the same opportunity, another set of experiments tested the hypothesis that hearing a 
novel word will induce children aged 4-and-5-years old to look for superordinate-level 
taxonomic relations. Each child took part in one of the two conditions.  The material and 
procedure were the same as in previously described study. In one condition (no label 
condition), the children were asked to find a picture which was the same as the target (e.g., 
"See this! Can you find another one?"). The other condition (label condition) took the same 
principle, except that a nonsense syllable was used to label the target picture (e.g., "See this 
Dax! Can you find another Dax?"). In both conditions the children were first presented the 
target picture. After that, they were shown two other pictures and had to pick one of them as 
being the same as the target. One of the pictures was related to the target in a thematic way 
(e.g. milk – cow), and the other picture was a member of the same superordinate category as 
the target (e.g., cow – pig).  
         As a result, when no label was provided, the children tend not to make categorical 
distinctions. When they had to make a choice between another member of the same category 
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and a thematic related object, they often selected the thematically related one. As predicted, 
children who heard the target picture being labeled with an unfamiliar word were much more 
likely to search for taxonomic relations than the ones who heard no labels. Again, the fact of 
hearing a new label caused the children to select objects categorically.   
         Following this line of arguments, the whole-object assumption leads children to treat 
novel words as labels for whole objects and not for parts or objects properties (Markman, 
1991).  Nevertheless, children must also learn words which refer to parts or other properties of 
objects. Based on this framework, in addition to using the whole-object and taxonomic 
assumptions to constrain the number of word meanings, children are also said to expect that 
words are mutually exclusive, it means, each object has only one label. This way, the mutual-
exclusivity assumption helps children to acquire terms other than object names by over-riding 
the whole-object assumption.  
         The advantage of assuming the mutual exclusivity constraint is that children avoid 
forming redundant hypotheses about the meaning of category labels. In this case, as children 
assume that an object can have just one name,  if they already know a label for "dog", they 
will conclude that a novel word they hear while they are looking at a number of animals 
(including dogs) such as "pig", does not apply to dogs. Another advantage of the mutual 
exclusivity is that if a child knows that the word for an object is "cup" then he or she can later 
learn the word "handle" for a part of a cup. In essence, this assumption gives children the 
chance to consider both the situation and context in making an informed decision. Haryu and 
Imai (1999) put it the following way:   
            
              The mutual exclusivity assumption is a very useful constraint for learning  basic- level 
category terms: children can map a novel word on to an object whose label has not yet 
been learned. It can also help children exclude a newly labeled object from the 
extension of an originally overextended old category and establish a new category 
(p.21). 
 
         Studies of children's language comprehension support the hypothesis that young 
children expect terms to be mutually exclusive (Markman, 1989). Researches have 
demonstrated that when hearing a novel word, children assume that it refers to another object 
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rather than to the object for which the label is already known (Golinkoff et al., 1995).  In this 
case, children maintain mutual exclusivity by mapping the new word onto the new object. For 
example, if children already know the word for a specific object and a novel label is applied 
in the presence of the target object, they reject the second label.  Assuming that there is no 
other object present in a given situation, they cannot treat the novel word as a label for a novel 
object. Thus, a new strategy must be elaborated by children in order to adhere to mutual 
exclusivity. It might be, for example, that children come up with no meaning for the second 
label. Or, they might try to  find a property to which the novel label can be applied to. As an 
example, 3-to-5-years old children have demonstrated to use the mutual exclusivity 
assumption to learn part and substance words (Markman & Wachtel, 1988).  In one of the 
studies conducted by the authors, infants were taught a new part term or a new substance term 
by showing them an object and saying, "This is a trachea" or "It is pewter." For unfamiliar 
objects, infants tended to interpret the term as a label for the object itself. For familiar objects, 
they tended to interpret it as a part or substance term. By this study, it was concluded that 
mutual exclusivity motivates children to learn terms for attributes, substances, and parts as 
well as for objects themselves.  
         Following this line of arguments, one can assume that all three postulated word-learning 
constraints contribute to very young infants quickly figure out the meaning of words. The 
whole-object assumption seems to serve as a first hypothesis, which can be later overridden in 
a range of different ways as language develops. 
 
Word learning as the result of associative learning         
         A traditional version of the associative learning theory – the learning that occurs when 
two or more events are paired together – was developed in the 18th century by the philosopher 
John Locke (1964). Locke argued that, if two thoughts occur at the same time, they become 
automatically associated, and one gives support to the other. For example, children learn the 
meaning of rabbit because the word is used when they are observing or thinking about 
rabbits. Thus, the word and the thought become associated and children could be said to have 
learned the meaning of the word. 
         Another traditional version of the associative learning theory was adopted by Skinner 
(1957). He proposed that learning the meaning of a word depends on establishing a 
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connection – through reinforcement and punishment - between a set of stimuli and a verbal 
response.   
         In the last few decades the traditional learning theories play a lesser role in current 
explanations of language development than it did earlier. One contemporary approach that 
emphasizes the role of general-learning process includes connectionist models of language 
acquisition (see Chapter 3.4).  This approach suggests that the process of language acquisition 
as well as the acquisition of some particular aspects of grammar can be explained through 
associative learning of neurons, which can be simulated in computer network models (i.e. 
Plunkett et al., 1992; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) . 
         To remind the reader, the central connectionist principle is that mental phenomena can 
be described by interconnected networks of simple units. That is, each unit is connected to 
every other unit either directly or via connections to intervening units. Basically, a 
connectionist network (c-net) consists of three different layers: an input layer, an output layer, 
and a hidden layer.   Learning in a c-net takes place by altering the strength of the connections 
between units in the different layers. At the start of a study all the connections between the 
different layers are of equal strength. As learning occurs, the strength of connections is altered 
so that some become stronger and others weaker.  
          As stated by Siegler, Deloache and Eisenberg (2003), for the connectionist account 
children do not need innate linguistic knowledge or special language-specific mechanisms to 
learn the many statistical regularities in the speech their hear. Instead, language development 
is claimed to be primarily based on general-learning mechanisms, resulting from the gradual 
strengthening of connections in the neural network. Interestingly, this account is consistent 
with the speech-perception research, which suggests that infants tend to focus on the speech 
sounds that are used in their native language, becoming increasingly sensitive to many of the 
numerous regularities in that language (Jusczyk, Cutler & Redanz, 1993).  
         As discussed earlier, the connectionist approach is based on computer models of neural 
networks that have the capacity to modify themselves as a result of input.  The network is 
provided with a large number of language input similar to what children are exposed to. The 
goal is to see if the network produces output that simulates the speech of real children. 
Importantly, this account has offered valuable contributions to the understanding of how 
children manage to acquire some specific grammatical aspects such as the acquisition of the 
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English past tense (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).  
          The connectionist model designed by Rumelhart and McClelland was developed in 
order to demonstrate how the past tense might be learned without using a rule. For example, it 
has been shown that from input of a large number of English sentences with regular and 
irregular verbs, neural network models can learn to form the past tense correctly. In the 
process, the models are observed to make the same kinds of errors that children make. In 
English, the past tense of a number of verbs is formed by adding "ED" at the end of the verb 
stem as "hunt – hunted", "talk – talked". These verbs are described as regular verbs. However, 
in some cases the past tense can be formed in one of a number of different ways as in "sing – 
sang", "fall – fell", "go – went", and so on. These verbs are known as irregular verbs. 
Rumelhart and McClelland's connectionist network was quite simple. There were 460 input 
units and 460 output units with each input unit connected to every output unit. They presented 
420 different word stems as the input and the task of the network was to learn to produce the 
appropriate past tense for each stem. As a result, the performance of the c-net was similar to 
that shown by children when learning to produce past tense forms. Regular and irregular verbs 
were treated differently, and the c-net produced overregularisation errors just like children do. 
These kinds of errors occur where the "ED" ending is used incorrectly with an irregular verb 
as for example "sing – singed", "go – goed".   As discussed by Elman et al. (1994), the 
network must learn to deal with both regular and irregular verbs in the same way that children 
do. It must learn that the past tense of "go" is "went" while the past tense of "show" is 
"showed".  The model learns through exposure to the different verbs as children learn from 
the input they receive from the environment. Repeated presentations of the stem will 
eventually eliminate the output error, i.e., the network will have learned to produce the correct 
past tense form of the verb given its stem.  
          By simulating the functioning of neural networks, this approach has demonstrated that 
the great deal of information which is latent in the environment can be extracted by the infants 
using simple but powerful learning mechanisms.  
           In disagreement with the explanations offered by the traditional associative learning 
theories, Bloom (1999, 2000) has developed an alternative approach for language acquisition. 
According to his account, children learn words with the help of general associative principles 
and thereby draw extensively on the children's understanding of the thoughts of others. As 
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Bloom (2000) explained it: 
                
                   When children learn that rabbits eat carrots, they are learning something about the 
external world, but when they learn that rabbit refers to rabbits, they are learning an 
arbitrary convention shared by a community of speakers, and implicitly, agreed-upon 
way of communicating. When children learn the meaning of a word, they are – 
whether they know it or not – learning something about the thoughts of other people 
(p. 55). 
 
          Bloom argued that many facts about word learning are consistent with the traditional 
perspective. Importantly, he pointed out that children's first words often refer to things they 
can see and touch. This is exactly what one would expect in the process of associative 
learning.  If you want to teach someone the meaning of cat, the best way to do this is to point 
to a cat, make sure that the person is paying attention to it, and say the word ‘cat’. In case you 
wait until there is no cat around and nobody is thinking about cats, and then say the word cat, 
the word will fail to be learned.  According to Bloom, this line of argument has some 
problems, however. 
          One of the problems has to do with the learning of names for things which cannot be 
seen or touched. It includes, for example, abstract entities such as numbers, ideas, fictional 
characters, and so on.  
         Another problem is that words are not always uttered when the referred object is in 
sight. In fact, concrete objects are also often mentioned without the object being in sight. A 
sentence like, "Do you want some milk?" would typically be uttered when the child is not 
looking at milk but rather looking at the parents’ face. However, it is not very likely that 
children will make errors such as calling faces "milk".  In this case, a solution offered by 
Bloom is that some of the time the word "milk" is used, children are not attending to milk, but 
the percepts  that are most associated with the word are those elicited in the situations where 
"milk" is involved. Children who start associating "milk" with faces, after hearing the word 
uttered many times (in specific contexts i.e., when milk is present)  milk.  
         There is a third problem for the traditional idea that children learn words by having an 
adult naming the objects for them; this behavior might not be universal. It might be typical in 
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our culture, but completely lacking in other cultures. But even in these cultures, children learn 
to speak their native language at roughly the same speed and the same richness as the 
language spoken in "our" culture (Lieven, 1994). However, this is a common problem for all 
theories that take the interaction child-adult   as a crucial factor for language learning.  
        A fourth and last problem pointed out by Bloom, which was originally raised by the 
philosopher Quine (1960), is a situation where a linguist visits somebody who speaks a 
language he does not know, and tries to understand the words in this language. For example: 
A rabbit runs by, the native speaker says "Gavagai", and the linguist notes the word "Rabbit" 
as a possible translation, subjecting the word to testing in further situations. As Quine argues, 
it is impossible for the linguist to be sure that the translation is correct. It can also be true that 
the word "Gavagai" refers to a particular rabbit; or that the word means "animal"; or even 
means the left leg of the rabbit, and so on.  However, Bloom suggests that some of the 
formulated possibilities are quite obviously wrong. For example, we know by intuition that 
‘gavagai’ uttered in this context does not mean the right front leg of a rabbit or a rabbit and 
half of a bush. The question here is: how do we come to this conclusion?  In an attempt to 
offer an explanation for mentioned question, Bloom (2000) states: 
 
          These problems of reference and generalization are solved so easily by children and 
adults that it takes philosophers like Quine and Goodman to even notice that they 
exist. If we see someone point to a rabbit and say “gavagai,” it is entirely natural to 
assume that this is an act of naming and that the word refers to the rabbit and should 
be extended to other rabbits. It would be mad to think that the word refers to 
undetached rabbit parts or rabbits plus the Eiffel Tower. But the naturalness of the 
rabbit hypothesis and the madness of the alternatives is not a logical necessity; it is 
instead the result of how the human mind works (p. 4). 
 
         As mentioned earlier, traditional associative perspectives assume that words are initially 
learned by association of a word (by hearing it) with an object perceived by seeing it.  Bloom 
(1999, 2000) argues for an alternative hypothesis: Words are learned by working out what 
people are making reference to when they are using the words.  Thus, children's word learning 
relies extensively on their understanding of the thought of others – on their theory of mind. To 
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make things clearer concerning Bloom's alternative hypothesis for associative learning, an 
experiment conducted by Baldwin (1991) should be taken into consideration: the aim of the 
study was to examine whether young infants actively contribute to the achievement of joint 
reference. In one experiment 18-months-old infants were first given an object to play with. In 
the mean time, another object was put in a bucket placed in front of the experimenter. While 
the infant was playing with the object, the experimenter would look into the bucket and say a 
novel phrase like "It's a doll!" According to the traditional associative learning perspective, in 
this situation, the child should associate the word uttered by the experimenter with the object 
he/she is looking at. However, this was not what happened. Instead, infants would look at the 
experimenter, and redirect their attention to what she was looking at, that means, to the object 
in the bucket. Furthermore, the infants were shown the two objects at the same time and 
asked: "Find the doll!" Interestingly, infants would then pick the object that the experimenter 
was looking at in the bucket and not the objects they were playing with (and looking at) when 
the word was uttered. These results point to the existence of early sensitivity to the linguistic 
significance of the speakers' non-verbal cues, raising also the possibility that young children 
use particular abilities such as gaze-following to help them work out what adults are intending 
to refer to when words are being used.  
         According to the alternative hypothesis offered by Bloom, to learn what object a word 
refers to, the child must have a way of connecting/associating the object with the word. 
However, this connection does not need necessarily to be direct, but needs to be established 
by an intentional act of naming. Thus, a prerequisite for word learning is that the child can 
recognize and understand the intention of the other person to refer to something. It is not true 
only for objects, but also for actions, ideas, properties, and so on. The next session offers a 
further discussion on the importance of social interactive contexts for language development. 
 
Word learning as the result of social interaction  
        Many researchers of child language support the idea that language is a social activity 
which arises from the desire to communicate with others and results from social interactive 
contexts (e.g., Snow, 1984; Vygotsky, 1986).  
        According to the behaviorist theory, adults shape children’s behavior through 
reinforcement (Skinner, 1957) by rewarding desired responses, which results on a gradual 
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shaping of child’s behavior. Social learning theorists, such as Bandura (1977), also add 
modeling and imitation as tools which are believed to influence socialization. 
         In contrast to the behaviorist theory, the psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1924/1952) 
assumes that children have intrinsic motivations and behavioral dispositions – which Freud 
named drives – that are contrary to those of their parents and society. In this case, parents and 
other adults are responsible for restraining children's natural tendency, and, at the same time, 
impressing behaviors and values which are acceptable by the society.  
        However, socio-cultural theories of socialization have challenged traditional approaches 
(e.g., Vygostky, 1986). Unlike the psychodynamic and behavioral perspectives, the socio-
cultural view highlights the social as well as the cultural forces on individual development – 
including the process of language learning. 
        It is important to note, that although the socialization process is universal, the content of 
socialization may vary substantially across cultures.  Despite these differences, the general 
goal of linguistic socialization is always to promote communicative competence. 
        According to Gleason (1988), language intersects with socialization in three different 
domains: 
 
          1. The first domain consists on the language parents and/or caregivers use  to instruct 
the child about what to do, feel, and think – the child's "marking orders". Here, the social and 
moral rules are the topic, and the language is the medium. A variety of linguistic forms such 
as explanations and anecdotes can be used to convey social and moral rules. 
 
        2. The second domain is explicitly linguistic. Parents and/or caregivers teach the children 
what to say (or not to say) on different occasions. Children are instructed to use particular 
speech forms (e.g. saying "thank you", saying "please", etc). 
 
        3. The third and final domain in which linguistic socialization occurs is in the indirect 
aspects of the linguistic interaction. Certain features vary systematically and are correlated 
with individual or group variables (e.g. gender, age, social class).   
 
        Ely and Gleason (1995) mention an interesting example of how language behavior 
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indirectly intersects with socialization and can be influenced by it: A report entitled "How 
Schools Shortchange Girls" (American Association of University Woman, 1992), summarized 
a study showing that boys in elementary and middle school called out answers (interrupted) 
eight times more often than girls. Moreover, boys' remarks were treated as appropriate, 
whereas girls were told off for speaking without being called upon (Sadker, Sadker & 
Thomas, 1981). The results of these studies offered evidences that socialization of gender 
specific speech is many times accomplished through differential interactions with boys and 
girls. And this kind of social experience may influence further communicative behaviors.   
         As stated by Snow (1984), much of the child's earliest socialization experiences take 
place at home during caregiver-child interactions.  Two general principles operate during 
these interactions which are assumed to result in language learning. Bukatko and Daehler 
(2001), describe these general principles as follows: 
 
                  First, parents  generally  interpret  their  infants' behavior as attempts  to  communicate, 
even  when   that   interpretation  may  not  seem  warranted to an  objective  observer. 
Second, children actively seek relationship   among objects, events, and people in their 
world and the vocal behavior of their caregivers. The result of these two tendencies is 
that parents are motivated to converse with their children and children have a 
mechanism for learning language (p. 259). 
    
         Parents and caregivers have a unique way to communicate with their young children. 
Motherese or parentese – as this way of communicating is called – may serve a number of 
functions in the child's acquisition of linguistic competence.  In most cases, this form of 
communication contains simple, well-formed sentences and is punctuated by exaggerated 
intonation. Clear pauses between segments of speech have also been observed (Newport, 
1977).  In addition, during the interaction with the child mothers tend to say names for objects 
more saliently than other words (Messer, 1981), and  move objects as they label them 
(Gogate, Bahrick & Watson, 2000). Interestingly, a study developed by Olson, Bayles and 
Bates (1986) also revealed that the more mothers talk to their children, the more words their 
children acquire.   
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                     44 
          By the time children begin to produce language, they have already established with 
their parents and caregivers a variety of social-communicative routines (Tomasello & Farrar, 
1986).  An important aspect to be observed during the caregiver-child interaction is the 
emergence of shared or joint attention.   Well defined by Baldwin (1995), “joint attention 
simple means the simultaneous engagement of two or more individuals in mental focus on 
one and the same external thing (p. 132).  
         Following Flom & Pick (2003), it is within the second half of the first year of life that 
infants begin to establish joint attention by looking, for example, in the same direction as the 
adult, as well as an adult’s action such as a pointing gesture or contingent head motion. 
         Although much is known about the developmental importance of joint attention, not 
much is known about what factors promote infants´ interaction in social exchanges.  How 
infants use information such as pointing and direction of gaze in establishing join attention is 
also a major focus of recent debates.  
         In an attempt to find out about the importance of verbalizations for promoting joint 
attention, Flom & Pick (2003) developed a study with 18-month-old infants. There were three 
conditions in this study: (1) the objects were presented with verbal information alone, (2) the 
objects were presented accompanied by looking and pointing, and (3) the objects were 
presented accompanied by looking, pointing and verbal encouragement. Out of the eight 
objects presented during the test setting, four were “familiar” to the infants, and, four were 
“unfamiliar” to them (the infants´ familiarity or unfamiliarity to the objects was identified by 
their parents). 
         As a result, it was found that 18-months-old infants can establish joint attention when 
they are given a label for a familiar object, but not when they are given a label for an 
unfamiliar object. Furthermore, it was found that when an adults´ gestures are accompanied 
by a verbal label, infants spend proportionately more time being engaged in join attention 
towards unfamiliar objects than to familiar ones.  However, the addition of verbal information 
to looking and pointing gestures did not promote a greater frequency of joint attention to both 
familiar and unfamiliar objects compared to looking and pointing alone.  
        These results demonstrate that verbal encouragement promoted basically longer periods 
of joint attention, but not more instances, and it happened only towards objects which infants 
were unfamiliar with. Infants seemed to use information such as looking and pointing to 
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determine where the adults´ attention is directed, and the verbal input to get information about 
the target object.  This data also shows that physical gestures may direct or redirect infants´ 
focus of attention to objects, while verbal encouragement may promote continued attention 
towards particular objects or events. As a result, children might learn about the relationship 
between verbal input and objects or events.  Thus, the present data could be taken as a helpful 
tool to understand how infants make the first word-world linkages.  
          In this context, recent research conducted by Brooks and Meltzoff (2005), examined the 
development of gaze following and its relation to language by testing infants at 9, 10 and 11 
months of age. In this set of studies, infants watched as an adult turned the head towards a 
target with either open or closed eyes.  
         The procedure used in this experiment was the following: Infants sat on their parents' 
lap across a table from the experimenter. After a warm-up phase, the experimenter placed two 
identical, colorful targets (toys) at eye level on either side of the infant. For the open-eyes 
condition, she silently turned her head and open eyes towards the target. For the closed-eyes 
condition, she closed her eyes immediately before performing the same head movement. Two 
synchronized cameras made separated recordings of the experiment for further scoring 
purposes. One recorded the frontal view of the infants' face, the other recorded the 
experimenter. The infants' vocalizations during the trials were also scored. Language 
assessment: When the infants were 14 and 18 months old, parents of the infants in the 10- and 
11-month-old open eyes condition were asked to complete the infant form of the McArthur-
Bates Communicative Development Inventory.   
          Results obtained by these experiments revealed that 10-and-11-month-olds followed 
adult head turnings significantly more often in the open-eyes than the closed-eyes condition. 
Nine-month-olds did not respond differentially. Results also showed a positive correlation 
between gaze-following behavior at 10-11 months and subsequent language scores at the age 
of 18 months. That is, infants who followed the adults' gaze and simultaneously vocalized had 
significantly higher language scores at 18 months. 
          As stated by Brooks and Meltzoff, the results suggest the existence of an important 
change in infants' gaze-following during a three months window just before one year of age. 
At 9 months, infants followed adult head turns towards a target as often whether she turns 
with eyes open or closed. In contrast, the majority of the older infants look at the adults target 
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specifically when the adult turns with open eyes, suggesting that genuine gaze-following 
develops at about 10-11 months of age. 
        Moreover, the findings concerning vocalizations suggest that gaze following plays a role 
in language acquisition. In the current experiment, gaze following plus simultaneous 
vocalization predicted later vocabulary comprehension but not word production. According to 
the authors, one possible interpretation to these results is that infants who are advanced in 
recognizing the connection between looker and object may have a leg up in word 
comprehension because they use the adults' gaze to disambiguate the referent of the adults' 
utterances.   
         Needless to say is that for social learning theorists the process of word learning results 
from the interaction infants have with adults and more language-skilled subjects. Among 
these interactions the use of motherese by parents or caregivers seems to play a crucial role. 
Importantly, motherese seems to be "multipurpose". Emotionally, it provides a framework for 
social interaction. Socially, it shows the child how to carry on a conversation, to comment on 
an idea, and to take turns in talking. Linguistically, besides teaching children new words, it 
teaches how to structure phrases and put ideas into language. Therefore, it is considered to be 
vital for language development. 
 
Word learning as the result of developing meaning  
        While some theorists argue that children are born with an innate capacity for language 
development (e.g. Chomsky, 1975, 1999), others support that children are actively involved in 
constructing meaning (e.g. Piaget, 1971, 1986). That is, each infant constructs an 
understanding of the world on the basis of his/her own activity and interactions with the 
physical world.  
         According to Piaget's theory of development, the general language ability depends on 
the sensorimotor achievements of infancy. Thus, language is part of the child's general 
cognitive development (Piaget, 1971, 1986). In his view, children cannot use language in its 
symbolic- representational function until they have developed the internal representation of 
objects, events, and people. Moreover, the foundation for the representational capacity is said 
to be settled during the sensorimotor period of development (0 – 2 years), which is marked by 
a number of changes in the infants' cognitive system. The following paragraphs will approach 
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some important concepts of Piaget's theory of cognitive development, which work as "pre-
requisites" for the attainment of the language ability. 
         Piaget's version of development was based on two assumptions regarding intelligence: 
1) it is a form of biological adaptation, and 2) it becomes organized by the interaction which 
the physical world.  For him, thinking exhibits two basic qualities: The first one is adaptation, 
which is a tendency to adjust or become attuned to the conditions imposed by the 
environment; the second is organization, which is a tendency for intellectual structures to 
become systematic and coherent.  
         In his theory, much of the sensorimotor period is taken up with developing perceptual 
categories of objects (Piaget, 1971, 1986). In addition, he saw no evidence that during this 
period infants have any conceptual representation that would enable them to think about 
objects without their presence. 
         In Piaget's analysis, concepts only develop when sensorimotor schemes become 
inherent, and it relies very much on learning about objects through physical interaction. In his 
approach, scheme is the basic mental structure, a kind of template for acting or thinking 
applied to similar situations or classes of objects. For example, the child who sucks his/her 
mother's breast, and at her thumb, is exercising the scheme of sucking. Piaget believed that 
schemes change throughout processes which he called assimilation and accommodation, and 
the earlier schemes set the stage for constructing more sophisticated ones, i.e. for categorizing 
objects, relating to family, and so forth. Assimilation and accommodation are the two 
complementary processes of adaptation described by Piaget, through which awareness of the 
outside world is internalized.  Assimilation is the process by which external stimuli are taken 
in and interpreted by the organism without changing the structure of the internal world. For 
example, infants tracking a visual object with their eyes are assimilating it visually. As stated 
by Anisfeld (1984), "assimilation is the process that turns sensory data into psychological 
experience and knowledge" (p.16). Accommodation, however, is the process whereby internal 
structures are adjusted to facilitate the assimilation of incoming stimuli.  
         Thus, assimilation and accommodation are basic processes which govern the adaptation 
of all organisms to their environment. These changes, however, depend on the opportunity to 
have experiences by interacting with the surrounding environment (i.e. play, touch, handle). 
The transition from sensorimotor activities to interiorized schemes is said to occur at the end 
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of the sensorimotor period.  
          In a Piagetian view, imitation plays a crucial role in this stage of development. He 
suggested that it was some special aspects of imitation that created images, which he 
considered the first true symbols.  The aspects of imitation that interested Piaget most was 
that it could not take place without active analysis of the model (Mandler, 2004). That is, it 
requires the imitator to actively analyze what the model is doing. Thus, when active analysis 
has taken place and imitation carried out, it eventually become interiorized in the form of an 
image. Imagery, however, enables infants to re-present objects and events to themselves, 
providing the foundation of thought. Bukatko and Daehler (2001) describe an interesting 
example: 
 
                At age sixteen months, Piaget's daughter Jacqueline was playing with  a boy  who 
suddenly had a dramatic temper tantrum. The next day, the normally well-behaved 
Jacqueline mimicked the little boys' behaviors with remarkable accuracy. To do so,  
she   must   have had  the ability  to  represent  the  boys'  overt   behaviors  in internal 
form and to draw on that representation hours later (p.274). 
        
          An important accomplishment of this period is the attainment of what Piaget called 
object concept or object permanence. As described by Bukatko and Daehler (2001), infants 
who possess this ability realize that objects continue to exist even though they no longer can 
be seen. Before the attaining of object permanence, an infant will not look for a dropped toy. 
Once object permanence has developed, the child will search for objects due to the realization 
that the object exists even without their direct contact or involvement with it. Thus, with the 
attainment of object permanence, the infant is able to develop mental symbols and use words 
to represent them.   
         As stated by Barrett (1995), another important accomplishment of the sensori-motor 
infant is the attainment of means-ends behavior (Piaget, 1971, 1986). Piaget considered this 
attainment crucial for the acquisition of words. This behavior consists of the ability to use 
means (i.e. tools) in order to achieve a particular goal (i.e. an object). As the child's first 
words are commonly used as means to an end (i.e. as means to communicate what they want), 
this correlation between the emergence of the first words and the achievement of means-ends 
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behavior seems to be reasonable.      
          In fact, according to the Piagetian perspective, cognitive development precedes 
linguistic development.  In order for the child to acquire object names, she/he should first 
overtake the cognitive chances of sensori-motor period. More specifically, the child's 
acquisition of object names is dependent upon the child's prior acquisition of object 
permanence and the emergence of the capacity for mental representation. 
        More recent studies, however, have moved away from studying such global relationship 
between cognitive and linguistic development, and have focused upon the possible 
relationships between specific cognitive achievements and the acquisition of particular words 
(e.g. Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986).   
         A set of studies conducted by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1986), have found that at the age of 
18 months the acquisition of words encoding disappearance is related to the development of 
object concept, while the acquisition of words indicating success and failure is related to the 
development of means-ends understanding. Furthermore, testing infants aged 13-to-19-
months the authors found that there were no similarly close relations between disappearance 
words and the means-ends tasks or between success/failure words and object-permanence 
tasks. 
        For the language assessment, Gopnik and Meltzoff used a questionnaire that described 
disappearance and success/failure contexts. Mothers received the questionnaire before testing 
began and were asked to focus their attention on these particular words, rather than recording 
everything the children said in an open-ended diary. To ensure that children were not simply 
imitating words, or using them in a single context, children were only counted as having 
acquired a word if they were reported to use it spontaneously in at least three appropriated and 
different contexts. In addition, any spontaneous use of disappearance or success/failure words 
during the recorded session were also scored as long as they use it appropriately. The scoring 
always took into account the meaning of the child's words which were deduced from the 
context, and not only the form of words themselves.  
         For the cognitive assessment, the children received a number of tasks adapted from 
Uzgiris and Hunt infant assessment scales (1975). They were scored as having passed an 
object-permanence task if they searched for the appropriated object on more than half of 
trials. In the case of the means-ends tasks, children were scored as having passed if they found 
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the correct solution without a period of trial and error (see Table 1 for the description of the 
object-permanence and means-ends task).  
          Evidences provided by this first study, suggest a clear relation between children's 
performance on the object-concept tasks and the use of disappearance words. Children who 
successfully accomplished the tasks were more likely to use disappearance words than those 
who did not. In addition, children who used insight to work out difficult means-ends tasks 
were more likely to use success-failure words than those who did not.   
         The above described findings were replicated and strengthened in a follow up study. 
Therefore, 19 children were followed longitudinally. The children's ages during the first 
session ranged from 13- to 19 months. Infants participating in this study were tested every 
one, two or three weeks, until they had acquired both disappearance words and success/failure 
words and had passed both object-permanence tasks and means-ends tasks. The procedure and 
scoring were the same as in the previously described experiment. In addition, children had to 
pass a particular task in two successive sessions before they were considered to have gained 
that particular cognitive skill. It ensured that the particular skill was consistent and stable. 
         Results revealed by this study, show that there is significant correlation between the age 
at which children acquire disappearance words and the age at which they solve object-
permanence tasks. At the same time, there is a significant correlation between the age at 
which infants acquire success/failure words and the age at which they work out means-ends 
tasks. The cross-correlations, however, are much smaller. There are much smaller correlations 
between disappearance words and means-ends tasks and between success/failure words and 
object-permanence task. In addition, the longitudinal study demonstrated that there were very 
short temporal gaps between the solution of object-concept task and disappearance words, and 
between the solution of means-ends tasks and the acquisition of success/failure words. In 
sum, these results suggest that children are particularly motivated to learn words which are 
relevant to the cognitive problems they are working out at the particular moment of 
development.  
          Following Mandler's (2004) approach on language development, "the most crucial 
aspect of the relation between preverbal concepts and words is that language is mapped onto 
concepts and not onto perception or sensorimotor schemas" (p.243). That is, when infants 
acquire their native language they build it on conceptual information which helps them to 
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discriminate and create categories for objects and events they experience.  
 
Table 1 
Description of the Object-Permanence and Means-Ends Tasks 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
            Task No.                                                            Task Description 
 
   Object-concept tasks: 
     4 ………………………….  Finding a completely covered object (3-5 trials). Object is hidden under 
                                                         cloth A. Child must search at A. 
     8 ………………………….  Finding an object after successive visible displacements (3-5 trials). Object  
                                                         is hidden at A, then hidden at B, then hidden at C. Child must search at   
                                                         C. 
    10 ………………………..   Finding an object following one invisible displacement with a single screen  
                                                         (3-5 trials). Object is hidden in hand, hand is placed under A, object is   
                                                         left under A. Child must search at A. 
    13 …………………………  Finding an object following one invisible displacement with three screens  
                                                         (5-7 trials). Object is hidden in hand; hand is placed under A, B, or C;  
                                                         object is left under A, B, or C. Child must search at correct cloth. 
    14 ………………………...   Finding an object following a series of invisible displacements (5-7 trials). 
                                                         Object is hidden in hand; hand is placed under A, then under B, then C.  
                                                         Object is left under C. Child must search under A, then B, then C, or  
                                                         directly under C.  
    15 ……………………….     Finding an object following a series of invisible displacements by 
                                                         Searching in reverse order. After child has searched at C three times on 
                                                         task 14, object is hidden in hand, hand is placed under A, then under B, 
                                                         then under C; object is left under A. Child must search under C, then B,  
                                                         then A. 
 Means-ends tasks: 
    9 …………………………      Use of string vertically to obtain object 
   10 ………………………..       Use of a stick to obtain object 
   11 ………………………..       Placing a necklace in a bottle 
   12 ………………………..       Stacking  a set of rings on a post, avoiding one solid ring 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Source: Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1986. 
 
          Contrasting Piaget's ideas on how infants build their conceptual system, Mandler argues 
that the infants' concepts start to be built early in life and are based on a process called 
perceptual analysis (Mandler, 1992a), by which they analyze aspects such as how objects 
move. For example, when infants look attentively at moving objects they do not only perceive 
their characteristics and their motion, but also begin to interpret what they see (i.e. kinds of 
paths objects take, the interactions of these paths, spatial information such as support and 
containment). Hence, besides seeing the perceptual differences of objects, infants gradually 
begin to associate what objects look like with what they do (see Chapter 4 for a further 
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description of this process). For example,  to say that a 6-months-old infant has a conceptual 
category of "animals" along with the perceptual category of "dogs" does not imply to have 
two disassociated categories. On the contrary, the concept of "animals" is just the 
interpretation of the dog the infants is observing and analyzing. The same concept of "animal" 
will be re-called when observing cats, cows, and a number of other mammals (Mandler, 
2000b). In fact, the interpretation infants give to events around them, and the inferences 
drawn from them set down the foundation on which the conceptual system is organized 
(Mandler, 1992a, 2003, 2004).  
         In support for the assumption that the  infants' conceptual system start to be built early 
in life, studies conducted by Mandler and McDonough (1993, 1998) have demonstrated 7-
and-11-month-olds' ability to discriminate objects when the global domains of animals, 
furniture and vehicles are contrasted. (Chapter 4 offers a more detailed description and 
discussion of studies on infants' concept formation). 
         As can be noted, in Mandler's point of view language is mapped into preverbal concepts 
and not onto perceptual schemes as suggested by Piaget.  It seems quite obvious, however, 
that there is at first a mismatch between the adults' language and the preverbal concepts onto 
which language is being mapped. Overextension of nouns is a common phenomenon in 
infants' first attempts to produce language. As discussed in Chapter 2, during their second 
year of life children go through a period where the first-learned nouns are given too broad a 
meaning. One of the reasons to such a phenomenon appears to be the result of having to deal 
with a limited vocabulary when trying to communicate with others. In some cases, however, it 
seems to be due to the relationship of one thing to another i.e. categorical membership (see 
Rescorla, 1980). Finally, "at least some of it appears to be due to the uncertain assignment of 
the extension of a word" (Mandler, 2004, p. 245).  For example, when  infants use the word 
"dog" to name a "cow" it may be that for young children there is a lack of clarity of what the 
difference between them is. Such confusions seem not to cross global domain boundaries, 
however. Recent research supports this assumption (McDonough, 2002).  
         As described by Mandler (2004), McDonough studied word comprehension in a 
paradigm in which distractor items were drawn from the same global category as well as from 
different global categories. Results indicated that at 2 years of age children are still unclear 
about the extension of words in the animal, vehicle, food and clothing domains. Although 
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overextensions were rare across domain boundaries, they occurred frequently within domains. 
For example, when asked to point to a dog among a number of pictures, they tended first to 
point to a dog, but then included a fox. They rarely pointed to an item from another global 
category.. According to Mandler, it seems that 2-years-old infants know what a typical dog 
and a typical fox looks like, but tend to pick a prototypical example first. What they are not 
sure about is the extension of the labels. A likely reason for this is that infants at this age still 
lack the conceptual differentiation between dogs and foxes, for example. Finally, it seems that 
differentiated meaning is required to limit such words correctly i.e. a set of facts which make 
the differentiation between dogs and foxes possible.  
         Another interesting characteristic of the infants' early nouns is that they tend to refer to 
objects at the basic-level (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Young children say "car", for example, 
rather than "vehicle" which has a more general meaning. But what would be the explanation 
for this once the first concepts formed by infants tend to be at the global-level (Mandler, 
1993, 1998; Pauen, 2000a)? As recent study has shown (McDonough, 2002), young infants 
are often unclear about the differences among certain animals and plant kinds. Following 
Mandler's ideas, parents play a crucial role in helping their children to work out basic-level 
concepts such as dog and fox. One of the ways to do this is using a superordinate term to 
identify new basic-level labels, saying things such as "This is a fox". "It's an animal".  "This 
labeling strategy places the referent of a new term in a known conceptual class" (Mandler, 
2004, p.246). However, even though parents sometimes use superodinate-level nouns to 
clarify basic-level ones, they are infrequent in speech. Hence, it is not surprising that 
superordinate-level nouns usually appear late in acquisition.  
         Taking into consideration that most of the terms used by parents and care-givers  while 
talking to children tend to be at the "basic-level", it is not surprising that infants first nouns 
also tend to be at the basic-level. Thus, it seems likely that the language parents use is the 
major contributor to the development of more "refined" concepts (i.e. basic-level concepts) as 
well as to the development of the general linguistic ability. 
         As can be seen, Mandler's approach differs from Piaget's in the sense that when infants 
start to acquire language they build first on concepts they have already formed and not onto 
sensorimotor schemes. The conceptual representation infants set up during their first year of 
life i.e. objects, properties and events, provide a cognitive basis onto which they can map 
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words from the speech that is directed to them. This child-directed speech draws their 
attention to specific categories of those categories (i.e. basic-level categories).  
 
Summary 
        So far, the previous sections have reviewed major theoretical approaches in language 
development research as well as their implications for the process of word learning.  As can 
be noted, the current theoretical accounts differ in many different respects. See below a brief 
summary of each theoretical view approached in this chapter: 
 
        1. The nativist view (i.e. Chomsky) assumes that all human beings are born with a set of 
rules to combine words in their minds, called "Universal Grammar". Importantly, this set is 
rules is argued to be common to all languages, thus children require only minimal input to 
trigger language development.  
 
       2. The interactionist approaches (i.e. Piaget, Vygotsky) link language development either 
to the development of general cognitive processes, or to the social organization of the 
environment.  For example, while Piaget suggests that children must develop concepts before 
they learn linguistic forms to represent them, Vygotsky saw language as a result of the child's 
social exchanges.  
 
       3. The  theory-theory  view  (i.e. Gopnick and Metzoff)  suggests  that  semantic and 
cognitive  developments  emerge  simultaneously.     For example,  the  attainment of 
preverbal object  concepts  may  motivate  children  to  learn  words by paying attention  to 
the  verbal input presented together with a given object.  At the same time,  the  use  of  some 
particular words may direct infants' attention to different aspects of objects, thus increasing 
conceptual understanding. 
 
      4. The connectionist approach,  is  a  contemporary  framework  in cognitive science 
which   attempts  to  explain  human   intellectual  abilities  using  artificial  neural networks  
based  on  the architecture of the brain.  Importantly, the general idea of this  view  is that 
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language  learning can be explained through associative learning  of neurons which can be 
simulated in computer network models.  
 
          As can be seen, the vast literature on language development provides some support for 
all of these views, but none of them seems to provide the full story of the children's language 
acquisition. Importantly, in attempt to explain the routes of language development the current 
views have offered important insights concerning the tools infants may use to the mastering of 
the complex language system (i.e., connectionist models of language development).   
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Chapter 4 
 
Object Categorization  
         So far, the course of language acquisition has been approached in terms of components 
of language which infants must master to be able to communicate in their culture. In addition, 
the main ideas from different views on language acquisition have been described.  
          This chapter will turn to the process of category formation in infancy.  
                                                                                                                                                       
4.1. Why studying infant categorization? 
        The world consists of an infinitive number of stimuli which can be perceived by the 
humans from very early on. 
        Yet in the first year of life infants start organizing their experiences with objects by 
separating them into different classes (Mandler & McDonough, 1998), based on similarities 
and differences perceived. This process is called category formation in infancy. 
        The mature system organizes the input and knowledge it has about objects at different 
levels of abstraction (i.e., Rosch et al., 1976; Pauen 2002a).  How this system develops and 
what kind of processes are activated in order to organize the experiences infants have with the 
physical world is still a topic of debate.  
        Following one view (Rosch et al., 1976; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Eimas & Quinn, 1994), 
“basic-level categories” develop first in early infancy. The basic-level of abstraction is 
considered the most inclusive level, at which the objects of a category possess a number of 
attributes in common or can be used in similar ways. Hence, the basic-level category 
formation would be guided by physical similarities among exemplars of a given category. It 
suggests that the first categories developed by infants are based on perceptual features. 
According to this view, the “earliest” developed perceptual categories would work as a 
foundation for a later construction of conceptual thinking.        
         Following another view (Mandler & McDonough, 1998; Mandler, 2000a; Pauen, 
2002a), infants perform a “global-to-basic-level shift" in early categorization. According to 
this framework, infants younger than one year old are able to develop concepts through the 
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experience they have with objects in the material world. Thus, identifying an object as 
member of certain category would allow access to broader representation including features 
that may be invisible. These representations would rely on what the objects do (e.g., 
functional and causal properties) and not on what objects look like.                            
        In sum, most studies on categorization in infancy explore what kind of distinction infants 
are able to make at different ages. However, the role of perceptual and conceptual 
representation in the infants´ early thinking is still not clear. Hence, further studies on this 
issue seem necessary. 
 
4.2. Do categorization studies reveal perceptual or conceptual processes? 
         As already mentioned, categorization research not only focuses on the question at what 
level of abstraction infants form object classes, but also on the question, what kind of 
information they use to make these distinctions. Two different processes of category 
formation have been described in the literature: One process is perceptual categorization. 
Here, categorization is based on what objects look like. The other process is the conceptual 
categorization. In this case, categorization is based on what objects do, their function, or how 
they interact (Rosch et al., 1976; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Quinn, Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993; 
Eimas & Quinn, 1994; Haith & Benson, 1998; Mandler, Bauer & McDonough, 1991; 
Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Pauen, 2002a). 
         So far, most developmental research on infant categorization focus on the development 
of perceptual categories. Only recently, this focus has shifted slightly towards the process of 
concept formation (conceptual categories). 
        According to Mandler (2000b), one of the mysteries of the human mind is how we begin 
to form concepts which are not the ones provided by our senses, being an even greater 
question how concepts are formed in first place. For example, when do infants develop the 
concept of a dog or animal? How do they do it? What constitutes these concepts in first place?   
          Some researchers assume that infants less than one year old are too young to develop 
conceptual categories. Therefore, early categories rely exclusively on perceptual processes 
(Haith & Benson, 1998).  In support for this assumption, Rosch and colleagues (1976) found 
that children under 5 years of age readily put together four pictures of different shoes or four 
pictures of four different cars. That is, they sorted objects according to "basic-level" 
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groupings.  These researchers believed that one way of grouping objects together can be 
described as ´”basic level”. That is, objects go together when they have physical resemblance 
to each other and can be used in similar ways. "Chair" is an example of a basic-level concept 
because they share similar properties: All chairs have seats, legs, and backs, and are used for 
sitting. Thus, when someone thinks about such properties he/she is thinking about a "typical" 
chair (see Figure 3 for an example of basic-level grouping).   
                        
                                                    
   
                                      
 
Figure 3: An example of basic-level grouping (from Bukatko & Daehler, 2001, p. 282) 
 
          In contrast, other categories are located at the superordinate-level. Members of a 
superordinate level grouping do not necessarily need to share perceptual features, and can be 
broader than the basic-level concepts. "Furniture" is an example of superordinate-level 
concept. Rosch and her colleagues believe that because basic-level groupings carry a larger 
number of similarities (especially perceptual information) they are easier for children to 
process (Figure 4 shows an example of superordinate-level grouping). 
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Figure 4: An example of superordinate-level grouping (from Bukatko & Daehler, 2001, p. 
282) 
 
         In fact, studies have demonstrated that three months old infants show ability to 
categorize at the basic-level, discriminating pictures of dogs from pictures of cats (Quinn, 
Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993). Quinn and Eimas (1996) also found out that infants’ ability to 
discriminate dogs from cats is based on their facial features. In the light of these findings, it 
has been concluded that cues from facial and head region may provide the kind of information 
that allows infants to differentiate basic-level categories within the animal domain. 
         Corresponding studies have all used the visual fixation task. In this kind of task pictures 
of real or artificial stimuli are presented within a habituation-dishabituation paradigm. A 
typical design first presents a series of exemplars from one category and than presents a new 
exemplar from the already known category paired with an exemplar of a contrasting category. 
The infant is considered to categorize when he/she looks longer at the contrasting category 
exemplar. 
         As can be seen, the traditional view supports that perceptual categories (e.g., dogs, cats) 
provide the foundation for the conceptual thought (Quinn, Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993).           
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According to this view, infants first learn about individual instances and then generalize to the 
other members of the same basic category. Following this line of arguments, infants first learn 
what a dog or a cat in general look like, and later learn to associate other properties and 
behaviors with the perceptual ones.  Hence, only later in development infants become able to 
generalize the perceptual basic categories to other category members, resulting in the 
formation of a more general category (e.g., animal). Following this line of reasoning, concept 
formation is built on perceptual processes which gradually become more abstract (Madole & 
Oakes, 1999). 
          In contrast, another view has demonstrated that infants are able to develop conceptual 
categories within their first year of life (Mandler & McDonough, 1993; Pauen, 2002a). 
According to the conceptual view, categorization depends less on what objects look like than 
on what they do.  
          In order to investigate whether early categorization is conceptual from the outset, 
Mandler & McDonough (1993) tested 9-and 11-month-olds using the object examination 
task1. In one of the experiments infants were presented a global task (birds versus airplanes) 
with a very high between-category perceptual similarity. The question asked by the authors 
was whether infants would have difficulty to make a categorical distinction between a set of 
animals and vehicles despite their high between-category similarity (see Figure 5). One of the 
authors had previously   hypothesized that the type of motion is an important factor in the 
initial conceptualization of what animals are (Mandler, 1992a, 1992b). Thus, if infants have 
already conceptualized one class as self-propelled (e.g., animals) and another class as non-
self-propelled (e.g., vehicles), these meanings might draw infants attention to the relevant 
parts. 
 
      
                                                 
1 The task is an habituation-dishabituation paradigm and will be described later in this chapter (see also Ruff, 
1986). 
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Figure 5: Stimuli – birds and airplanes (Mandler & McDonough, 1993) 
 
         The first study was conducted with 11-months-old infants.  The airplanes all had 
outstretched wings and mostly the same shape.  Most of the airplanes were made out of metal 
whereas the birds varied in material. While the experiment was in progress, the researchers 
got concerned about the different material the exemplars were made of. Therefore, the same 
study was conducted with 9-months-old, but all exemplars presented were made out of 
plastic, thus showing the same texture. 
        As a result, both groups (9-and-11-months old) successfully categorized birds and 
airplanes as different domains, despite the physical between-category similarity. The same 
task was later presented to 7-months-old, who also showed a tendency to discriminate both 
categories. The pattern presented by the 7-months-old suggests that the process of global 
categorization begins by this age. 
        Results obtained in the corresponding studies provide strong evidences suggesting that  
the process of category  formation  can not be explained by perceptual features alone but 
might include properties which are invisible (e.g., functional or causal).  Hence, the formation 
of conceptual categories seems to start early and life and relies much more on how the objects 
interact with the physical world than on physical attributes, as suggested earlier. 
 
4.3. How do categories develop within the first year of life? 
        All the objects in the world exhibit a reasonable number of attributes which enable them 
to be classified in many different ways (e.g., shape, color, function). Thus, every existing 
category has principles or rules which relate its members to each other.          
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         While there have been many studies describing infants’ categorization abilities at 
different ages (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Pauen, 2002a) there have been still few 
researches concerning how the first categories emerge in infancy. The kind of information 
used by infants for making categorical distinctions is also a remaining question. 
         Do children form categorical representations based on perceptual features or based it on 
factors which are more abstract?  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one line of research 
supports that the first categories developed by infants are based on perceptual attributes of 
objects (Rosch et al., 1976, Eimas, 1994; Eimas & Quinn, 1994, 1996).  Another research 
group argues that the process of category formation is based on what objects do and the way 
they interact (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Mandler, 2000b, 2003; Pauen, 2002b).  
         According to those who support the early categories as being based on perceptual 
attributes,  infants first learn about individuals such as one or more cats, and than  generalize 
the observed properties to cat as a class.  They first learn what a cat looks like and than 
associate other kinds of properties or behaviors to this perceptual category. With experience, 
infants become able to generalize the properties from the basic categories they have learned to 
other perceptually different creatures to build a more general category which is the global 
category of animals. 
         In this framework, it is through experience that the infant becomes aware of aspects of 
categorical distinction which are more abstract. Later, the child uses this categorical 
distinction in order to make inductive inferences about new members of the categories 
((Madole & Oakes, 1999). 
         In contrast to the traditional view, researches on early conceptual development lead to 
different findings. This assumption assumes that categorization is based on concepts and 
depends less on what objects look like than on what objects do. The physical appearance or 
similarity among objects can serve as a predictor for its behavior or function but it is not an 
essential component to be considered a member of a distinct category (Mandler, 2000b, 
2003).       
         Taken together, one could conclude that more than one kind of categorization can be 
observed in infancy. More importantly, perceptual and conceptual categories seem to serve 
different functions. That is not all, however. Concerning this issue, Mandler (2000b) presents 
her point of view as follows: 
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Perceptual categorization is used for recognition and object identification.   Conceptual 
categories, on the other hand, are used to control inductive generalization (and for other 
kinds of thought as well). Infants, like adults, make their inductive generalizations on 
the basis of kind and not on the base of perceptual similarity. Of course, adults do make 
use of perceptual similarity in their inductions, but they use it to help determine kind 
and not on the basis for induction in its own right. No matter how much something may 
look like an animal, if we think (for whatever reason) it is not an animal, we will not 
ascribe animal properties to it (p. 31). 
 
         Given the evidences, it seems quite wise to consider that the process of category 
formation cannot be explained by one view alone. In many cases perceptual and conceptual 
attributes are closely linked.  However, it is important to take into consideration that  recent  
researches  have indicated that infants less than one year old are able to distinguish categorical 
domains (e.g., birds vs. airplanes; animals vs. furniture) even when the between-category 
perceptual similarity was high (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, Pauen, 2002b). The reported 
findings suggest that infants overrode perceptual attributes provided by the given stimuli in 
order to make categorical distinction. Therefore, suggesting that infants make use of 
information others than perceptual attributes for categorization. The nature of the information 
used seems to be still a question, however.  
 
4.4. Levels of categorization: the global-to-basic-level shift in infancy 
         For a long time basic-level categories were said to develop first in infancy (Mervis & 
Rosch, 1981; Rosch et al., 1976). Using a Visual Fixation Task (for a description of the task 
see Methods of Assessment later in this chapter), Quinn and Eimas (1996) showed that 3-to-
4-month olds discriminate basic-level categories within the animal domain. In contrast, more 
recent developmental studies show that the initial categories developed by infants may be 
broader in nature, suggesting the existence of a “global-to-basic-level shift” in infancy 
(Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Pauen, 2002a).  
        Using an Object Examination Task (see also Methods of Assessment) , Mandler & Mc 
Donough (1993) found that at the age of 7 months infants begin discriminating animals and 
vehicles as different domains.  At the age of 9-and-11-months they did it robustly. Although 
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global categorization was successfully accomplished by the mentioned aged-groups, basic-
level categorization within these domains was more variable. Infants showed no category 
discrimination when presented to the basic-level contrast dogs versus rabbits or dogs versus 
fish. At the same time, birds and airplanes were treated as different even though the between-
category similarity was high. 
        Furthermore, Mandler & McDonough (1998) demonstrated that 7-to-11-months infants 
can successfully accomplish the task when the global domains of animals, vehicles and 
furniture are contrasted. Plants and kitchen utensils were tested at 11 months and these 
domains were also categorized. At the age of 11 months, infants did not discriminate the 
subcategory tables and chairs. In the animal domain, 9-and-11-month-olds responded to the 
life-form distinction between dogs and birds, but did not differentiate dogs from cats until the 
age of 11 months. 
         Following this line of reasoning, Pauen (2002a) developed a set of studies to investigate 
whether the global-to-basic-level shift occurs within the first year of life.  In a longitudinal 
study, 20 infants were tested twice, at the age of 8 and 12 months. In this study, half of the 
infants solved a global level task with the contrasting categories animals and furniture, 
followed by a basic level task which varied systematically: dogs and birds or chairs and 
tables. The other half solved a basic level task only.  Following the classical OET design, in a 
total of eight trials the infants saw each object twice. At the test phase, first a new same 
category exemplar was presented, followed by an exemplar of a contrasting category. As a 
result, at the age of 8 months the infants did discriminate the categories at the global level but 
failed to discriminate in the basic level task. Yet, at 12 months of age, infants solved 
successfully the tasks at both, global and basic level but treated both test items as equally new 
in the global level task.  
         Taken together, the above mentioned data provide considerable evidences that infants´ 
categorical thinking undergoes systematic changes with age. They show a global-to-basic-
level shift within their first year when an Object Examination Task is being used. This task is 
said to provide infants the opportunity to show categorical knowledge based upon factors 
others than perceptual attributes alone (which is said to be the case of the VFT). This issue 
will be discussed further in this chapter. 
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4.5. What kind of information is important for categorization? 
          In an attempt to answer this question, it has been suggested that representations such as 
causality and functionality provide conceptual basis for categorization. Corresponding 
information may lead infants to form a global-level distinction between animates and 
inanimates very early in life (Mandler, 1992b).  
          According to Mandler, the theory of the foundation of conceptual thought proposes that 
infants make use of perceptual information not only for perceptual categorization proposes 
but also to form summary representations and to constitute meaning of objects. These early 
meanings are assumed to be represented in the form of image-schemas which abstract 
dynamic aspects of objects such as capacity to perform self-propelled movements (besides the 
analysis of static perceptual attributes). For this reason, image-schemas allow infants to form 
concepts like animates and inanimates (see Chapter 5.1). 
          As stated by Pauen and Traeuble (under revision), a number of developmental studies 
suggest that the human being is born with the capacity to form categories based on perceptual 
similarities and dissimilarities between objects (e.g., Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch et al, 
1976). In contrary, recent conceptual studies reveal that 10- and 11-month-olds show 
evidence for knowledge-based reasoning, promoting categorical distinctions such as animates 
and inanimates (Pauen, 2002b).  
         Moreover, recent experiments conducted by Pauen and Traeuble (under revision) 
showed that after watching an unfamiliar animal toy and a ball performing self-propelled 
motion together, 7-and-11-month olds expected only the animal to start moving again by 
itself. The corresponding results suggest that infants´ motion expectation to the unfamiliar 
animal and not to the ball give evidences of an existing previous knowledge about behavioral 
properties of object kinds. It includes knowledge about the ability to perform self-propelled 
motion, which is the case of the animal. 
         It can be summarized that existing evidence supports the idea that object categorization 
cannot be explained by an analysis of static perceptual information alone. As described earlier 
in this chapter, infants less than one year of age demonstrate conceptual categorization 
(Mandler & McDonough, 1993).  They go beyond the information about the appearance of 
objects to make conceptually based judgments and inductive inferences. For example, 
Mandler (1992a) suggested that infants understand animals as self-starters which interact with 
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other objects, and this characterization is true for animals in general and not to specific kinds 
of animals.         
 
4.6. Methods of Assessment 
The general familiarization-preference-for-novelty paradigm 
          The familiarization-preference-for-novelty paradigm is an important method for 
studying category formation in early infancy (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998, Pauen, 
2002a, 2002b).  
          In a typical task a set of exemplars from one category is being presented 
(familiarization phase), prior to a pair combining a new exemplar from the familiarized 
category with a new exemplar from a contrasting category (test phase).  Longer attentive 
looking at the new category exemplar is assumed to reflect category discrimination. 
          Two different tasks have been developed based on the general familiarization-
preference-for-novelty paradigm: the Visual-Fixation task (VFT) and the Object Examination 
Task (OET). 
 
The Visual-Fixation Task (VFT) 
         In a typical visual-fixation task infants are presented 2-D pictures. The procedure is the 
following: infants are firstly familiarized with a number of pairs of exemplars from one 
category. Following the familiarization phase, infants are presented a new exemplar from the 
familiar category paired with a contrasting category member (test phase). Infants are 
considered to categorize when a longer looking at the contrasting category member is 
perceived (see Figure 6).   
        Using the visual-fixation design, studies have demonstrated that young infants are able to 
make categorical distinction at the basic level (Quinn, Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993; Eimas & 
Quinn, 1994; Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Eimas and Quinn (1994) demonstrated that 3- and-4-
month-olds categorized horses as different from cats and zebras, and cats as different from 
tigers, failing to discriminate cats as different from female lions. Furthermore, Quinn and 
Eimas (1996) have shown that 3-and 4-months-old infants are able to distinguish perceptually 
similar natural species (e.g., dogs and cats). The corresponding study suggests that cues from 
facial and head region provide the critical source of information which allows infants to 
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discriminate dogs and cats as different classes and presumably a number of other members 
within the animal domain. 
 
                                
 
                                
 
                                
 
                                
  
Figure 6: Visual Fixation Task – stimuli presented by Quinn & Eimas (1996) 
 
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                       68 
        As stated by Pauen and Traeuble (under revision), it has been suggested that infants 
performance in visual-fixation tasks reflects basic processes of visual abstraction called on-
line categorization. It has been proposed that infants may abstract perceptual similarities 
between the presented pictures, creating a perceptual representation of the category during 
familiarization. Thus, at test, the categorical distinction is explained by the perceptual 
dissimilarity of the contrasting category object. As the out-of-category exemplar does not 
share similar properties with the familiarized class, infants pay more attention to it, inferring 
category discrimination (Eimas & Quinn, 1994; Quinn & Eimas, 1996).  
         Based on corresponding findings, the traditional view assumes that the first categories to 
emerge in infancy are based on perceptual features and gradually turned into concepts by 
having additional information associated with the perceptual ones.  
         However, although a number of researches have supported this view, it has not been 
without criticism. Mandler (2000a) particularly suggests that the visual-fixation technique has 
been a rich source of information about categorization but it is less informative about how 
infants conceptualize the stimuli they are looking at.  Mandler also argues that through this 
technique infants can discriminate, for example, pictures of dogs from pictures of cats, but do 
they know what dogs and cats are?  If so, what have the infants learned about this kind of 
animals? These questions remain on debates, however. 
 
The Object-Examination task (OET) 
         In a typical object-examination task infants are presented 3-D miniature models. The 
task is suitable for testing infants 6- to 7 months or older.  The procedure is the following: 
during the familiarization phase, infants are presented a series of 3-D miniature models which 
have different looking although belonging to the same superordinate category (e.g. different 
looking animals). At test, infants are presented an exemplar from a contrasting category (e.g. 
a vehicle). Category discrimination is inferred when a longer attentive looking (examining) at 
the contrasting category member is observed. In the classical OET version, infants are 
presented four different exemplars from the same category twice (familiarization phase). At 
the test phase, a new member of the familiar category is presented, followed by a contrasting 
category exemplar.  Yet in a modified OET version, a larger number of members that all 
belong to the same category are presented only once. Following the familiarization phase, at 
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test, infants are presented a member of a contrasting category. Category discrimination is 
inferred when a longer examining at the contrasting category member is observed. In both 
versions infants are allowed to freely manipulate the objects. 
         In contrast to findings on visual-fixation tasks, studies using object-examination tasks 
have demonstrated a global-to-basic-level shift in early infancy (Mandler & Mc Donough, 
1993, 1998; Pauen, 2002a).  
         Using the object-examination task in a classical version, Mandler & McDonough (1993) 
showed that 9-and 11-months-old successfully categorized animals and vehicles as different 
classes. The same study was developed with 7-months-old, who also demonstrated a 
categorization pattern although not significant. However, performance on basic-level tasks 
was more variable. Sub categorization was just found for vehicles, and no categorization was 
found for the animal domain.  
         The object-examination task has been by many applied since then – some of them 
focusing explicitly on methodological concepts (e.g. Ruff, 1986; Oakes, Madole & Cohen, 
1991). Conducting studies with 7-and-12-months-old, Ruff (1986) demonstrated that during 
examining infants focus their attention on the object and actively take in information. It was 
also demonstrated that examining declined with increasing familiarity, while behaviors such 
as mouthing and banging did not. Other important insight obtained in corresponding studies is 
that the duration of examining has no clear relationship with age. However, although 
examining did not vary systematically with age, it decreased with familiarity to objects.   
         Interestingly, recent research investigating the relations between examining time and 
heart rate (HR) during an object examination task, revealed that HR was lower during states 
of focused attention (examining) than during states of casual attention (looking) or non-
looking (Elsner, Pauen & Jeschonek, 2006). During the familiarization phase, while 
examining stayed about the same, mean HR increased. At test (where a new exemplar from 
the familiar category is followed by a contrasting category item), the examining increased and 
mean HD decreased, indicating that infants focused their attention on the out-of- category 
member. This data suggests that HR provides a suitable objective measure to study infants' 
performance during object-examination tasks. 
         Oakes, Madole and Cohen (1991) conducted two studies in order to investigate the 
object-examination effectiveness to explore early discrimination and categorization.  A first 
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                       70 
study was conducted with 6-and-10-month-old infants and aimed  exploring simple stimulus 
discrimination. In this study infants were first familiarized with a single object, followed by 
the presentation of two novel objects at test. More specifically, the aim of this study was to 
determine whether infants´ examining decreases with familiarization and subsequently 
increases when the novel objects are presented.  As result, the infants demonstrated a 
significant decrease in attention to the objects throughout familiarization. At test, an increase 
in attention to both novel objects was perceived, indicating clear discrimination.  In a second 
study, also conducted with 6-and-10-month-old infants, the aim was to explore infants´ 
categorization responses when familiarized with a category of objects.  As result, after 
familiarized with a category of objects, infants clearly responded to the categorical change. 
        It has also been suggested that the participation in object-examination tasks permits the 
infants to activate previously acquired world knowledge (Mandler & McDonough, 1993; 
Mandler, 2004) by manipulation of objects. Thus, the representation of animates and 
inanimates   may be especially activated through this technique. As will be shown in the 
following paragraphs, a number of studies support this idea. 
 
4.7. The application of knowledge during the test setting 
         As suggested above, the participation of infants in Object Examining Tasks (OET) may 
allow the activation as well as the application of previously acquired real-world knowledge.   
        The process called knowledge-based categorization supports that categorization 
responses are at least partly based on previous representations which have been formed by the 
infants prior to the start of the experimental session. It includes properties others than the 
perceptual attributes which is assumed to be the case of Visual-Fixation Tasks.  
        It has been suggested that visual fixation tasks provide an on-line category formation 
which is mainly based on perceptual features of the given objects. Quinn & Eimas (1996) 
assumed that during the familiarization phase infants form a perceptually based representation 
that generalizes to novel items of the familiar category member, but not the out-of-category 
item. This would result in a longer looking at the out-of-category member during the test 
phase.  
       Supporting the assumption that infants’ performance in object-examination tasks is 
influenced by previous acquired real-world knowledge, Pauen, Babocsai, Löffler and 
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Traeuble (2003) demonstrated that 11-months-old performance in an OET contrasting dog 
with cats varied according to whether infants had a dog or a cat as a pet. Infants living with 
either a cat or a dog at home were able to categorize cats and dogs as different classes 
whereas those who did not have a cat or dog at home failed to succeed in this task.    
        Following this reasoning, Pauen (2002b), tested 11-months-old (Group A and B) where 
the infants examined four different exemplars from a superordinate category (animals or 
furniture) twice, followed by a new exemplar of the familiar superordinate category and an 
exemplar of a contrasting category. Group A explored natural-looking toy-replicas with low 
similarity between categories whereas group B explored artificial-looking toy-models with 
high similarities between categories. Following this experiments, another study was 
conducted where the same artificial-looking toys (animals) were presented as familiarization 
objects (Group B) but no contrasting category was presented.  Responses varied only with the 
presence of category change, and not with the degree of similarity between categories.    
        Results obtained through the above described experiments demonstrate that infants less 
than one year old show knowledge-based categorization when the object examination task is 
used. In addition, the manipulation of perceptual between-category similarity does not 
influence their performance on the task. 
       
4.8. Which method is best suitable for studying concept formation? 
         Empirical evidence has demonstrated that the visual-fixation task (VFT) and the object-
examination task (OET) lead to different results (Pauen & Traeuble, in preparation).  While 
evidence obtained with the VFT demonstrated infants’ ability for perceptual category 
formation at 3 to 4 months of age, evidence provided by OET studies suggests that processes 
other than on-line category formation may be involved (Mandler & McDonough, 1993; 
Pauen, 2002b). 
          It has been suggested that the participation of infants in visual-fixation tasks activates 
processes of visual abstraction, providing a categorization based on the perceptual attributes 
of the objects (Quinn & Eimas, 1996). According to this view, category recognition is 
inferred from differential looking at the objects infants have been familiarized with and at the 
novel category exemplar. As described by Mandler (1988), the participation of infants in 
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visual-fixation tasks requires basically perceptual recognition and not conceptual 
categorization (which can be accessed independently of perception).  
         In contrast, the participation of infants in object-examination tasks seems to promote the 
activation of previously acquired real-world knowledge. This knowledge activates conceptual 
representations developed based upon experience with real-world objects before the start of 
the experimental session.  Allowing infants to explore realistic toy-models may permit infants 
easier activate previously real-world knowledge than looking at pictures in a more passive 
task. 
       Clearly, it has been suggested that the use of object-categorization tasks provide infants 
the opportunity to build categories based on information others than perceptual 
representations. Thus, concept formation is effectively accessed by object-examination tasks.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Preverbal concept formation and its relation to early word acquisition 
       The current chapter is divided in three parts. The first part offers a brief description of the 
process of perceptual analysis (Mandler, 1992a) in infancy and its role for concept (category) 
formation. Second, some ideas about perceptual and conceptual processes in infancy will be 
presented. In the next step, empirical findings concerning the origins of word-to-world 
mapping will be described, before potential links between cognitive and linguistic abilities 
can be discussed. 
     
5.1. The process of perceptual analysis and its role in concept formation 
         As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the remarkable achievements of the first year of life is 
the ability to sort objects into groups – process called object categorization.  While some 
researchers (e.g., Rosch et al., 1976) support the idea that our first categories are perceptually 
based, others argue that infants less than one year old have the ability to form conceptual 
categories (e.g., Mandler and McDonough, 1993, 1998). That is, categorization is based on 
concepts which infants build based on information other than the perceptual input. More 
specifically, it is assumed that infants use information about what objects do or the way they 
interact to each other. 
         In an attempt to develop a theory that explains how the very first concepts are formed, 
Mandler (1988) proposed that perceptual analysis is the mechanism which is firstly used by 
infants in order to form early concepts.  A definition of this process is presented by   Mandler 
(1992a).  Part of it goes as follows: 
 
           Perceptual analysis is a process in which a given perceptual array is attentively 
analyzed, and a new kind of information is abstracted. The information is new in the 
sense that a piece of perceptual information is recoded into a non-perceptual form that 
represents a meaning. Sometimes, perceptual analysis involves comparing one object 
with another, leading to conceptualizing them as the same (or different) kind of thing, 
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but often it merely involves noticing some aspects of a stimulus that has not been 
noticed before… (p. 589) 
 
         According to Mandler, the capacity to engage in perceptual analysis begins very early in 
life. However, it seems likely that such analysis primarily requires the development of some 
sensorimotor schemata (e.g., stable schemas of three-dimensional objects). In her view, a 
crucial aspect about perceptual analysis is that it works as a "concept-making engine", 
transforming perceptual information into another format.  For example, a young baby does not 
have any concept of "apple" in the first place, but has the ability to attend to and analyze 
perceptual cues. This analysis results in the meanings that establish concepts - in this case, the 
concept of apple. Furthermore, she argues that, perceptual analysis seems to be the unique 
way which concepts can be formed before language comes into play.           
       Moreover, Mandler (1992b) proposes that infants make use of perceptual information not 
only for the purpose to do perceptual categorization, but also to transform representations into 
meanings of objects and relations involved. These early meanings are represented in the form 
of image-schemas which abstract aspects of objects like their capacity to perform self-
propelled movements, besides the analysis of perceptual features. Thus, the image-schemata 
allow infants to form concepts which depend more on what objects do than on what they look 
like (e.g., animate-inanimate objects and relational concepts, such as containment and 
support). Figure 7 illustrates the concepts of animacy and inanimacy. As the figure shows, 
"animates" demonstrate capacity for self-propelled movement (i.e. animals) whereas 
"inanimates" need to be caused to move (i.e. vehicles). 
 
                         CONCEPT                                                           CONCEPT 
 
         
 
 
 
                     Animate motion                                                   Inanimate motion 
 
 Figure 7:  Concept of Animates versus Inanimates (Mandler, 1992a) 
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           Although Mandler's view of concept development has offered important insights to the 
research community, a number of researchers have seen her view with some criticism (Quinn 
& Eimas, 2000; Quinn, Johnson, Mareschal, Rakison & Younger, 2000). While Mandler 
(1992a) believes that the process of perceptual analysis functions to recode and redescribe 
perceptual data (which results on the formation of concepts), Quinn and others (see above) 
argue for an alternative framework of concept development. According to them, the 
development of "knowledge-rich concepts" can be explained without appealing to specialized 
process and representational structures such as perceptual analysis and image schemas. 
Stating Quinn and Eimas (2000), "mature concepts have their start with the joining together of 
the surface features and dynamic movement properties of objects that may be perceived and 
represented directly by infants. Many less apparent features may be acquired subsequently 
through the informal and formal tuition that can occur via language" (p. 56). Language, in 
their view, can serve as a rich source of information about objects that may not be 
immediately (or even ever) apparent to our senses (i.e. looking, hearing, tasting).  
         Following Quinn and Eimas' framework, one may begin to acquire a concept such as 
"animal" from the recognition of many static perceptual attributes i.e. faces, overall body 
shape, and leg-like appendages among others (Quinn & Eimas, 1996; Rakison & Butterworth, 
1998).  These properties are often correlated with the capacity to perform self-propelled 
movements (Mandler & McDonough, 1993). Furthermore, the representations of animals as a 
conceptual kind can the secured when the representations of biological functions (i.e. eating, 
reproducing) are acquired, at times by means of language. Finally, the  result of this 
acquisition process is a representation for "animal" that is defined by multiple attributes.  
          In fact, according to the alternative framework of concept development (see Quinn & 
Eimas, 2000), a representation like "animal" that may begin by picking out simple perceptual 
attributes (mostly from looking and other sensory modalities) comes over time to have 
sufficient knowledge to permit specifying the kind of thing something is. Importantly, this 
process is argued to the continuous and integrative.  
 
5.2. Perceptual and conceptual processes in infancy 
          For the past two decades, a number of researchers have concentrated their efforts to find 
out how infants form their first concepts (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Quinn, Eimas 
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& Rosenkrantz, 1993; Eimas & Quinn, 1994; Quinn & Eimas, 1996; Pauen, 2002a, 2002b). 
Nevertheless, a problem which still remains unresolved is what the processes involved in 
early cognitive organization really are. 
            Perceptual categorization is assumed to be an automatic part of perceptual processing 
that analyzes the perceptual similarities between different objects. According to this view, 
perceptual processing creates perceptual schemas based on what objects look like. This line of 
thought also assumes that the representations of natural kind categories and artifacts occur 
primarily at the basic level. Only later in development infants are able to establish 
hierarchically organized superordinate categories (Eimas & Quinn, 1994).           
           Contrary to this view, conceptual categorization is considered to rely on what objects do 
and how they interact.  For this kind of categorization the role that objects play in events and 
not their physical attributes matter. That is, the appearance of an object is not sufficient to say 
what kind of thing an object is. This process is assumed to enable the notion of kinds such as 
animals, vehicles, plants, and furniture (see Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998).  
        As mentioned by Madole and Oakes (1999), research from the conceptual perspective 
has suggested that perceptual processes or physical attributes are insufficient to explain 
category formation. Since categorization is basically a process of grouping discriminably 
different objects and responding to them as equivalent, it is important to have a reliable basis 
for this grouping. However, according to the conceptual perspective such a basis is difficult to 
be found in the perceptual world. In this theoretical framework, categorization is conceptually 
based from the outset.  
        Using the visual-fixation paradigm, studies on perceptual categorization found that three 
months old infants categorize pictures of dogs as different from cats (Quinn, Eimas & 
Rosenkrantz, 1993), and also zebras as different from horses (Eimas & Quinn, 1994).  
Furthermore, Quinn and Eimas (1996) suggest that infants treat dogs as different from cats 
because they refer to their facial features rather than overall appearance. Hence, cues from 
facial and head region provide a kind of information that allows infants to differentiate basic 
categories of animal species that otherwise show a close resemblance one with another. These 
studies used the visual-fixation paradigm.  Comparable findings could not be obtained when 
an object manipulation task was applied, however (e.g. Mandler & McDonough, 1998). 
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         As mentioned by Mandler (2000b), according to the perceptual view basic-level 
categories such as dogs and cats are the foundation on which concept formation is built.  Only 
later in development they acquire the ability to generalize the perceptual basic categories they 
have already learned to other different category members in order to build a superordinate 
category which in this case is the category of animal. Thus, the process of concept formation 
is assumed to begin at a concrete level and gradually becomes more and more abstract 
(Madole & Oakes, 1999).   
         The traditional view that infants categorize objects solely in terms of perceptual features 
has been criticized. Supporters of the conceptual view suggest that object categorization is 
conceptual from the outset and depends less on the perceptual appearance of objects than on 
what they do (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Pauen, 2002b).  
         Illustrating the viewpoint of the conceptual perspective concerning the origin of the 
earliest concepts, Mandler (2003) states: 
 
            The meaningfulness we ascribe to objects and events is due to our conceptual 
interpretation of them… Quinn and Eimas (2000), for example, say that to posit 
conceptual representations in addiction to perceptual one is cumbersome and poses a 
heavy biological burden. In particular, they object the notion that there might be two 
representations, one perceptual and the other conceptual, for each category of objects 
and events. But, of course, that is not the implication of having a conceptual 
representational system in addition to the ability to form perceptual schemas. Infants do 
not just lie in their cribs and form perceptual categories; from a very early age they 
interpret what they see. (p.104) 
 
         In addition, Mandler argues that to say that an infant has the concept of animals along 
with a perceptual category such as dog, does not imply purely perceptual processes. On the 
contrary: having the concept (category) of animal just means that the infant has interpreted the 
"dog" he/she has observed.  This way, the same concept (category) of animal will be recalled 
when observing any other mammal or land animal (i.e. cats).   
        Following this line of reasoning, it is possible to understand what the conceptual view 
means by saying that early concepts tend to be more global than many early perceptual 
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categories.  Infants are able to see the difference between dogs and cats in early age, but it is 
by interpreting either one that they come to the concept of animal. Thus, the foundation of the 
adult conceptual system relies on the interpretation infants give to objects and events as well 
as by the inferences they draw from them. 
        In attempt to find out how far infants generalize behaviors they observe, Mandler and 
McDonough (1996) studied generalization infants make.  They used a technique they called 
generalized imitation which is basically the following: the experimenter modeled a simple 
event using small replicas of real-world object and encourage the infants to imitate what they 
had observed. As an example, the experimenter first showed the infants a dog being given a 
drink from a cup. In the following step, infants were given the cup but instead of the dog used 
for modeling, they received two other objects. The infants might have received an elephant 
and a car along with the cup, or even a different dog or a cat with the cup, to see which object 
they would choose for their imitations. According to the authors, it is possible to test what the 
infants have understood from the events they have observed by varying the selections of 
objects available to them; infants' imitations are based on what they have understood from 
observations they make. 
        As result, it was found that 14-month-olds generalize very broadly. When drinking or 
sleeping was modeled with a dog, infants generalized it to all animals but rarely demonstrate 
these behaviors with vehicles.  In addition, when experimenters modeled keying a car or 
giving a child a ride, infants generalized it to all vehicles, including forklifts and airplanes, but 
rarely generalized the behavior to animals. When these behaviors were modeled with both, 
appropriate and inappropriate objects, such as giving both a dog and a car a drink, infants 
were reluctant to cross domain boundaries in their imitation when inappropriate actions were 
modeled to them. 
         This work was extended to 9- and 11-month-olds (McDonough & Mandler, 1998). The 
technique was simplified. To make the task suitable for this age-range, the experimenters 
modeled the same events used in the first two experiments (Mandler & McDonough, 1996) 
but included an opportunity for direct imitation, eliminating also the choices which were 
possible in the procedure. After modeling, infants were encouraged to imitate what they had 
observed using the same objects. Following this, a single generalization object was presented 
along with the prop, in order to find out whether or not the infant would imitate using the new 
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object. On half of the trials infants received an appropriate object to go along with the prop 
(e.g., a bird and the cup) and on the other half they received an inappropriate object (e.g., an 
airplane and the cup).  In general, 9- and 11-month-olds showed similar results as the ones 
obtained with 14-months-old infants. They showed ability to broadly generalize behaviors and 
infrequently performed behaviors with inappropriate objects. Despite the fact that the 
simplified procedure worked well with 11-month-olds, 9-months-old infants just were able to 
produce some of the events with direct imitation. When they had to generalize imitative 
response to a new object, the level of difficulty seemed to be even higher. The data reported 
so far suggests that 9 months seems to be about the lower limit for using imitation techniques 
to test their conceptual understanding. 
         In parallel to research on inductive generalization, the development of conceptual 
categories from 7-to-11-months of age was explored by Mandler and McDonough (1998) 
using an object categorization task. Infants of this age range showed category discrimination 
in the global domains of animals, vehicles and furniture (recall chapter 4 for more details on 
these studies). 
         According to the authors, although information about the bases infants use to make 
these broad categorizations is still lacking, they speculate that for animals and artifacts there 
might be behavioral property that specify animacy and inanimacy (i.e., type of movement and 
nature of interactions of objects when they take part in events). These speculations are 
supported by the work of Pauen and Traeuble (under revision) which demonstrates  that after 
watching an unfamiliar  animal toy and a ball performing together, infants less than one year 
of age expected only the animal to start moving by itself.  Infants' motion expectation to the 
unfamiliar animal toy and not the ball give evidences of existing previous knowledge about 
properties of object kinds such as the animal ability to perform self-propelled motion.  
         A statement by Mandler (2003) expresses the main differences between perceptual and 
conceptual categories very nicely: 
      
                    The final and most important difference has to do with the function that categories   
serve. Perceptual categories are used to recognize objects and identify them.  This 
function  provides stability and the sense of familiarity  but in  itself  does not   provide 
the meaning of what is being  categorized. It is concepts that give patterns meaning, and 
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it is concepts that infants use (just like adults) for purposes of making inductive 
generalizations. Both  adults and infants are influenced  by perceptual appearance, of 
course, but they use it to help determine the kind  something represents and not as the 
basis of induction in its own right. No matter how much something looks like an animal, 
if we think, for whatever reason, that it is not an animal, we will not ascribe animal  
properties to it. (p.118)   
    
         In sum, evidence provided by the conceptual view has suggested that infants are 
responsive to factors other than static perceptual attributes from very early on. Moreover, 
corresponding researches demonstrate infants’ ability to form abstract object representations 
relying on behavioral attributes. The animate-inanimate distinction provides a prominent 
example.  
 
5.3. Early concepts and lexicon development: the puzzle of word learning  
        Within their first years, infants form categories which capture both, commonalities and 
differences among objects. As reported by Waxman (2004), most of these early categories 
will be at the basic-level (e.g., dogs) and the more inclusive global-level (e.g., animal). 
Concurrent with conceptual advances, infants learn words which represent these categorical 
distinctions. How infants come to establish an initial mapping between objects and their labels 
in the early phase of language acquisition has been an important focus of debate lately.  
         As postulated by Waxman (2004), in the course of word learning the infant is faced with 
a difficult three-part puzzle: 
   
         Typically one individual points to an object and provides its name. To succeed, the 
infant must (1) parse the relevant word from the on going stream of speech, (2) identify 
the relevant entity in the ongoing stream of activity in the world, and (3) establish a 
word-to-world correspondence. To put matters more formally, successful word-learning 
rests on the infants' ability to discover the relevant linguistic units, the relevant 
conceptual units, and the mappings between them. (p.106) 
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         Seeking for an explanation of how infants come to accomplish the puzzle of word-to-
world mapping, it has being suggested that infants may take particular advantage from the 
language sounds they hear, linking speech sounds to the objects they see (Baldwin & 
Markman, 1989).  Assuming that infants can hear words as units, and that they have object 
classes in their mind, they must realize that these phonetic packages are meant to "map to" 
objects in their environment.  
        But how do the sounds of language map to the world? As mentioned by Baldwin & 
Markman (1989), it has been assumed that ostensive definition plays a critical role in helping 
young infants discover the reference of object labels.  In this case, ostensive definition 
includes at least two components: (1) some way of nonverbal indication of a direction such as 
pointing to an object, and (2) naming an object.  As it has been suggested, these components 
may provide information which could help infants to figure out the reference of object labels.   
         In order to investigate whether infants in their early phase of language acquisition  tend 
to treat language as related to things in the world, Baldwin & Markman (1989) developed a 
study with 10-to-14-months-old infants. They assumed that infants should pay more attention 
to objects when those were accompanied by words (labels).  Thus, if infants attend more to 
objects when labeling occurs, it would help explaining  how they start establishing the first 
word-object relations – connecting the sound patterns they hear (words) to objects they see in 
the environment.   
         To test this hypothesis, the study conducted by Baldwin and Markman compared how 
long 10-to-14-months-old infants looked at unfamiliar toys when a labeling phrase 
accompanied their presentation, versus when no labeling phrase accompanied the presented 
objects.  It was found that infants attended longer to objects they were accompanied by 
labeling. Infants examined a given object longer when an adult offered them labeling phrases 
such “See the robot! It is a robot,” using natural intonation of adult speech to a child.  
         In a second study infants from two age groups were tested (10-to-14-month-olds and 17-
to-20-month-olds).  This study aimed to examine whether the presence of labeling phrases 
increased infants´ attention to objects compared to what pointing (which is also a 
nonlinguistic method of directing infants´ attention) could accomplish. The infants were first 
presented pairs of unfamiliar toys in two different situations: (1) a pointing condition alone, 
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where the experimenter pointed a number of times at one of the toys, and (2) a labeling plus 
pointing condition, where the experimenter labeled the toy while pointing to it.  
        Results have shown that infants looked an equal amount of time at the target object 
whether it was labeled or not, thus suggesting that pointing is a powerful method to direct 
infants´ attention to objects. However, in a subsequent play period, when no labeling phrases 
were applied, infants looked longer to the objects which had previously been labeled than at 
the ones that had not, thus suggesting that labeling has some lasting and attention enhancing 
effect. This tendency of language to sustain infants´ attention to objects may help them learn 
the connection between words and objects. 
        This issue was also investigated in a recent study conducted by Flom and Pick (2003). 
Studies developed by the authors suggested that within the second half of the first year of life 
infants begin to establish join attention by looking at the same direction as an adult through a 
pointing gesture or head motion. The infants´ first responsiveness to physical ostensive 
gestures may foster their later understanding of the relation between the words they hear to 
objects they see.  Thus, well before they start producing their very first words, infants may 
take particular advantage from the labels adults frequently offer to objects. In other words, 
infants begin figuring out the reference of labels when they notice that the sound patterns they 
hear people uttering are connected to things they see in the world. 
         After the infant recognizes the link between objects and labels, he/she must learn that a 
word refers to a class of objects and not only to the object specific to the particular event in 
which the word was learned. That is, the infant must take advantage of the economy and 
power of object labels.  
        As described in Chapter 3, Markman and colleagues (Markman, 1991; Markman & 
Hutchinson, 1984) offer a solution for the problem of word-to-world mapping which is based 
on principles which they called "constraints".  In spite of having opponents (e.g., Nelson, 
1988), this "principles approach" has become important because it reduces the number of 
possibilities which infants might use to find out the meaning that novel words may have.  
        It is important to note that the mapping problem is often considered to be one-way. That 
is, concepts are learned non-linguistically and then labeled by the child. However, mapping 
may be two-way, where language also influences the categorical organization that infants 
make. To put it in other words, it is suggested that a close interaction between language and 
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conceptual organization might exist influencing and facilitating one another (see Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1998). 
         Stated by Golinkoff and Hirsh-Pasek (1990), once the infant has learned the lexical 
mapping problem, the next part is the acquisition of rules to put words together.  Sentences 
are successions of words and the infants must learn that, just as words map to objects and 
object classes, sentences map to events and relation in the word.  
        Slobin (1985) has demonstrated that infants are more likely to pay attention to one word 
at a time in the input, usually the first or the last word. However, at some point the infant must 
realize that sentences are greater than the sum of its parts and usually map to a specific 
relation. For example, hearing a sentence such as "She is kissing the keys", infants must 
realize that it is not sufficient to look at the action of kissing and to the set of keys. Instead, 
the intention of sentences like this is to specify particular relations between the action of 
kissing and the set of keys.  
        In order to see whether infants go beyond word-by-word mapping, Hirsh-Pasek and 
Golinkoff (1987) tested 13-to-15-months-old infants. Described by Golinkoff and Hirsh-
Pasek (1990), the referred experiment used the preferential looking paradigm. In this study, 
infants were shown simultaneous videos of a woman kissing keys and holding a ball in the 
foreground and a woman kissing a ball and holding the keys in the foreground. When the 
infants heard the sentence "She is kissing the keys" they watched the video which contained 
the matching event significantly longer than the video which showed the non matching event. 
Although preliminary, this study suggests that besides mapping objects and object classes, 
language may be also mapped to events even before productive speech. 
          To summarize, the problem of language learning has been mostly stated as requiring 
world's  knowledge, segmenting the sound stream, and discovering the rules for the mapping 
that exist between these domains. The problem of language acquisition, however, still requires 
an explanation of how infants come to perform the mapping between the sounds and their 
corresponding meanings. 
         Searching for an alternative explanation for the problem of word mapping, Waxman 
(1999, 2003) developed an integrative possibility. She proposed that infants begin the process 
of word learning equipped with a broad expectation, linking words to commonalities among 
objects. This initially broad expectation is later fine-tuned in accordance with the form-to-
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meaning mappings which are realized in the native language under acquisition. Thus, the 
infant begins the process of language acquisition with a broad expectation regarding word-to-
world mappings and not as a tabula rasa without any a priori expectations to guide the 
process of acquisition (Smith, 1999). Some studies have being given growing evidence 
supporting this view. For example, a study conducted by Balaban & Waxman (1997) showed 
that novel words highlight commonalities among objects in 9-months-old infants, promoting 
also object categorization in 12-to-13-months old infants (Waxman & Markow, 1995). This 
early expectation seems to be supported by several domain-general principles as (1) a 
perceptual preference for listening to novel words over other kind of auditory stimuli and also 
(2) the ability to notice similarities and differences among objects. This broad initial link may 
serve at least three essential functions. First, as words direct attention to commonalities, this 
link facilitates the formation of a growing repertoire of object categories and concepts. 
Second, it supports infants´ first intention to establish symbolic reference, e.i., to establish a 
lexicon. And third, this initial broad expectation may set the stage for the evolution of more 
precise expectations linking particular grammar forms (e.g. nouns, adjectives) to types of 
relation among objects (e.g., object categories, object properties) in the language under 
acquisition. The next chapter will provide more evidence for this line of reasoning. 
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Chapter 6  
 
The effect of labelling and other kinds of auditory input on object 
categorization 
        Recent research suggests that the presence of object labels exert a powerful influence on 
infants’ object categorization (Waxman & Markow, 1995). In support for the assumption that 
language may shape conceptual understanding, recent studies suggest that infants may take 
particular advantage from words they hear, connecting them to stimuli or events they are 
referring to (Baldwin & Markman, 1989). But these finding have raised another question: Is 
language the only way to influence object categorization or may other sources of auditory 
input also exert influence on object categorization tasks? 
        In this chapter I will explore a number of studies which have been developed in order to 
answer these intriguing questions. 
          
6.1. How labelling objects may influence object categorization 
         Within their first years, infants develop capacities which are exclusively found in 
humans: they develop rich and flexible object categories, and they acquire language. In this 
context, the development of categories and the acquisition of language have separately been 
investigated over years (i.e. Fenson et al., 1994; Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Pauen, 
2002a; Quinn, Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993; Rosch et al., 1976). Recent research, however, 
has suggested the existence of close links between the development of language and category 
formation (Waxman & Markow, 1995; Balaban & Waxman, 1997).  
         In an attempt to find out how naming may influence object categorization, a number of 
experimental paradigms have been developed lately (Gopnick & Meltzoff, 1986; Waxman & 
Markow, 1995; Balaban & Waxman, 1997; Pauen, 2000; Booth & Waxman, 2002; Waxman 
& Braun, 2005). 
         Interestingly,  results of corresponding studies have showed that giving labels to objects 
during an experimental session promotes a general increase in attention to the target objects in 
11-months-old infants (Pauen, 2000), as well as object categorization in 12-to-13-month-olds 
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(Waxman & Markow, 1995) and in 9-months-old infants (Balaban & Waxman, 1997). Booth 
and Waxman (2002) demonstrated that as object names, the demonstration of objects' 
function is also salient to infants facilitating categorization in 14-and 18-month olds. 
         Evidence provided by Waxman and Markow (1995) suggests that novel words can serve 
as an invitation to form categories. The use of novel words during an object examination task 
is assumed to help infants to look for the properties that the objects labelled with the same 
word may share with each other. The authors tested infants at the one-word stage with some 
version of object-examination task. The task was basically the following: Infants received a 
set of four exemplars from one category (e.g., different looking animals), one at a time, 
presented only once each. These exemplars were little toy-models of real world objects that 
infants could play with one after the other for a certain amount of time. Following the 
familiarization phase, infants received a perceptually new exemplar from the already familiar 
category (e.g., a new animal) and a new exemplar from a contrasting category (e.g., a fruit) 
simultaneously. At test, if they spent more time examining the out-of-category exemplar it 
was taken as evidence for category discrimination (Figure 8 shows the design used by 
Waxman & Markow, 1995)                  
         In one of these studies, Waxman and Markow (1995) presented two higher-level 
contrasts: animals vs. vehicles and tools vs. animals, as well as two basic level contrasts: cars 
vs. airplanes, and cows vs. dinosaurs.  Each infant was encouraged to complete all four tasks. 
In the noun condition, the experimenter labelled the object repeatedly only in trial 1, 2, and 4. 
For example, "[Infants name]. Look, a (n) X!"  In the no word condition, the experimenter 
used the same short introductory phrase without labelling the object at the end. On 
familiarization trial 3, infants in both noun condition and no word condition were treated 
identically. The experimenter said, "[Infants name}. Look!"  This design insured that all 
infants were exposed to the introductory phrase used in the subsequent test trials (described 
below). 
         At test, two objects were presented simultaneously (one object from the familiar 
category and another from a contrasting category). This time, no label was offered. After the 
test pair was introduced, the experimenter placed the objects within the infants´ reach for 45 
seconds.  
         Infants participating in Experiment 1 ranged from 9 to 20 months (mean age: 13 
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months). Whereas performance in the basic-level task was at ceiling even in the no-labelling 
condition, infants in the label-condition showed improved categorization performance in the 
superordinate-level tasks. This finding supports the idea that words highlight commonalities 
among exemplars of the same category, facilitating category discrimination. Yet, in 
Experiment 2, when 12-months-old infants (range: 11; 9 to 13; 3 months) received objects 
that did not belong to the same category (neither basic-level nor superordinate-level), nouns 
did not influence infants’ behaviour with these random sets of stimuli. 
 
               Familiarization phase 
                   Familiarization Trial 1                                             Familiarization Trial 2 
                                                                   
                Noun: "See the fauna?"                                              Noun: "See the fauna?" 
                   Adjective: "See the faunish one?"                              Adjective: "See the faunish one?" 
                   No word: "See here?"                                                 No word: "See here?" 
 
               Familiarization Trial 3                                               Familiarization Trial 4 
                                                                    
                 "See what I have"                                            Noun: "See the fauna? 
                                                                                                      Adjective: "See the faunish one?" 
                                                                                                      No word: "See here?" 
                                                                                            
              Test phase 
                                                      Test Trial 
                                          
                                                 "See what I have"   
 
 Figure 8: Design of experiment from Waxman and Markow (1995) 
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         In a third Experiment, Waxman and Markow (1995) tested 12 month-olds (range: 11 
months, 0 days to 13 months, 7 days), using again two superordinate-level contrasts (animals 
vs. fruits; tools vs. vehicles) and two basic-level contrasts (cars vs. planes; horses vs. cats). 
Methods and procedures followed the previous study. The authors included one more 
labelling condition in which the experimenter identified the objects by using an adjective 
rather than a noun, saying: "[Infant name]. See a (n) X-ish one." This time, parents were also 
asked to complete a language inventory while infants were accomplishing the object-
examination tasks. Based on the questionnaire data, two vocabulary groups (high, low) were 
formed for word production. Whereas infants in the high vocabulary group profited from the 
labelling (noun, adjective) in the superordinate-level task, responses of infants in the low 
vocabulary group were less systematic. Kind of label (noun, adjective) did not have any effect 
on performance.  
        This set of findings suggests that infants who participate in an object-examination task 
can use words as an invitation to learn categories towards the end of the first year of life 
(especially if their language skills are well developed). However, it does not seem to be 
important if the verbal input is a noun or an adjective. 
        Extending these findings, Balaban and Waxman (1997) explored the effect of labelling 
on categorization performance in 9-months-old infants participating in a visual-preference 
task. In this study, infants were first familiarized with 9 single pictures of animals from the 
same basic-level category (rabbits or pigs) one after the other with a labelling phrase (e.g., "a 
rabbit") or a pure tone. In the word condition, six of the nine familiarization items were 
labelled during presentation. In a tone condition, a sound was presented instead of the word.  
During the test phase infants saw two pairs of pictures in succession. Each time, a new 
exemplar of the familiar category was presented together with a new object of a contrasting 
category.                                              
        Results revealed a general influence of auditory input in both conditions. Infants looked 
longer at pictures accompanied by auditory stimulation than at pictures without an auditory 
input, no matter if it was a word or a sound. However, effects on categorization performance 
were only found in the word condition. When dinosaurs (land animals) and birds (air animals) 
were contrasted in a follow-up study, these general findings were replicated. In a third study 
the authors presented pictures of dinosaurs and birds accompanied by words with degraded 
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phonetic information. In this way infants were impeded to understand the meaning of the 
word although it could be recognized as verbal input. Infants´ performance at test was 
comparable to the word condition. Based on these results, Balaban and Waxman (1997) 
concluded that at the age of 9 months categorization performance in a visual basic-level task 
can be influenced by verbal input (this study will be recalled further in this chapter). 
         Taken together, the above described studies suggest that language can have an important 
effect on categorization in the one-word stage. Object names and adjectives do highlight 
commonalities among objects. These commonalities seem to help infants parsing objects into 
meaningful categories. For example, infants pay more attention to category relevant 
similarities when objects are labelled than if no label is provided (Waxman & Markow, 1995). 
It suggests a strong interaction between cognitive and linguistic development, supporting also 
the idea that language may shape conceptual understanding. Moreover, even before infants 
are able to speak, their ability to comprehend object names may support predictions about 
what objects will be found in the world when a specific name is heard.  Labelling objects may 
also make infants look for non-obvious properties of category members which share the same 
name.  
 
6.2. Object categorization and auditory input: labels versus other sources of 
auditory stimulus 
          Given evidence that labelling can have powerful influence on category formation, an 
important question raised is whether this influence can be exclusively applied to object labels 
(and object functions) or also to other kinds of auditory input.  
          The question of whether labelling as well as other kinds of auditory input exert the 
same influence on infants' categorization has been examined by recent researches (Balaban & 
Waxman, 1997; Fulkerson & Haaf, 2003). 
          In attempt to answer this question, Balaban and Waxman (1997) tested 9-months-old 
infants with a visual-preference task.  In this study the authors compared the effect of word 
phrases and tone sequences on infants' categorization.  
         During familiarization, infants were presented a series of nine pictures from the same 
basic-level category (e.g., rabbits or pigs). Three of the nine familiarization slides were 
presented in silence, while the remaining six familiarization slides were presented in 
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conjunction with an auditory stimulus.  Infants assigned to the Word condition viewed six 
familiarization slides accompanied by the corresponding word phrase (e.g. "a rabbit" or "a 
pig"). In the Tone condition, those six slides were presented in conjunction with a tone 
sequence. During test, infants were presented to two pairs of slides in succession: each time a 
new member from the familiar category (e.g. another rabbit) and a new member of the 
contrasting basic-level category (e.g. a pig) were presented together. 
        The results indicate a general influence of auditory stimulus on visual attention, and, 
more specifically, influence of words on infants' performance. During familiarization, infants 
revealed to pay more attention to the slides accompanied by auditory stimulus than on silent 
trials, no matter if it was a word phrase or a tone sequence. At test, the performance of infants 
assigned to the Word and Tone condition differed, however: effects on category 
discrimination were only found in infants assigned to the word condition.  In a follow-up 
study, when dinosaurs were contrasted with birds, the same general pattern of results was 
found. 
        In a third study, the authors presented again the basic-level contrast dinosaurs and birds. 
This time they included a new condition where slides were accompanied by words with 
degraded phonetic information. Results of this study replicated the effects found in the earlier 
experiments for the Word as well as the Tone condition.  The results for the Content-Filtered 
Word condition resembled the results for the Word condition in the sense that in the Content-
Filtered Word demonstrated significantly greater attention to object in the novel category (at 
test).  
        This pattern of results suggests that word phrases influence object categorization in 
infants as young as 9-months of age. Importantly, the same kind of influence could not be 
found when a tone sequence was used. These results are consistent with previous studies 
(Waxman & Markow, 1995) which also document a facilitative effect of novel words on 
categorization at the superordinate-level in older infants. 
        Also attempting to find out whether different kinds of auditory input may influence 
object categorization, Fulkerson and Haaf (2003) developed a set of experiments with 9-and-
15-months-old infants, using an object-examination task. In this study each infant was 
assigned to two tasks: one basic-level task (e.g., horses vs. giraffes or airplanes vs. trucks) and 
one global-level task (e.g., animals vs. vehicles), but only to one of three conditions: label, 
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non-labelling sound, no sound condition. 
        During familiarization, infants were presented three objects from a specific category 
twice. Each trial lasted a total of 30 seconds.  At test, two 30-sec trials immediately followed 
familiarization phase. On one test trial, a new member from the already familiar category was 
presented; on the other, a novel category exemplar was presented.  The order of the test trials 
was crossed with age, sound condition, order of category level, order of auditory source, and 
pair of stimulus sets which infants received. 
        In the label condition, familiarization items were presented with the labelling phrase  
"Look at the bicket!" on one task,  or " Look at the toma!" on the other. In the non-labelling 
sound condition familiarization items were introduced with repetitive mouth sounds on one 
task, or a five-note melody on the other. Auditory source was manipulated within subjects. 
For infants in the label and non-labelling sound conditions the auditory stimulus for one 
problem was presented orally by the experimenter, and played on a voice recorder for the 
other. In the no sound condition, familiarization items were introduced without any added 
sound. At test, the experimenter placed the object on the table in front of the infant without 
presenting any additional auditory stimulus. 
         Reported results demonstrate that labelling phrases helped infants categorize objects at 
the global but not at basic-level relative to non-labelling sounds and no sound condition. That 
is, infants at both ages only demonstrated global category discrimination when objects were 
introduced with a labelling phrase.  In addition, results showed that the effect of labelling on 
infants' global categorization was also influenced by the sensitivity to the source of auditory 
input, which seems to become more restricted with age. This finding was particularly apparent 
on the global-level task. Nine-month-olds demonstrated global categorization when objects 
when presented with a labelling phrase, no matter whether auditory input was presented orally 
by the experimenter or played on a recorder. At the same time, 15-months-old infants only 
demonstrated global categorization when objects were labelled by the experimenter.  
        These studies replicate results from previous research in the sense that global 
categorization was particularly influenced by the presence of object labels. However, it differs 
from previous studies in the sense that the same facilitative effect of labels was not found at 
the basic-level. In the current study, 9-and 15-months-old infants categorized the stimuli at the 
basic-level regardless of sound or auditory source condition. To remind the reader, Balaban 
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and Waxman (1997) found a facilitative effect of labelling in 9-month-olds object 
categorization when the basic-level categories pigs and rabbits were contrasted.  An 
explanation for this discrepancy in results was offered by Fulkerson and Haaf (2003). 
According to these authors, the nature of the stimuli may provide a partial answer for this 
problem. While Balaban and Waxman used two-dimensional line-draw stimuli, the study 
conducted by Fulkerson and Haaf used three-dimensional objects. In this case, the greater 
perceptual details offered by 3D objects may facilitate category discrimination. It would at 
least partially explain why basic-level categorization may have been easier to detect in their 
study than it was in Balaban and Waxman's study.  
         In addition, an important issue raised by this study is what characteristics of labelling 
phrases underlie their facilitative effect. One possibility is that the observed influence of 
labels on infants' categorization is due to the presence of speech sounds, more specifically, 
infant-directed speech sounds.  However, if the effect of labelling on categorization was due 
to the presence of speech sounds, non-labelling repetitive mouth sounds should lead to the 
same effects as the labelling phrases. It was not the case, however. Results on the global 
problem did not offer any evidence of categorization in the presence of non-labelling 
repetitive mouth sounds at 9 or 15 months. Therefore, the authors speculated that the effect of 
labelling phrases on 15-month-olds performance observed in this study might be attributed 
particularly to the presence of verbal label.  The performance of 9-month-olds in this study 
does not make it possible to speculate on the relative roles of verbal labels or language in 
general in this age group. But at 15 months of age, the influence of linguistic input on 
categorization seems to become specific to the presence of verbal labels. Further studies 
would be important to clarify what characteristics of labelling phrases may account for their 
facilitative effect on categorization at different ages. Reported results demonstrate a general 
influence of auditory input on visual attention, if compared to control condition (no auditory 
stimulus). However, categorization pattern was only influenced by the presence of words, 
suggesting that words can serve as invitation to form categories. 
         Taken together, the reported findings suggest that language and cognition might go hand 
in hand in development. Moreover, this relation might be bidirectional, as suggested by 
Gopnick and Meltzoff (1986). Following their specificity hypothesis, the attainment of 
preverbal object concepts might motivate infants to acquire words by paying attention to the 
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verbal input presented together with a given stimulus. At the same time, the use of particular 
words may direct infants' attention to different aspects of a given stimulus, therefore 
providing conceptual understanding. For example, the use of similar labels may direct infants’ 
attention to commonalities which objects may share, whereas the use of different labels may 
highlight differences among objects.  
          It should be noted, however, that previous research using either the visual-preference 
technique or the object examination task suggested that global-level categorization is acquired 
at an earlier age than basic-level categorization (Mandler & McDonough, 1998; Pauen, 
2002a; Quinn & Johnson, 2000). In contrast to this finding, the evidence reported above 
suggests that basic-level categorization is good even without the help of language input 
whereas global-level categorization can be enhanced when objects are being labelled.  In the 
context of studies using the object examination technique (Waxman & Markow, 1995; 
Fulkerson & Haaf, 2003), this may have to do with the fact that the global categories were  
represented by a reduced number of familiarization items before the start of the test-phase:  
Fulkerson and Haaf presented three different looking exemplars twice, and Waxman and 
Markow presented four category members only once. Previous studies used at least four items 
presented twice. Without any instruction, it seems rather difficult to understand that this is a 
categorization game. This may explain why language had a facilitating effect under these 
circumstances.  
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Chapter 7  
 
Experiment 1 
Does labelling influence 7-month-olds object categorization? 
        A number of studies have demonstrated infants' ability for category discrimination at 
different ages (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Quinn, Eimas & Rosenkrantz, 1993; 
Quinn & Eimas, 1996; Quinn & Johnson, 2000; Pauen, 2002a).  
        The current literature reveals that infants participating in a visual preference task 
typically show a global-to-basic level shift between 2 and 3 months of age (Quinn & Johnson, 
2001). Infants participating in object examination tasks show the same kind of shift between 
the age of 7 and 12 months (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998; Pauen, 2002a). 
        Using an Object Examination Task, Mandler and McDonough (1993) found that around 
the age of 7 months infants begin to discriminate animals from vehicles.  At the age of 9-and-
11-months this ability seems to be pretty robust. Although global categorization was 
successfully accomplished during the second half of the first year of life, performance in 
basic-level categorization tasks with each domain was less consistent. Infants demonstrated 
no category discrimination when presented with the basic-level contrast dogs versus rabbits or 
dogs versus fish that look rather different from each other. At the same time, birds and 
airplanes were treated as different even though the between-category similarity was high. 
        Further studies conducted by the same authors point to similar conclusions. Mandler and 
McDonough (1998) found that 7-to-11-months infants successfully accomplished the task 
when the global domains of animals, vehicles and furniture were contrasted.  At the age of 11 
months infants did not discriminate the subcategory tables and chairs. Within the animal 
domain, 9-and-11-month-olds responded to the life-form distinction between dogs and birds, 
but did not differentiate dogs from cats until the age of 11 months. 
         In support for the assumption that infants perform a global-to-basic level shift in early 
categorization, Pauen (2002a) demonstrated that both 8-and-12-month-olds succeed when the 
categories animals and furniture were contrasted. Moreover, only 12-month-olds showed 
basic-level category discrimination when dogs and birds or chairs and tables were contrasted.  
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         Taken together, previous work suggests that infants undergo a global-to-basic-level 
shift.  While global category discrimination (e.g., animals, vehicles, furniture) is about to 
begin at the age of 7 months, basic-level discrimination (e.g., dogs, cats) starts towards the 
end of the first year of life. 
         In line with these findings, studies have demonstrated that naming objects during an 
experimental session promotes a general increase in attention to the target objects in 11-
months-old infants (Pauen, 2000) and promotes categorization performance in 12-to-13-
month-olds (Waxman & Markow, 1995). Particular effects of verbal input on category 
formation were also found by Balaban and Waxman (1997) in 9-months-old infants (see 
Chapter 6). Therefore, the use of verbal input seems to have powerful effects on 
categorization in the one-word stage. 
        Based on the findings described thus far, an interesting question can be raised: Does 
labeling at different levels of abstraction influence early category formation? Most studies 
investigating the effect of labelling on categorization tested infants at the one-word stage 
starting with 11 month olds (e.g., Waxman & Markow, 1995; Pauen, 2000). However, the 
current literature does not provide investigations about the effect of labels in object 
examination tasks at younger ages. To fill this gap, a set of studies was conducted testing the 
influence of language on 7-month-olds' categorization performance at the global level, using 
an object categorization task. It was chosen to test categorization at the global level because 
7-month-olds already show some awareness of this ability, but are not fully stable. Hence it 
will be interesting to see whether or not the labelling of objects may improve performance. As 
a first step, infants were tested in two conditions: (a) receiving basic labels, and (b) receiving 
global labels.  
        Differing from the procedure used by Waxman and Markow (1995), in the current set of 
studies a series of ten different looking exemplars from the same global category was 
presented during the familiarization phase. At test, one new exemplar from the familiar 
category (Test1) and one perceptually new exemplar of the contrasting category (Test2) were 
presented in sequence. Categorization was inferred by a longer examining time to the 
contrasting category member. 
            Given that language is suggested to sustain infants' attention to objects (Gopmik & 
Meltzoff, 1986) and has important effects on object categorization in the one- word stage 
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                       96       
(Waxman & Markow, 1995) we expect infants to respond in the following way:  
            Presenting 7-month-olds objects accompanied by basic-level labels (i.e., "turtle", 
"giraffe", "crocodile" "jeep", "oldtimer", "tractor") is a good way of drawing infants attention 
to differences among objects which belong to the same class. As suggested by Waxman 
(2003), applying unique names to unique individuals highlights their dissimilarities 
(perceptual or conceptual), thus providing means for tracing individual identity over time. 
Labeling each individual object differently should increase infants' interest in the stimuli and 
may thus keep a rather high level across all trials.  
           At the same time, presenting objects accompanied by a global-level label (i.e., "animal", 
"vehicle") is assumed to draw infants' attention to the similarities among the selection of 
familiarization stimuli and to the differences between both global domains. Waxman (2003) 
suggests that giving objects a common name, initiates a search for deeper and perhaps non 
obvious similarities among them, thus permitting rapid learning about categories.     
           Based on this line of thoughts, it was hypothesized that the use of basic-level labels will 
promote higher scores of examination time across all trials (i.e. familiarization and test trials). 
Consequently, infants may not respond with an increase in attention to the category change. 
At the same time, the use of global-level labels should promote a decrease in attention across 
the familiarization items because each familiarization exemplar will be labelled by the same 
name. As a consequence, higher scores in attention are expected in response to the novel 
category item presented at test because it will be accompanied by a new label. 
        In fact, naming objects at either the global or the basic level is expected to elicit different 
responses to the same set of stimuli depending on the level of abstraction of the labels: it 
should increase awareness of perceptual differences among exemplars in the basic-label 
condition whereas it should increase awareness of perceptual similarities among the 
familiarization stimuli and support category discrimination in the global-label condition.  By 
comparing infants' performance in both experimental groups, we hope to learn more about 
how the kind of verbal input given influences 7-month-olds object categorization. To 
investigate this issue, experiments 1a and 1b were conducted. 
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Experiment 1a 
          The main purpose of Experiment 1a was to investigate the effect of basic-level labels 
on 7-month-olds object categorization pattern by using the object examination task.  The 
categorical contrast was animals versus vehicles.  
 
 Method 
 Participants    
      Data collection took part in a medium-sized university town (Heidelberg) with a mixed 
socio-economic background. Infants’ names were obtained from birth records, and their 
families were contacted by letter. Parents received a certificate with their child’s photo for 
participation. A total of 35 infants took part in Experiment 1a (mean age = 7 months, 5 days; 
range: 7 months, 0 days to 7 months, 26 days). All the infants participating in this experiment 
came from a German speaking family. Sixteen additional infants were tested but excluded 
from the final sample due to the fact that did not meet criteria for participation (N= 14), due to 
fussiness (N= 1), or experimenter error (N= 1). The criteria for including subjects in the final 
sample were: 1) Infants participating in the labelling condition should necessarily have the 
German as the only spoken language; 2) Parents should not interact verbally or  play with the 
infants during the experimental session; 3) During the habituation phase infants should 
necessarily be looking at the objects when they were labeled in at least 8 trials; 4) During the 
test phase infants should be looking at the objects (t1, t2) when they were labelled. 
Stimuli 
       The stimuli consisted of 3-D realistic looking toy models representing the categories of 
animals and vehicles. They varied substantially in appearance within each given category. 
The animal category included a zebra, a rabbit, a hippo, a seal, a ladybird, a giraffe, a 
crocodile, an eagle, a fish, a fox, and a turtle. The category vehicle included an oldtimer, a 
motorcycle, a car, a motor home, an ambulance, a jeep, a scooter, a tractor, a deep loader 
truck, a fire truck, and a garbage truck. All objects were either made out of plastic or metal, 
and easily graspable by the infants (Figure 9 shows picture of the stimuli). 
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  Figure 9: Stimuli – realistic toy models of animals and vehicles 
 
 
Procedure 
        Infants were seated in a highchair at a table near their mothers or on the mothers' lap 
(only if necessary). The mother was asked to remain silent and did not interact with the child 
during the session. The experimenter presented each object within reach of the child for 20 
seconds. Infants were allowed to play freely with the given material. Trial duration was 
indicated by a small lamp lighting up on the wall behind the child. If an object fell to the 
floor, the experimenter quickly picket it up and placed it back on the table.   
        The method of assessment used was a modified object examination task which differs 
slightly from the classical OET. In the classical version, infants are presented four different 
exemplars from the same category twice (familiarization phase). At test, a new member from 
the familiar category is presented followed by a contrasting category exemplar.   In the 
modified OET version, which was used in the current experiments, infants were first 
presented ten different looking exemplars from a specific category (familiarization phase). At 
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test, a new exemplar from the familiar category was presented, followed by a contrasting 
category exemplar. Category discrimination was inferred when a longer examining time at the 
contrasting category member was perceived. The order of presentation, as well as the 
familiarization category (animal or vehicle), were counterbalanced within each group.   
         In this study the experimenter labelled each object when it was placed in front of the 
child. Following the introductory phrase: "Schau mal, was ich here fur Dich habe!  Ein X!" 
("Look what I have here for you! An X!"), each object was labelled by its appropriate basic-
level term (e.g., "Zebra", "Hase", "Nilpferd", "Robbe", "Kafer", "Giraffe", "Krokodil", 
"Adler", "Fisch", "Fuchs",  "Schildkrote" in the case of animals, and, "Oldtimer", "Motorrad", 
"Auto", "Wohnmobil", "Tieflader", "Krankenwagen", "Jeep", "Feuerwehrwagen", "Mofa", 
"Traktor", "Müllwagen" in the case of vehicles). Each object presented was hence labelled 
differently. 
 
Coding 
       Sessions were videotaped. The analysis of the video tape was carried out by two 
independent coders who had not been involved in the process of data collection. With the help 
of stop-watches they assessed the accumulated examination time for every trial. Examination 
is defined as a subset of looking time during which the infant focuses attention on the target 
and is involved in active information intake (Ruff, 1986; Oakes, Madole & Cohen, 1991). 
This state of attention is typically accompanied by a decrease in heart rate as compared to 
looking time (Elsner, Pauen & Jeschonek, 2006), thus indicating deep cognitive processing. If 
there was a difference of more than three seconds between the  examination time measures of 
the two coders for a given trial, this trial was discussed and coded separately again. For 
further analyses the standardized results from both coders were used as raw data. 
 
Results  
        Mean-coder reliability was high (r = .98), thus suggesting that examination duration was 
assessed with a high degree of objectivity.  
         To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
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(animal, vehicle) as independent variable, and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
        This analysis revealed a clear habituation effect F(1, 33) = 4.85, p < .05. Mean 
examination times decreased significantly from phase A to phase B. No significant interaction 
was revealed by this analysis.  
         When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable, infants showed a significant increase in examination duration from the last 
familiarization trial to the out of category item, F(1, 33) = 60.05, p < .05. The interaction 
between habituation condition and test trials was not significant. Table 2 reports the means 
and standard deviations for both habituation and test phase in any condition. 
 
Table 2 
 Means (in seconds) and standard deviations for both habituation (A, B) and test phase (t1, 
t2), separated by experimental condition (basic label, global label, no label). 
      __________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  Habituation Phase                                        Test Phase 
      __________________________________________________________________                                     
                                      Phase A                     Phase B                    Test 1                      Test 2 
                                           M             SD            M             SD            M            SD           M            SD 
      __________________________________________________________________ 
             Basic label         6.47          2.69          5.49          2.02          4.43          2.86        9.60          4.20 
             Global label       6.20          2.82          4.94          1.81          4.74          3.10        8.09          4.85 
             No label             5.22          2.30          5.04          3.35          5.16          4.22        7.01          4.70     
        ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Discussion       
         In a modified version of the object examination task contrasting toy models of animals 
and vehicles with the presence of basic-level labels, 7-month-olds showed both a significant 
habituation as well as significant categorization effect. For these infants, examination duration 
decreased significantly from familiarization phase A to phase B. Moreover, examination times 
also increased significantly across the test trials. 
        Habituation condition (animals, vehicles) did not have any impact on the results.  Both: 
infants familiarized with animals as well vehicles showed a comparable decrease in attention 
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from phase A to phase B. At test, the same general pattern of results was found.  The increase 
in attention to the contrasting category item was comparable for infants habituated with 
animals as with vehicles.   
        Contrary to our expectations, infants did not keep attention at a high level throughout the 
entire session, but rather showed the same pattern of responding as one would expect in a no-
labeling condition. Despite the fact that each item was labeled differently, they familiarized to 
the category and revealed category discrimination at test, thus suggesting that language input 
did not impede categorization performance. It should be noted, however, that a more elaborate 
discussion of the observed pattern of findings is only possible when the effect of basic-level 
labels can be compared to the effects of presenting each exemplar with its appropriate global-
level term. Experiment 1b addresses this issue. 
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                                           Experiment 1b  
        The main purpose of Experiment 1b was to investigate 7-month-olds performance in an 
object examination task using global-level labels. Results revealed by this task will allow a 
direct comparison of performance in both labeling conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants    
      As in Experiment 1a, data collection of infants participating in the global-label condition 
took part in Heidelberg.  The procedure for contacting parents was the same as in the previous 
experiment. Parents received a certificate with their child’s photo for participation. A total of 
35 infants took part in Experiment 1b (mean age = 7 months, 8 days; range: 7 months, 0 days 
to 7 months, 25 days). All the infants participating in this experiment came from a German 
speaking family. Twenty-two additional infants were tested but excluded from the final 
sample for not meeting the final sample's criteria for participation (N= 16), fussiness (N= 3), 
or experimenter error (N= 1).  
 
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding 
        As before, the stimuli consisted of 3-D realistic toy models representing the categories of 
animals and vehicles. The general procedure and coding were also the same, but in the global-
label condition the experimenter referred to the objects using their appropriated superordinate-
level label: "Tier" (animal) or "Fahrzeuge" (vehicle). Infants' interaction with the objects was 
video-taped and later analyzed off-line by two coders according to examination duration. 
 
Results  
         Mean-coder reliability was again very high (r = .97). Means of both coders for each trial 
served as raw data for further analyses. 
          To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
(animal, vehicle) as independent variable and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
         This analysis revealed a clear habituation effect F(1, 33) = 11.16, p < .05. Mean 
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examination times decrease significantly from phase A to phase B.  Results also revealed a 
main effect for habituation condition F(1,33) = 10.07 p < .05.  Infants familiarized with 
vehicles showed higher mean examination times in both phases of the familiarization period 
(MA= 7.49, SDA= 2.97; MB= 5.73, SDB= 2.18), than infants familiarized with animals (MA= 
4.98, SDA= 2.12; MB= 4.20, SDB= 1.16). No interaction was significant.  
         When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable, infants showed an increase in examination duration throughout the test phase F(1, 
33) = 15.21, p < .05.  No significant interaction between test trials and habituation condition 
were revealed by this analysis. See Table 2 for the mean examination times and standard 
deviation for both habituation and test phase. 
 
Basic versus Global-level labels 
         To find out whether the kind of verbal input given had any impact on infants' responses, 
performance of each labelling condition for familiarization and test phase were statistically 
compared.  
         To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
(animal, vehicle) and labelling condition (basic, global) as independent variables and 
habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable.  
        This analysis revealed a clear habituation effect, F(1,66) = 14.78, p < .05. Mean 
examination times decreased significantly from phase A (M= 6.34, SD= 2.75) to phase B (M= 
5.22, SD= 1.95). Results also revealed a main effect for habituation condition, F(1,66) = 7.86, 
p < .05. Infants familiarized with vehicles showed higher mean examination times in both 
phases of familiarization (MA=7.11, SDA= 2.93; MB= 5.79, SDB= 2.10), than infants 
familiarized with animals (MA= 5.61, SDA= 2.37;  MB= 4.68,  SDB= 1.67). No interaction was 
significant. 
          When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable, infants showed an increase in examination duration throughout the test phase F(1,66) 
=  61.55, p < .05. No interaction was significant.  
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Integrative discussion of results from Experiment 1a and 1b 
        Seven-month-olds participating in a modified OET, contrasting animals with vehicles, 
showed highly similar performance when the stimuli presented were accompanied by either 
global- or basic-level labels. This pattern of findings suggests that the kind of verbal input did 
not influence 7-month-olds responses, thus raising the question whether language has any 
impact on young infants' categorization at all. 
        Interestingly, previous studies testing same aged infants with a global animal-vehicle 
contrast demonstrated infants' ability to categorize, but failed to show familiarization effects 
(Mandler & McDonough, 1993). This comes as a surprise because Mandler and McDonough 
provided infants with only four different exemplars which they presented twice each. Hence, 
it should have been more likely that infants showed a familiarization response. One may 
speculate that providing labels to objects (no matter at which level of abstraction) may 
increase the general attention towards the given objects, and paying more attention may 
support the process of forming (or activating) a category during the experimental session. 
This interpretation would at least partially explain why infants participating in the current 
experiments (basic and global-level label) showed significant habituation while those 
participating in Mandler and McDonough's studies did not.  Alternatively, the reason for the 
presence of absence of habituation response may have to do with the specific selection of 
exemplars chosen to represent each category, or differences between German and American 
samples. To investigate which option seems more likely, one would have to compare 
performance in both labelling conditions with performance in a task that uses the same 
population and the same set of stimuli but presents each exemplar without any label. For this 
purpose, Experiment 1c was conducted. 
        Since the kind of language input (basic or global-label) did not influence the general 
pattern of results, both language groups were combined to form one "labelling condition". 
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Experiment 1c 
 
          Experiment 1c investigated 7-month-olds categorization performance in a global 
animal-vehicle object categorization task without the presence of any object labels.  
Comparing the results between Experiment 1a and 1b (combined) with Experiment 1c, it will 
be possible to directly test the impact of labelling on infants' general attention, familiarization 
and categorization responses.  
 
Method 
Participants 
       Infants participating in the no label condition were taken from a pool of more than 150 
infants who took part in a larger project located in Berlin (Germany). The criteria of selection 
of infants taken from this pool were gender and habituation condition, which both matched 
infants participating in the basic- and global-level label condition of Experiment 1a and 1b. A 
total of 35 infants took part in Experiment 1c (mean age = 7 months, 8 days; range: 6 months, 
25 days to 7 months, 29 days).  
 
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding 
        In Experiment 1c, infants were presented the same toy models as in the previous 
experiments. The procedure as well as the coding was also the same as previously described. 
In the no-label condition the objects (familiarization and test trials) were accompanied by an 
introductory phrase such as "Schau mal here!" ("Look here!) or "Schau mal was ich hier für 
Dich habe" ("Look what I have here for you!"). Hence infants received verbal input, as 
before, but the experimenter provided no labels for the given exemplars.  Infants' interaction 
with the objects was video-taped and later analyzed off-line by two coders according to 
examination duration. Hence, the procedure was highly comparable to that in Experiment 1a 
and 1b. 
 
Results  
         As before, mean-coder reliability was high (r = .96). To determine whether infants 
showed a familiarization response, the mean examination time for the first five trials (phase 
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A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and statistically compared, using a 
mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category (animal, vehicle) as independent 
variable, and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
        This analysis revealed no habituation effect F(1, 33) = .142,  p. > .05. No interaction with 
habituation condition was significant, either. 
        When object examination at test (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement variable, infants 
showed a significant increase in examination time from the new same-category item to the 
out-of-category exemplar  F(1, 33) = 5.00, p. < .05. The interaction between habituation 
condition and test trials was not significant, however. See Table 2 for the mean examination 
times and standard deviations for both habituation and test phase. 
 
Discussion 
        Similar to previous results obtained with a different version of the object examination 
task without labelling (Mandler & McDonough, 1993), 7-month-olds participating in 
Experiment 1c showed no habituation, but a significant categorization response. This result 
differs from the pattern of findings obtained in Experiment 1a and 1b. A full evaluation of the 
corresponding findings requires a direct statistical comparison between performance in the 
labelling and the non-labelling condition, however. 
 
Label versus No label condition 
         In order to find out whether labelling influences 7-month-olds categorization in any 
way, a comparison of infants' performance in the two conditions (no label, label) was 
conducted.  
        An analysis with mean examination duration during the habituation phase as dependent 
variable revealed an habituation effect F(1, 101) = 6,14, p < .05,  as well as a significant effect 
for habituation condition F(1, 101) = 5,59, p < .05. Mean examination times decrease from 
phase A (M= 5.97, SD= 2.65) to phase B (M= 5.16, SD= 2.49).  Higher  scores were  reached 
in  both phases when infants were  familiarized  with vehicles (MA= 6.55,  SDA= 2.96; MB= 
5.75,  SDB= 3.03) than when they were familiarized with animal items (MA= 5.41, SDA= 
2.20; MB= 4.60, SDB= 1.69). A marginally significant interaction between habituation phase 
and labelling condition was also observed, F(1, 101) = 3,29, p = .072, resulting from the fact 
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that infants tended to examine the objects longer in the labelling condition (MA= 6.34,  SDA= 
2.75; MB= 5.22,  SDB= 1.95), than in the non-labelling condition (MA= 5.22,  SDA= 2.30; 
MB= 5.04,  SDB= 3.35).     
        When object examination during test phase served as repeated measurement variable, the 
following results were observed: Infants showed a significant increase in attention across test 
trials F(1, 101) = 39,85, p < .05, thus indicating that both categories were discriminated. 
Furthermore, we found a significant interaction between test trial and labelling condition 
F(1,101) = 6,46, p < .05. This interaction can be explained by the fact that infants 
participating in both conditions did not differ significantly in the first test trial, t(103) = .816,    
p > .05, but those in the labelling condition showed a stronger categorization effect than 
infants in the non-labelling condition, t(103) = -1.93, p < .05. In addition, we also observed a 
two-way interaction between test-trial and familiarization condition, F(1, 101) = 4,11,  p < 
.05. Infants familiarized with animals showed stronger increase in attention from the first to 
the second test trial (Mt1= 4.33, SDt1= 2,74; Mt2= 8.64, SDt2= 4.52), than infants familiarized 
with vehicles (Mt1= 5.24,  SDt1= 4.00; Mt2= 7.82,  SDt2= 4.83).  
        Figure 10 shows the infants' general pattern of results during both habituation phase (A, 
B) and test phase (t1, t2), separated by the experimental condition (labelling, non-labelling). 
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Figure 10: Infants performance during the habituation (A, B) and test phase (t1, t2)  according 
to the experimental condition (label, no label). 
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Integrative discussion of results from Experiments 1a, 1b and 1c    
          The reported set of experiments shows an interesting pattern of results that allows some 
tentative conclusions about how labelling influences 7-month-olds categorization in an   
object examination task:  Infants participating in all three conditions (basic label, global label, 
no label) showed significant categorization when animals were contrasted with vehicles.  The 
current literature has demonstrated that the ability for global level distinction starts at the age 
of 7 months (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998). 
          Labelling had some effect on infants' habituation performance, as indicated by the fact 
that a familiarization response was only observed for those who received labels but not under 
control conditions (i.e. without labelling). Similar findings were obtained by Mandler and 
McDonough (1993), testing 7-month-olds without the presence of object labels. Hence, 
labelling may support the process of online-category formation even in young infants, as 
suggested by Balaban and Waxman (1995).       
         Labelling also influenced categorization performance. At test, the presence of object 
labels promoted a sharp increase in attention from test item 1 to test item 2 (see Figure 8). 
Despite the fact that this increase was also observed in the non-labelling condition, it was 
much weaker, as indicated by a significant interaction of test-trial and labelling condition.    
         Taken together, the reported set of findings is well in accord with the current literature 
in terms of showing infants' early emerging ability to categorize animals and vehicles in an 
object examination task. Furthermore, we have shown that labelling supports both, the 
process of familiarization as well as categorization at 7-months of age. Previous studies 
exploring the role of labelling for categorization performance tested slightly older infants (i.e. 
9-month-olds; see Balaban & Markow, 1997). Hence, the present series of experiments 
extends this conclusion to even younger infants. 
         Contrary to our original expectations, we did not find any impact of kind of label on 7-
month-olds' performance. More specifically, we had expected to find reduction of 
categorization response in the basic-label condition as compared to the global-label condition. 
The lack of corresponding findings may indicate that 7-month-olds do not yet understand that 
labels highlight either similarities or dissimilarities between exemplars of the same domain. 
Rather, they seem to look out for similarities among a given set of familiarization stimuli 
anyway. Language seems to support this process in a more general sense. This could change 
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with age, however. For example, it could be that infants show different responding in both 
language conditions as soon as they enter the stage of word learning (i.e. 10-12 months of 
age). To explore this possibility Experiment 2 was conducted. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Experiment 2 
Does labelling influence 11-month-olds object categorization? 
        Experiment 1 has demonstrated that labeling objects at different levels of abstraction 
does not influence the general pattern of categorization among 7-month-olds. To explore 
whether this pattern of findings changes with age, a new set of experiments will test the 
influence of labeling objects during an object examination task at the age of 11 months. 
Following up on the theoretical introduction to Experiment 1, we expect that the use of basic 
labels highlight dissimilarities among the familiarization stimuli, thus leading infants to show 
less strong familiarization effects and categorization responses. When global labels are being 
used, this should support the "natural" tendency of infants to look out for similarities among 
the given habituation stimuli and to detect category boundaries more easily.  
        Since infants are known to start learning basic-level categories as well as basic-level 
terms towards the end of the first year of life, we expect 11-month-olds to show a pattern of 
findings that varies systematically with the kind of labeling input (i.e. basic vs. global).     
        As before, we first report separate analyses for each labeling condition, before both sets 
of data will be analyzed together. 
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Experiment 2a 
          The main purpose of Experiment 2a was to investigate the effect of basic-level labels 
on 11-month-olds object categorization pattern by using the modified object examination task.   
 
 Method 
 Participants    
      Data collection took part in a medium-sized university town (Heidelberg) with a mixed 
socio-economic background. Infants’ names were obtained from birth records, and their 
families were contacted by letter. Parents received a certificate with their child’s photo for 
participation. A total of 26 infants took part in Experiment 2a (mean age = 11 months, 12 
days; range: 11 months, 0 days to 11 months, 29 days). All the infants participating in this 
experiment came from a German speaking family. Seven additional infants were tested but 
excluded from the final sample for not meeting the final sample's criteria for participation (N= 
5), fussiness (N= 1), or experimenter error (N= 1).  
 
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding 
        In this set of experiments, we used the same toy models as in the experiments conducted 
with 7-months-old infants.  Procedure and coding was also the same as in the previous set of 
experiments. In the basic-label condition, the experimenter named the objects using their 
appropriated basic-level label. For example, after the introductory phrase: "Schau mal was ich 
hier für Dich habe!" ("Look what I have here for you!"), each object was labelled by its 
individual name (e.g., "Zebra", "Hase", "Nilpferd", "Robbe", "Kafer", "Giraffe", "Krokodil", 
"Adler", "Fisch", "Fuchs",  "Schildkrote" in the case of animals, and, "Oldtimer", "Motorrad", 
"Auto", "Wohnmobil", "Tieflader", "Krankenwagen", "Jeep", "Feuerwehrwagen", "Mofa", 
"Traktor", "Müllwagen" in the case of vehicles). Infants' interaction with the objects was 
video-taped and later analyzed off-line by two coders according to examination duration. 
 
 Results  
        Mean-coder reliability was high (r = .97). Means of the measures obtained by both 
coders for each given trial were taken for further analysis. 
        To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
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time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
(animal, vehicle) as independent variable, and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
        This analysis revealed no significant decrease in examination duration across the 
habituation trials, F(1, 24) = .022,  p  > .05. No interaction was significant either. 
         When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable, infants showed a significant increase in examination duration throughout the test 
phase, F(1, 24) = 6.80, p < .05.  No interaction between habituation condition and test trials 
was significant, however. Table 3 reports the mean examination times and standard deviations 
for both habituation and test phase in any condition. 
 
Table 3 
 Means (in seconds) and standard deviations for both habituation (A, B) and test phase (t1, 
t2), separated by experimental condition (basic label, global label, no label). 
      __________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  Habituation Phase                                        Test Phase 
      __________________________________________________________________                                      
                                      Phase A                    Phase B                      Test 1                     Test 2 
                                           M             SD           M            SD             M            SD           M            SD 
      __________________________________________________________________ 
             Basic label         6.23          3.23          6.17          2.87          6.72         4.68          9.34        3.79      
             Global label      5.43           2.76          5.60          2.70          6.56         3.90          8.84        3.87   
             No label            4.48           2.32          4.52          2.69          3.56         3.15          6.41        5.14 
        ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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                                              Experiment 2b  
           Experiment 2b was conducted to investigate the effect of global-level labels on 11-
month-olds object categorization pattern.  Results obtained by this task will allow a direct 
comparison of infants' performance in a modified OET with the presence of basic and global-
labels conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants    
      As in Experiment 2a, data collection of infants participating in the global-label condition 
took part in Heidelberg. Infants’ names were also obtained from birth records, and their 
families were contacted by letter. Parents received a certificate with their child’s photo for 
participation. A total of 25 infants took part in Experiment 2b (mean age = 11 months, 11 
days; range: 11 months, 2 days to 11 months, 28 days). All the infants participating in this 
experiment came from a German speaking family. Five additional infants were tested but 
excluded from the final sample for not meeting the final sample's criteria for participation (N= 
4), or fussiness (N= 1).  
 
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding 
        In the current experiment infants were presented the same stimuli as previously. The 
general procedure as well as coding was also the same as before. In the global-label condition, 
the experimenter referred to the objects using their appropriated category label: "Tier" 
(animal) or "Fahrzeug" (vehicle). For example, after the introductory phrase: "Schau mal was 
ich hier fur Dich habe!" ("Look what I have here for you!"), each object was labelled by its 
appropriate global-level label (e.g., animal or vehicle). Infants' interaction with the objects 
was video-taped and later analyzed off-line by two coders according to examination duration. 
 
 Results  
        Mean-coder reliability was equally high as before (r = .97). Means of both coders for 
each trial served as raw data for further analyses. 
         To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
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statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
(animal, vehicle) as independent variable, and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
         This analysis revealed no significant habituation effect F(1, 23) = .067 p > .05, and no 
significant interaction.    
        When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable infants showed a significant  increase in examination duration throughout the test 
phase F(1, 23) = 4.45, p < .05. Again, no interaction between habituation condition and test 
trials was revealed. See Table 3 for the means and standard deviations for both habituation 
and test phase. 
 
Basic versus Global-level labels 
        To test whether the general pattern of results from the two language groups was really 
comparable, we conducted two separate analyses of variance with labelling condition (global, 
basic) as independent variables and either familiarization phase (A, B), or test-exemplar 
(same category, different category) as repeated measurement variable.      
          This analysis revealed no significant habituation effect, F(1,47) = .003, p > .05. No 
interaction was significant, either. 
          When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable, infants showed a clear increase in examination duration throughout the test phase,  
F(1,47) = 10.60, p < .05. Results also revealed a marginally significant main effect for 
habituation condition, F(1,47) = 3.15, p = .082. Examination duration was slightly higher for 
infants familiarized with animals (Mt1= 7.12,  SDt1 = 4.04;  Mt2= 10.14,  SDt2= 3.96) than 
for infants familiarized with vehicles (Mt1=6.14,  SDt1= 4.53;  Mt2= 8.01, SDt2= 3.36). No 
interaction was significant.  
          This analysis show that the kind of verbal input (basic or global label) did not influence 
the infants' general pattern of results..  
     
Integrative discussion of results from Experiment 2a and 2b   
         The findings reported for Experiment 2 are largely comparable to those of Experiment 1 
testing younger infants. More specifically we found that kind of labelling (global or basic) did 
not have any effect on infants' familiarization or categorization responses. Differing from 
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Experiment 1, no indication of a habituation response was found in 11-month-olds. It seems 
unlikely that infants suddenly "loose" their ability to look out for similarities among 
familiarization exemplars altogether. Rather, it may be the case that 11-month-olds have 
already started to pay special attention to perceptual differences between various basic-level 
exemplars, thus keeping attention at a high level throughout the habituation phase. 
Interestingly, this tendency to analyse exemplars at the perceptual level is not influenced by 
kind of labelling. 
        To further explore whether language has any impact on 11-month-olds' performance, 
both labelling groups will again be combined, and compared to a group of same-aged infants 
who did not receive any labels. 
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                                           Experiment 2c 
 
          Experiment 2c was conducted to investigate 11-month-olds categorization performance 
when animals and vehicles are contrasted without the presence of object labels.  Results 
obtained in this study will provide the opportunity to verify in what extend labelling objects at 
different levels of abstraction influence object categorization. 
 
Method 
Participants 
       As in the set of experiments conducted with 7-month-olds, infants participating in the no 
label condition were taken from a pool of more than 150 infants which took part in a larger 
project located in Berlin (Germany). The criteria of selection of infants taken from this pool 
were again gender and habituation condition, which necessarily matched infants participating 
in the basic and global-label condition. A total of 25 infants took part in Experiment 2c (mean 
age = 11 months, 6 days; range: 11 months, 0 days to 11 months, 29 days).  
 
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding 
        In Experiment 2c, stimuli as well as procedure and coding were the same as in 
Experiment 1c.  In the no-label condition the objects (familiarization and test trials) were 
accompanied by an introductory phrase (as described before) but no label was provided at the 
end.  Infants' interaction with the objects was video-taped and analyzed off-line by two 
independent coders. 
 
Results  
        As previously, mean-coder reliability was high (r = .96).  
        To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
(animal, vehicle) as independent variable and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
          Similar to infants participating in the basic and global-label conditions, infants 
participating in the current experiment revealed no habituation effect F(1, 23) = 0.19,  p > .05.  
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Habituation condition did not have any impact on the results.  
        When object examination during  test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable infants showed an increase in examination duration throughout the test trials F(1, 23) 
= 8.29, p < 0.5,  as  well  as  a  marginally  significant  main effect  for habituation condition, 
F(1, 23) = 3.93, p = .059. Higher scores were reached by infants familiarized with animals 
(Mt1 = 4.36, SDt1 = 2.95; Mt2 = 8.31, SDt2 = 5.88) than by infants familiarized with vehicles 
(Mt1 = 2.82,  SDt1 = 3.26; Mt2 = 4.67,  SDt2 = 3.79). See Table 3 for the means and standard 
deviations for both habituation and test phase. 
 
Label versus No Label condition 
         To investigate whether labelling influences 11-month-olds categorization in any way, 
infants' performance in the two conditions (label, no label) was compared. An analysis with 
mean examination duration during both habituation phases as dependent variable, and 
labelling condition as well as habituation condition (animals, vehicles) as independent 
variable,  revealed no habituation effect F(1, 72) = 0,30, p > .05, and a significant effect of 
labelling condition F(1, 72) = 5,09, p < .05.  Higher scores in examination duration were 
reached in both phases by infants participating in the label condition (MA= 5.84, SDA= 3.01; 
MB= 5.89, SDB= 2.77), than by infants participating in the no label condition (MA= 4.48,  
SDA= 2.32; MB= 4.52, SDB= 2.59). No other main effect or interaction was significant.  
       When object examination during test phase served as repeated measurement variable in 
the same kind of analysis, infants showed a significant increase in attention across the test 
trials, F(1, 72) = 18,04, p < .05. This analysis also revealed a significant effect for the 
labelling condition, F(1, 72) = 13,69, p. < .05, as well as for habituation condition, F(1,72) = 
7,41, p. < .05. Higher scores in examination duration were reached by infants participating in 
the labelling condition (Mt1= 6.64, SD= 4.27; Mt2= 9.09, SD= 3.80) than by infants 
participating in the no label condition (Mt1= 3.56,  SD= 3.15; Mt2= 6.41,  SD= 5.14). In 
addition, infants familiarized with animals examined the objects longer (Mt1= 6.25,  SD= 3.91; 
Mt2= 9.56, SD= 4.65) than those familiarized with vehicles (Mt1= 5.01,  SD= 4.39;  Mt2= 6.86, 
SD= 3.82). Figure 11 shows the means for both habituation and test phase according to 
experimental condition (label, no label). 
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Figure 11: Infants performance during the habituation (A, B) and test phase (t1, t2)  
according to the experimental condition (label, no label). 
 
 Discussion 
         Consistent with previous studies on category formation (Mandler & McDonough, 1993), 
11-month-olds participating in an object categorization task using no labels successfully 
discriminated animals from vehicles. Yet, during the familiarization phase no decrease in 
examination duration was observed.       
         During the test phase, we found a marginally significant effect for the habituation 
condition: higher scores on examination duration were reached by infants familiarized with 
animals than by infants familiarized with vehicles. Since this preference for animals was not 
observed during familiarization, it can not be argued that infants of the tested age-range show 
any general preference for either animals or vehicles. 
 
Integrative discussion of results from Experiments 2a, 2b and 2c  
        As younger infants participating in Experiment 1, 11-month-olds participating in a 
modified OET, contrasting animals and vehicles, showed no systematic difference depending 
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                     119      
on labels: Infants showed highly similar performance when the stimuli presented were 
accompanied by basic- or global labels. More specifically, basic-level labels did not impede 
categorization performance. This pattern of findings suggests that global-level categorization 
appears to be stable across age and not to be influenced strongly by language input.  
        Interestingly, previous studies testing same age-group infants with the global contrast 
animals vs. vehicles without the presence of language input, has demonstrated infants' ability 
for both, familiarization and categorization effect (Mandler & McDonough, 1993). 
Alternatively, the reason why infants participating in Mandler and McDonough's study 
showed a significant familiarization effect, and infants participating in our studies did not, 
may have to do with the kind of task: In our studies infants were provided with ten different 
category exemplars during familiarization, whereas Mandler and McDonough provided 
infants with only four different exemplars which were presented twice each. Therefore, it is 
more likely that infants show a significant familiarization effect. 
        The results obtained in our experiments may reflect a general developmental trend in 
terms of perceptual and conceptual fine-tuning with age: While older infants threat different 
familiarization exemplars as distinct, younger infants detect commonalities more easily. This 
developmental trend appears to explain why 11-month-olds did not show habituation effects 
in any condition. The presence of object labels did not have any significant impact of the 
results.  It should be noted, however, that categorization performance was not impeded by the 
absence of a habituation effect. This suggests that categorization responses may occur in the 
presence or absence of a habituation response, thus suggesting that category discrimination 
does not depend exclusively upon the process of abstracting similarities among the given 
familiarization stimuli online. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Experiment 3 
How about a basic-level task? Does labelling make the difference? 
         Experiment 1 and 2 have demonstrated that the presence of object labels did not 
influence 7-and-11-month-olds' general pattern of results when the global categories of 
animals and vehicles were contrasted.  
        Based on the results described so far, one may speculate that the presence of language 
input cannot influence the level of abstraction at which infants think about objects: Using an 
object examination task without the presence of object labels, infants of both age groups (7 
and 11 months) show the ability for global-category discrimination (Mandler & McDonough, 
1993, 1998). Our experiments replicated this finding, regardless of whether global-level or 
basic-level nouns accompanied the presentation of a given set of stimuli. Thus, given objects 
labels during the experimental session did not influence infants' general categorization 
performance in a global-level task.  
        These results lead us to raise an interesting question:  Does labelling objects influence 
categorization when category performance is not yet at ceiling? Would basic-level terms 
facilitate basic-level categorization at an age when infants have not yet finished the global-to-
basic-level shift? To answer this question, we chose to test 11-month-olds' basic-level 
categorization performance when cars and trucks are contrasted without the presence of verbal 
input.  In case no significant categorization pattern will be found, it will be interesting to see 
whether or not labelling objects may improve basic-level categorization performance at the 
one-word stage. 
        To begin, a "no labelling" condition was conducted.  As in Experiment 1 and 2, we used 
a modified object categorization task. Experiment 3a addresses this issue. 
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Experiment 3a 
         The main purpose of Experiment 3a was to investigate infants' categorization 
performance when the basic-level categories cars and trucks are contrasted without the 
presence of object labels. 
  
Method 
Participants 
     The data for this experiment was also collected in Heidelberg.  A total of 22 infants took 
part in Experiment 3a (mean age = 11 months, 9 days; range: 11 months, 0 days to 11 months, 
23 days). Seven additional infants were tested but excluded from the final sample for not 
meeting the final sample's criteria for participation (N= 3), fussiness (N= 3), or experimenter 
error (N= 1).  
Stimuli 
      The stimuli consisted of 3-D realistic looking toy models representing the basic-level 
categories "cars" and "trucks". They varied substantially in appearance within each given 
category.  The car category included eleven different looking cars. The category truck 
included eleven different looking trucks (Figure 12 shows picture of the stimuli). 
            
                        
 
                               
 
                        
   
                                    
   
  
 Figure 12: Stimuli – realistic toy models of cars and trucks 
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Procedure and coding 
        Procedure and coding was the same as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. As before, in 
the no label condition the experimenter used an introductory phrase such as "Schau mal was 
ich hier fur Dich habe!" ("Look what I have here for you!"), when the objects were placed in 
front of the child, but no object label was given at the end.  
 
Results  
        Mean-coder reliability was high (r = .96).  
        To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with habituation category 
(cars, trucks) as independent variable and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
        Infants participating in Experiment 3a revealed no habituation effect F(1, 20) = .007, p > 
.05. However, a main effect for habituation condition was observed, F(1, 20) = 5.19, p < .05.  
Higher scores in examination duration were reached for infants familiarized with trucks (MA= 
8.59, SDA= 3.56;  MB= 8.59,  SDB= 3.45), than for infants familiarized with cars (MA= 5.41,  
SDA= 2.94;  MB= 5.51,  SDB= 3.90).  No interaction was significant.    
        When object examination during test phase (t1, t2) served as repeated measurement 
variable, infants showed no significant increase in examination duration from the first to the 
second test item F(1, 20) = .003,  p  > .05. The interaction between habituation condition and 
test trial was also not significant. Table 4 reports the mean examination duration and standard 
deviations during both habituation and test phase in any condition. 
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Table 4 
 Means (in seconds) and standard deviations for both habituation (A, B) and test phase (t1, 
t2), separated by experimental condition  (no label, label). 
      __________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  Habituation Phase                                        Test Phase 
      __________________________________________________________________                                      
                                     Phase A                     Phase B                     Test 1                     Test 2 
                                          M             SD            M             SD            M            SD           M           SD 
      __________________________________________________________________ 
             No label            7,00           3,58          7,05          3,92          7,82          6,69        7,71         4,81 
 
             Label                 7,76          3,28           6,38          3,01         4,78          4,20        6,89         4,58 
        ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Discussion 
        In a modified version of the object categorization task contrasting toy models of cars and 
trucks without the presence of object labels, 11-months-old infants showed no significant 
habituation or a significant categorization effect. This set of findings is consistent with 
literature which has demonstrated that 11-month-olds' basic-level categorization is not yet 
fully stable (Mandler & McDonough, 1998). 
       During the familiarization phase, a significant effect for habituation condition was found: 
higher scores on examination duration were reached by infants habituated with trucks, than by 
infants habituated with cars. At test, no such preference was observed, however.  
      To find out whether labelling objects during the experimental session influences 11-
month-olds' performance in a basic-level task, Experiment 3b was conducted.  
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Experiment 3b 
       The purpose of Experiment 3b was to explore the effect of objects labels when the basic-
level categories cars and trucks are contrasted. Results obtained by this experiment will allow 
a direct comparison between infants' performance in the two conditions (no labelling, 
labelling). These results are expected to tell us whether the presence of object labels influence 
11-month-olds' categorization performance in a basic-level task. 
 
 Method 
Participants 
      A total of 22 infants from the same population as in Experiment 3a took part in 
Experiment 3b (mean age = 11 months, 12 days; range: 11 months, 0 days to 11 months, 27 
days). All the infants participating in the label condition came from a German speaking 
family. Four additional infants were tested but excluded from the final sample because they 
did not meet the final sample's criteria for participation (N= 3), or fussiness (N= 1).  
 
Stimuli, Procedure and Coding 
        Stimuli, procedure and coding were the same as before. In the labelling condition,  the 
experimenter named each object when it was placed in front of the infant, using the German 
phrase: “Schau mal was ich hier für Dich habe: Ein X!” (“Look, what I have for you, an X!”). 
Familiarization trials and test trial 1 (new exemplar from the familiar category) were 
accompanied by the same global-level label: "Auto" (car) or "Laster" (truck) which 
represented the basic-level category that the infant had been familiarized with. Test trial 2 
(new exemplar from the contrasting category) was accompanied by the global-level label 
which represented the contrasting category class.    
 
Results  
        Mean-coder reliability was again high (r = .98). As in the previous experiments, means of 
both coders served as raw data for further analysis. 
        To determine whether infants showed a familiarization response, the mean examination 
time for the first five trials (phase A) and the second five trials (phase B) were calculated and 
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statistically compared, using a mixed-design analysis of variance with  habituation condition 
(cars, trucks) as independent variable and habituation phase (A, B) as dependent variable. 
       Corresponding analysis revealed a clear habituation effect, F(1, 20) = 5.81, p < .05,  as 
well as a significant interaction between habituation phase and familiarization condition F(1, 
20) = 5.77, p < .05. While examination times clearly decrease for infants familiarized with 
trucks (MA= 8.70,  SDA=3.25;  MB= 5.95, SDB= 3.05),  no decrease in examination duration 
was revealed by infants familiarized with cars (MA= 6.82,  SDA= 3.18;  MB= 6.82,  SDB= 
3.06) .   
       This analysis also showed a clear increase in examination times from test trial 1 (new 
object from the familiar category), to test trial 2 (novel category exemplar), F(1, 20) = 6.19, p < 
.05. A marginally significant interaction between test trial and habituation condition was also 
observed, F(1, 20) = 3.52, p = .075. While for infants familiarized with cars examination 
duration clearly increased across the test trials (Mt1= 4.33,  SDt1= 3.52;  Mt2= 8.04, SDt2= 
4.64), for infants familiarized with trucks only a slightly increase was observed (Mt1= 5.22,  
SDt1= 4.92;  Mt2= 5.74,  SDt2= 4.42).  See table 4 for the mean examination times and 
standard deviation during both habituation and test phase. 
 
Discussion 
        In Experiment 3b we found that 11-month-olds' participating in a basic-level task 
contrasting cars and trucks show a clear habituation, as well as significant categorization 
effect. 
          The reported results also revealed a significant interaction between habituation phase 
and familiarization condition: while infants familiarized with trucks showed a clear decrease 
in examination duration from phase A to phase B, infants familiarized with cars showed 
comparable examination times in both habituation phases.  At test, we found a marginally 
significant interaction between test trial and familiarization condition: while examination 
duration across test trials clearly increased for infants familiarized with cars, such increase 
was less salient for infants familiarized with trucks. 
        Given that infants participating in a similar task without the presence of labels failed to 
show habituation as well as categorization effect, one may conclude that labelling objects 
supports basic-level categorization at the age of 11 months when cars and trucks are 
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contrasted. Figure 13 shows infants' performance during the habituation phases (A, B) as well 
as during test phases (t1, t2), separated by experimental condition (labelling, no labelling). 
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Figure 13: Infants' performance during habituation (A, B) and test phase (t1, t2) according to 
the experimental condition (label, no label) 
 
Label versus No Label condition 
        In order to find out whether labelling influences 11-month-olds’ object categorization in 
a basic level task, infants’ performance in the two experimental conditions (no label, label) 
were statistically compared.  
        An  analysis of variance  with mean examination duration during both habituation phases 
as dependent variable, and experimental condition (no label, label) as well as habituation 
condition (cars, trucks) as independent variable, revealed no habituation effect F(1, 40) = 
2,27, p > .05, as well as marginally significant effect for habituation condition F(1, 40) = 3,96, 
p = 0.53. Higher scores in examination duration were reached for infants familiarized with 
trucks (MA= 8.65, SDA= 3.32; MB= 7.27, SDB= 3.45), than in infants familiarized with 
vehicles (MB= 6.12,  SDB= 3.07;  MB= 6.16,  SDB= 3.48). Results also revealed a marginally 
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significant interaction between habituation phase and familiarization condition F(1, 40) = 
3.14, p = 0.84. While for infants familiarized with trucks examination duration slightly 
decreased from phase A (M= 8.65,  SD= 3.32), to phase B (M= 7.27,  SD= 3.45), no decrease 
in examination times were observed for infants familiarized with cars (MA= 6.12,  SDA= 
3.07;  MB= 6.16, SDB= 3.48). In addition, a marginally significant interaction was observed 
between habituation phase and labelling condition F(1, 40) = 3.15, p = 0.84. While infants 
participating in the non-labelling condition revealed no decrease in examination duration from 
phase A (M= 7.00, SD= 3.58)  to phase B (M= 7.05, SD= 3.92), infants participating in the 
labelling condition showed a slightly decrease in examination  from habituation phase A (M= 
7.76,  SD= 3.28 ) to habituation phase B (M= 6.38,   SD=  3.01).  
             This analysis also showed no increase in examination times from test trial 1 (new 
object from the familiar category), to test trial 2 (novel category exemplar), F(1, 40) = p > .05. 
No interaction was significant. See session General Discussion for a discussion on these 
results. 
       
Integrative discussion of results from Experiment 3a and 3b 
        Experiment 3a and 3b revealed that 11-month-olds' performance in an object 
examination task contrasting cars and trucks varied systematically with the presence of 
language input: While infants participating in a basic-level task without the presence of labels 
failed to show habituation and categorization effect, infants participating in the labelling 
condition successfully accomplished the task. 
        The reported results suggest that presenting objects the same label during the 
familiarization period might have drawn infants attention to the similarities among objects 
which belong to the same class, thus promoting a habituation effect. As a consequence, a 
significant increase in attention was observed when the contrasting category exemplar was 
presented accompanied by a new label.  
        This pattern of findings suggests that the presence of labels can support object 
categorization when infants do not yet make a corresponding distinction spontaneously.  This 
result is in accord with the literature suggesting that the use of certain words may direct 
infants' attention to specific aspects of given stimulus, providing the opportunity to increase 
conceptual understanding (Waxman & Markow, 1995). According to Waxman and Markow, 
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words can serve as invitations to form categories because it may help infants to look for the 
similarities that the objects labelled with the same word may share. 
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Chapter 10 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
           The current set of experiments explored whether the presence of object labels at 
different levels of abstraction influence infants' categorical thinking in preverbal age through 
an object examination task. 
          As discussed earlier (see Chapter 6), previous studies have suggested that words have a 
facilitative effect in 12-to-13-month olds’ object categorization (Waxman & Markow, 1995) 
and also in 9-month-olds (Balaban & Waxman, 1997). Importantly, these studies were mostly 
concerned to show the influence of verbal input (i.e. words) in infants’ object categorization, 
but failed to clarify what kind of verbal input is important for categorization. The current set 
of experiments goes a step further, investigating what kind of object labels have an effect  on 
object categorization at particular age groups.  
          Interestingly, results revealed that when the categorization performance is already at 
ceiling, the presence of object labels (no matter at what level of abstraction) does not change 
infants’ categorization abilities. In addition, labels seem to be most effective if infants are  
about to learn the given category, suggesting that it is important to present infants the correct 
level of categorical contrast with the language input. The following paragraphs will discuss 
these general results in detail. 
          Contrary to our initial hypothesis, the reported findings suggest that the kind of label 
used during the experimental session (basic-level label, global-level label) does not influence 
7-and-11-month olds' categorization ability when the global categories vehicles and animals 
are contrasted. Previous research has demonstrated infants' ability to discriminate animals and 
vehicles as different domains when the stimuli were presented without the presence of object 
labels (Mandler & McDonough, 1993, 1998). Our experiments replicated these findings. The 
presence of basic or global labels did not influence this general ability, however. This set of 
results shows that categorization is not influenced by the presence of object labels (no matter 
at what level of abstraction) when infants have the ability to categorize spontaneously (i.e. 
without the presence of object labels). This replicates earlier findings by Balaban and 
Waxman (1997). 
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         Interestingly, the effect of language input could be observed when the basic-level 
categories cars and trucks were contrasted: eleven-month olds participating in the no labelling 
condition failed to show a significant habituation as well as categorization effect, whereas 
infants who took part in the labelling condition successfully accomplished the task. This 
general pattern of findings suggest that the presence of  object labels influence categorization 
at preverbal age specially when the concepts are not yet at ceiling (a discussion on these 
results will be carried on further in this session).  
           In the studies conducted with 7-month olds (Experiment 1), labelling had some effect 
on infants' habituation as well as categorization responses: A significant habituation was only 
found in the presence of object labels (no matter if basic-or global level labels), suggesting 
that the presence of verbal input may increase infants' general attention towards the given 
objects, thus promoting habituation. Despite of that, infants' performance on the basic and 
global label condition were statistically comparable. In addition, labelling also had some 
effect on infants' categorization performance: although both groups (labelling, no labelling) 
showed a significant categorization pattern, a sharp increase in attention across the test trials 
was observed in the labelling condition only, suggesting that the presence of object labels 
support 7-month-olds' object categorization. 
           The results observed in the 11-month-olds (Experiment 2), are largely comparable to 
the ones from 7-month-olds (Experiment 1).  More specifically, the kind of labelling (basic 
label, global label) did not have any impact on categorization results. Contrasting the results 
revealed by the younger infants, no habituation response was found in 11-month olds in any 
condition. As discussed earlier, one possible interpretation is that 11-month olds might be 
particularly interested in the perceptual differences between members of a given category. As 
a result, a high level of focused attention is kept throughout the habituation phase. 
Interestingly, this general tendency seems not to be influenced by the presence of language 
input. Whereas the presence of basic-or global labels did not influence infants' categorization 
or habituation performance, responses clearly differed between labelling and no labelling 
condition. Objects presented were examined longer when labeled verbally, no matter if the 
labels were at the basic-or global level of abstraction. Previous studies report similar findings 
(Pauen, 2000). In the set of studies conducted by Pauen, same age-group infants were 
presented the global categories of animals and furniture in three conditions: (1) with basic-
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level labels, (2) with global-level labels, and (3) no labelling. Whereas objects were examined 
longer in the presence of labels, the kind of verbal input did not influence results. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that language increases general attention for objects at the age 
of 11 months. 
         The results from Experiment 3, indicating a facilitative effect of words on categorization 
are consistent with previous work suggesting that words can serve as invitation to learn 
categories (Waxman & Markow, 1995). Like in the current studies, Waxman and Markow 
argue for a facilitative effect of labels on infants' categorization. According to the authors, the 
presence of object labels may help infants to look for the properties that objects labelled with 
the same word may share with each other. The fact that the interaction does not get significant 
when results of the two experimental conditions (no label, label) are compared should not be 
evaluated too high. First of all, because of the size of the sample which is quit small (11 
infants in each familiarization condition), and therefore the variance may be too high and the 
values not strong enough to find significant results. Another factor is that there is lots of 
variance due to the habituation condition. For example, the means that are seen in the graphs 
(see Figure 13), mostly reflect what infants in the truck condition do, so it could be also that it 
indicates that infants at this age are really busy with understanding this category, and 
therefore pick up the label.  Anyway, more studies are needed to clarify this issue.  
Importantly, this set of data suggests that many aspects may influence the effects of language 
in infants’ categorization and it is very important to take into consideration which exemplars 
and what categorical contrast is used being difficult to make generalizations overall. 
        One interesting difference between the reported results and those of previous studies 
conducted by Waxman & Markow (1995) concerns the level of abstraction at which labelling 
exerts some effect. In the present case, the presence of object labels influenced 11-month-olds 
object categorization at the basic-level. To remind the reader, the present experiments did not 
find habituation and categorization patterns at the basic-level in the no labelling condition, but 
did indeed find it in the presence of object labels. The pattern of findings from the no 
labelling condition is supported by the literature that shows that basic-level categorization 
starts at about the age of 11-months although not yet fully stable (Mandler & McDonough, 
1993, 1998). In previous studies, labelling influenced 12-to-13-month olds global-level 
categorization. As global-level categorization is demonstrated to be stable in this age-group 
 
How labelling objects at different levels of abstraction influence object categorization                                     132 
(Pauen, 2002a), the fact that 12-to-13-month olds did not show categorizationin  the control 
condition (i.e. no labelling) but did in the experimental condition (i.e. superordinate-level 
label) may have to do with methodological issues. While the current studies presented ten 
different looking exemplars during the familiarization phase, providing infants the 
opportunity to habituate to the referred category, previous studies conducted by Waxman and 
Markow only used four items presented once. Thus, it seems quite likely that the reduced 
number of familiarization items presented only once and without any instruction (i.e. control 
condition), did not provide infants the opportunity to build the referred category in mind and 
understand that this is a categorization game. Therefore, the use of object labels at the 
superordinate-level may have helped infants to search for the commonalities among the set of 
stimuli, promoting a categorization response. In fact, the reason why basic-level 
categorization was observed in Waxman and Markow's studies in any condition, might be 
explained by the fact that perceptual similarities are quite high among a set of basic- level 
stimuli, making it easier for infants to recognize the out-of-category item. Like in our studies, 
the presence of object labels did not influence results when categorization was already at 
ceiling. 
           Altogether one can see that the findings described in this dissertation seems to vote for 
the specificity hypothesis (Gopnick & Meltzoff, 1986, 1998) and provide an important piece 
of the puzzle of how infants come to understand that words map onto concepts. As previously 
postulated by Gopnick and Meltzoff,  the interaction between labelling and categorization 
seems to be bidirectional: at the same time that the presence of object labels may influence 
categorization, the attainment of object concepts (categories) is suggested to influence infants’ 
ability to understand words and to pick up on words. 
         Taken together, the closing point seems quite simple: words can serve as invitations for 
infants to form categories, suggesting that labels can increase conceptual understanding 
especially when the conceptual understanding is not yet at ceiling. On the other hand, a more 
conclusive statement about the influence labelling exerted in the performance of infants 
participating in Experiment 3 seems to require further investigations. It seems quite obvious 
that the presence of object labels in Experiment 3 made infants respond to the task in a 
different way than they otherwise do (i.e. no labelling condition). A question that remains 
open is the following: Was infants' categorization performance influenced by the simple fact 
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that a verbal label accompanied the objects, making infants pay more attention to the 
perceptual similarities and dissimilarities of objects, or the source of the verbal input (at the 
global level) played a crucial role? In order to clarify this issue, it would be necessary to 
conduct an additional study using the same stimuli and procedure as Experiment 3, but a 
basic-level label condition. By comparing infants' performance in both conditions, one could 
draw a more conclusive statement about the influence of object labels in this task. 
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